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Abstract
Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms
of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are
construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental
antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have
criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will
and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of
reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis
defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical
relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do
not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore,
no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those
alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-
explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal
alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it
provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation
between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I
defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-
causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the
standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action.
Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do
not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best
account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.
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1Introduction
This thesis defends what I call the standard-causal model of agency. In broad outline,
this theory construes intentional, rational and autonomous agency in terms of event-
causal processes that lead from the agent’s mental states and events to the
performance of an action. It assumes that actions are events, which are actions in
virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. The standard-
causal approach has a long history.1 But I shall restrict my considerations to recent
and contemporary analytical philosophy. In the nineteen fifties and sixties, the theory
was strongly criticised by many philosophers who were influenced by Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy and Ryle’s The Concept of Mind.2 It is generally agreed, though, that
Donald Davidson successfully rebutted all the major objections in his seminal paper
‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’.3
Why, then, is the standard-causal model in need of defence? There are several
things to say. The standard-causal model has been the predominant position in the
analytical philosophy of action and mind, which is to say that it is largely taken for
granted. However, throughout the history of philosophy one can find voices of
dissent.4 Given that, it is certainly interesting and worthwhile to question reigning
orthodoxy and to take a new look at the assumptions behind it and at the intuitions
that support it. However, the voices of dissent are not confined to times pre-analytical
philosophy or pre-Davidson. In fact, in recent and contemporary analytical
philosophy there is a trend towards alternative models of agency. I think we can
distinguish between the following three main reasons responsible for that trend.
                                                 
1 Alfred Mele claims that the idea that an agent’s mental states and events cause and causally explain
actions is ‘at least as old as Aristotle’: ‘the origin of action—its efficient not its final cause—is choice,
and choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end’ (Nichomachean Ethics, 1139a31-32).
Compare Mele, 2003, p. 38.
2 Compare Anscombe, 1957; Melden, 1961; and Taylor, 1966.
3 Davidson, 1963, reprinted in Davidson 1980, essay 1. G. F. Schueler, for instance, who is a
contemporary opponent of the standard-causal theory, acknowledges that Davidson ‘demolished’ the
early challenges to the standard-causal theory—especially the so-called logical connection argument.
Compare Schueler, 2003, p. 9.
4 There are, of course, numerous examples of philosophers who reject the approach to construe action
in terms of efficient- or event-causation for various reasons. Many contemporary opponents of the view
refer to Kant or Thomas Reid—or to Roderick Chisholm as an early opponent in the history of
analytical philosophy. And, ironically, opponents of the view may refer to Aristotle, just as its
proponents. In the Physics, for instance, Aristotle says that ‘a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a
hand, which is moved by a man’ (VII, 5, 256a, 6-8)—as opposed, of course, to being moved by some
state of or change in the man.
2Firstly, precise and compelling formulations of the so-called consequence
argument for incompatibilism about free will gained more and more weight in the
recent debate on free will.5 There is no straightforward connection to the question of
whether the standard-causal model of agency is true or tenable. But it is not very
difficult to see—as I will explain in chapters one and four—that the standard-causal
model cannot account for libertarian free will—that is, the variety of free will that is
incompatible with the thesis of causal determinism. Given that, it is only
understandable that incompatibilists have been trying to find an alternative model of
agency.
Secondly, the standard-causal model appears counterintuitive in at least the
following two respects. The theory construes agency in terms of event-causal
processes: actions are caused by mental states and events. Some philosophers think
that this approach fails to capture the very phenomenon of agency, as it recognises
only happenings and causal relations between them. When we act for reasons, for
instance, we act spontaneously in the light of reasons. If that agential power is
reduced to the causal efficacy of mental states and events that represent our reasons,
then agency, as the challenge goes, disappears. Further, the standard-causal theory
claims that reason-explanations of action are causal explanations. However, the
practice of explaining human actions in terms of reasons is very different from the
scientific practice of uncovering lawful connections between types of events.
Thirdly, some philosophers are dissatisfied with the reductive and non-reductive
varieties of physicalism that have dominated recent philosophy of mind. Those
theories of the mind typically presuppose the standard-causal model, which is a
reductive model in the sense that it reduces the agent’s power to act to the causal
efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. Alternatively, some
philosophers seek to understand the relation between mind and body and the
phenomenon of mental causation in terms of emergence and emergent causal powers.
And some forms of emergentism, as I will explain in the first chapter, go hand in hand
with non-reductive theories of agency.
Given all that, we can see why the standard-causal model is in need of defence. I
will respond to all three challenges in due course. In the first chapter, I will defend the
                                                 
5 The most prominent statement of that argument can be found in van Inwagen, 1983. For an overview
of the contemporary free will debate see Kane, 2002.
3theory against the claim that non-reductive models of agency—in particular, agent-
causal models—do better in capturing certain important features of human agency,
such as free will and moral responsibility.
In the second chapter, I will defend causalism about reason-explanation—that is,
the view that reasons cause and causally explain actions, which is an integral part of
the standard-causal model. I will argue that non-causal alternatives fail provide an
account of what it is to act for reasons, and I will provide what can be called a global
argument for causalism. I will argue that causalism is to be preferred, because it is the
only model that provides an integrated account of agency: it locates the phenomenon
of action within the event-causal order and provides, thereby, an account of the
relationship between reasons for actions and the causes of bodily movements.
In the third chapter, I will defend causalism in the form of non-reductive
physicalism against the influential causal exclusion argument and against, what I shall
call, the coincidence problem—the problem of explaining the systematic relationship
between the level of intentional reason-explanation and lower levels of neuro-
physiological and physical explanation. I will argue that this problem can be solved
without assuming identities between mental and non-mental types and without
assuming that intentional theories can be reduced.
In the fourth and in final chapter, I will respond to the mentioned challenge of
disappearing agency. I will argue that the standard-causal model captures agency,
because it captures the phenomenon of agential control. As part of that response, I
will present a solution to the much-discussed problem of deviant causal chains.
Further, I will argue that agents who act for reasons need not consider reasons in a
process of deliberation, and they need not treat some consideration as a reason.
Finally, I will argue that we do not have reason to believe in our having free will,
under the assumption that incompatibilism about free will is true. I will suggest that
this result is less drastic than one may think, because there are viable accounts of
moral responsibility and of free and autonomous agency available, which do not
presuppose libertarian free will.
Note that the three mentioned challenges to the standard-causal model are global
or external, rather than internal challenges—that is, unlike the logical connection
argument or the challenge from deviant causal chains, they do not point towards
internal problems and inconsistencies. Rather, they question the very approach—they
4question the idea that agency can be understood in event-causal terms. Accordingly,
my responses concern the big picture, as it were, rather than the details of the view.
That is reflected in the fact that I will stay neutral on many issues concerning the
ontology of action. I will stay neutral, for instance, on the questions whether actions
and events are to be individuated finely or coarsely. The general metaphysical
framework of this thesis can be described as broadly Aristotelian. I will assume that
there are substances—that is, things and beings that persist through change—and
properties. I will remain neutral on the question of whether events are particulars or
instantiations of properties.
Further, I will defend causalism as non-reductive physicalism, because there is,
as I think, prima facie reason to endorse that view. But I will not reject other options,
such as the identity theory or functionalism. My aim, in other words, is to defend the
standard-causal approach as broadly as possible, rather than a particular version of it.
Apart from the mentioned reasons, my motives for that defence can be summarised as
follows.
Firstly, I mentioned two intuitions that count against the standard-causal
approach. There are, however, equally strong—if not stronger—intuitions in support
of both the standard-causal account of action and the causal theory of reason-
explanation. Suppose you recall, while you are reading these lines, that you want to
send an important parcel today, and that you realise that the post office will close
shortly; and suppose you find yourself on the way to the post office a few minutes
later. It is very plausible to think that those thoughts motivated and resulted in your
action—that those mental states and events made you to or moved you to head
towards to the post office. Given that, it seems quite natural, and only one innocuous
step further, to suggest that those mental states and events are among the causes of the
action. Similarly, when we ask you why you are heading that way, you will probably
say that you are heading to the post office, because you want to send that parcel—and
that you have to hurry because the office will close shortly. And given the relevant
information, we will explain your action to others in a similar fashion. Again, it seems
quite natural to think that such explanations are causal explanations, because it seems
that they are true only if the mentioned mental states and events actually caused you
to perform the action.
5My second motive is integral to my defence. I think that the theory is attractive,
because it provides an integrated account of agency in the sense outlined. There are
two perspectives on our role and place in the world, which have sometimes been
described as being incompatible or in tension with each other.6 On the one hand, we
are active beings that can make a difference to the course of events. On the other
hand, we ourselves are part of the event-causal order. Our physical movements, which
seem to constitute our actions, have sufficient neural antecedents, which in turn have
another sufficient physical cause. A model of agency that can reconcile those two
perspectives has a great theoretical advantage over any alternative theory that fails to
do so. The standard-causal model, as I will argue, can establish this reconciliation—or
integration—, whereas non-causal alternatives fail.
One may interpret the previous point—my second motive—as saying that the
standard-causal model is to be preferred, because it confirms to the philosophical
orthodoxy—or prejudice—known as naturalism. Let me say two things in response to
that. Firstly, if my commitment to the standard-causal model is motivated by
commitment to naturalism, then the variety of naturalism in question is a very weak
one. My motive presupposes only that human agents are part of the order of events in
the sense outlined. Naturalism, however, makes typically much stronger claims in
addition to that. It says, for instance, that all facts supervene on natural or descriptive
facts, that all concrete phenomena must be explained in terms of efficient causation,
or that all explanations must be reduced to the natural sciences.7 Secondly, my motive
is not simply that the standard-causal model confirms to some variety of naturalism,
and I will not, for instance, reject alternative models for the reason that they assume
non-naturalistic kinds of causation, such as final-causation or substance-causation.
Rather, my motive is that the standard-causal model is the only model that provides
an integrated account of agency by locating action in the event-causal order and by
explaining the relationship between, on the one hand, actions and reasons for actions
and, on the other hand, physical movements and their physical causes. (I will develop
this point in more detail in chapter two.)
                                                 
6 Compare, for instance, Melden, 1961; Thomas Nagel, 1986; and Bishop, 1989. Or one might as well
think of Kant’s doctrine of the two standpoints (compare the Groundwork, p. 62, for instance).
7 It is, notoriously, a difficult task to spell out what naturalism says exactly. Compare, for instance,
MacDonald, 1992, and Pettit, 1992.
6Chapter One: Agents and Their Powers
The main focus in this chapter is on what I shall call reductionism and non-
reductionism about agency. At the heart of our conception of agency is the idea that
agents are capable of self-movement. What distinguishes agents from other beings or
things is that they can bring about change by bringing about change in
themselves—they can move things by moving themselves. Reductionism about
agency says, very roughly, that an agent’s power or ability to engage in agency is
reducible to relations between changes in—and states of—the agent; it is reducible, as
I shall say, to relations between agent-involving states and events. Non-reductionism
about agency denies that. It says that an agent’s power—and the relation that holds
between the agent and an action—is primitive and irreducible.
In the first part, I will begin with some preliminary remarks concerning the
nature of behaviour, actions and agents. I will then say more about reductionism and
non-reductionism, and I will introduce a third position—namely, volitionism. Then I
will turn to the theory of agent-causation, which is the most prominent version of the
non-reductive approach. Proponents of that theory argue that the reductive approach
fails to capture important aspects of human agency, that their non-reductive theory
can account for those aspects, and that we have therefore good reason to endorse their
view. I shall defend the reductive approach against that challenge, and I will argue in
this and in subsequent chapters that there is reason to prefer the reductive approach.
In the final section I will, firstly, introduce a fourth position, which I shall call
pluralism. Secondly, I will present objections to volitionism. Then I will show that the
arguments against the agent-causal theory can be generalised—that they are
arguments against the non-reductive view in general. And, finally, I will show that
apparently alternative positions fall under reductionism, non-reductionism or
pluralism about agency. The apparent alternatives that I will consider are the theory of
agency that is implicit in a broadly Kantian moral psychology and so-called
emergentist views.
Some Preliminaries on Behaviour and Action
It is a commonplace in the philosophy of action to approach the question what action
or agency is by contrasting the things that agents do with things that happen to them.
7What is the difference between, say, Sue’s walking down the corridor and her tripping
over the doorstep? What is or what constitutes the difference between being active
and passive?1
That distinction may be helpful in introducing the subject matter, but it is
questionable whether it is useful beyond that. A first problem is that there are many
cases, which apparently do not fall under either category. Considers Sam’s writing an
e-mail, Sam’s blushing in response to an embarrassing joke, and Sam’s catching the
flu. Writing the mail is something that Sam does, and catching the flu is something
that happens to him. But what about Sam’s blushing? On intuitive grounds, we would
neither classify it as something that Sam does, nor as something that happens to him.
One may argue, on theoretical grounds, that Sam’s blushing can be subsumed under
one of the two categories. But such arguments, I think, will not convince us that we
should subsume the blushing under one category rather than the other. Rather, they
will show, at best, that things can coherently be divided up and subsumed in a certain
way. Alternatively, and more plausibly perhaps, a third category can be introduced
that covers all—or at least the most important—cases that lie between actions and
happenings. One might distinguish, for instance, between actions, mere behaviour and
happenings, and Sam’s blushing could then be classified as an instance of mere
behaviour.
However, it is also a commonplace in the theory of action to point out that such
classifications are to some extent arbitrary and relative to interest.2 Any plausible
theory of action must have the resources to distinguish between cases like Sam’s
writing the mail and Sam’s blushing. If the latter is classified as an action, then the
theory will, presumably, distinguish between at least two very different kinds of
action; namely, one that subsumes the writing and one that subsumes the blushing. I
think nothing of importance depends on whether a theory subsumes it under action,
behaviour, mere behaviour, or whatever, as long as the theory has the resources to
distinguish it from other kinds of action, such as intentional action and action that is
done for reasons.
                                                 
1 Berent Enç, for instance, distinguishes between two problems of action theory, the first of which is to
distinguish ‘the class of things that we do as rational agents from things that happen to us’ (compare
Enç, p. 39-40). See also, for instance, Melden, 1961, especially chapter 6; Davidson, 1980, p. 43;
Goldman, 1970, pp.70-71; Frankfurt, 1988, p. 69; Brand, 1984, p. 1; and Dretske, 1988, p. 1.
2 Compare, for instance, Brand, 1984, p. 4, and Dretske, 1988, pp. 6-7.
8In many disciplines the terms action and behaviour are presupposed as primitive,
as are other actional or agential notions such as response and control. In fact, often
the terms action and behaviour are used interchangeably in one discipline, and
differently in different disciplines. But that, of course, is not a problem, for the
physicist’s talk about the behaviour of electrons certainly does not interfere with the
philosopher’s distinction between behaviour and happenings.
Given that, we should be sceptical about the idea that there is something such as
action, agency or behaviour simpliciter. We should be sceptical about the idea that we
can define those notions in a way that satisfies all our intuitions concerning those
notions in all contexts. Rather, we should focus on the features of the kind of agency
that we are interested in. Here we are, first and foremost, interested in human
agency—in particular, the features and aspects of agency, which are distinctive of
human agency. It may, of course, be very useful to consider the features of the kinds
of agency exercised by non-human animals and organisms and to contrast them with
the features of human agency. But, generally, a theory of action must have the
resources to distinguish between the relevant features of agency only within its
domain of interest. That is to say that it should it not be expected that the theory
provides conditions and definitions that satisfy all intuitions concerning the concepts
of behaviour and action simpliciter.
Adult human agents are—normally or usually—capable of intentional, rational,
deliberative, autonomous and free agency. Human agency comprises all those
different forms or kinds of agency. In chapter 4 I will say more about the more
refined or higher aspects of deliberative, autonomous and free agency, and I will turn
to the question of how those kinds or aspects of agency are related. For now, I shall
follow a common practice and associate action with intentional and rational action in
the following sense. Firstly, actions are goal-directed, purposive or motivated in the
sense that agents perform them in order to achieve or attain certain goals or ends. And
secondly, actions admit of so-called rationalising explanations, which are essentially
formulated in psychological or intentional terms, and which render the performance
9of the action intelligible by referring to some of the agent’s mental states and events
that constitute—or that can be associated with—the agent’s reasons for the action.3
Let us now return briefly to the distinction between actions and happenings.
There is, it seems undeniable, a genuine distinction between things that agents do and
things that happens to them. However, it would be a serious mistake to think that,
therefore, actions cannot be explained in terms of—or reduced to—happenings.4
Without further specification a happening is simply an event, and a happening that
involves an agent—that is partly constituted by an agent—is an agent-involving
event. It would be a mistake to think that every agent-involving event is something
that happens to the agent. Trivial counterexamples are given by basic bodily
functions. Sweating, for instance, is not something that is properly described as
something that happens to me.
In fact, it is common to assume that actions can be reduced to events. The easiest
way to see why this is a plausible assumption is to consider the description of an
action which features a transitive verb with an intransitive counterpart, such as raise
and rise. Whenever Sue raises her arm, the following two events occur: the event of
Sue’s raising her arm and the event of Sue’s arm rising. The former event entails that
Sue performed an action, but the latter does not. The reductive view assumes that
every description of an action entails that an event of the latter act-neutral or non-
actional kind occurred, and that the action is either identical with or constituted by
that event. In the following, I shall assume that this is correct—I shall assume that
actions can be reduced to act-neutral events.5
A weakness of the distinction between the things that agents do and the things
that happen to them is that it provides merely a negative characterisation of agency. It
tells us only what actions are not—namely, things that happen to us. Given that
actions are constituted by events, the way forward is to ask in virtue of what act-
neutral events constitute actions.
                                                 
3 In the analytical philosophy of action, the two primary sources concerning the close relationship
between action, intentional action and acting for reasons are Anscombe, 1957, and Davidson, 1963
(reprinted as essay 1 in Davidson, 1980).
4 For instance, Moya, 1990, does not distinguish clearly enough between things that happen to agents
and mere happenings—that is, events. The same is true of some passages in Melden, 1961, and Nagel,
1986.
5 I will return to the relation between actions and events in chapter 2, pp. 99.
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Self-Movement and Internal Causes
A common strategy is to characterise action or behaviour in terms of its causal
history—its history of production. Fred Dretske, for instance, has proposed a
characterisation of behaviour as endogenously or internally produced—that is, caused
—movement.6 All movements are, presumably, performed or executed by some being
or system, and they are events which involve that being or system in the sense that
they are partly constituted by it. What distinguishes a mere movement from a
movement that constitutes behaviour, according to Dretske, is the fact that the latter is
produced by the being or system itself. The movement of a stone, for instance, is
produced by external forces; the stone moves, because it is being pushed or pulled by
something else. The movement of a cat’s paw, however, is produced either by
something external to the cat or by the cat itself. Only the latter is behaviour, because
only the latter is internally produced movement. That is, I think, a plausible starting
point for capturing the intuition that agency has something to do with self-
movement—the idea that agents are able to bring about change by bringing about
change in themselves.
Dretske thinks that action is a subclass of behaviour; namely, intentional or
rational behaviour.7 What we obtain is a neat categorisation of action as a subclass of
behaviour, and of behaviour as a subclass of movements. However, the offered
characterisation of behaviour appears to be too wide. At one point Dretske says that
behaviour is ‘internally produced movement or change’.8 Events such as taking a
breath, sweating, digesting, pumping of blood, it seems, are internally produced
changes. But, intuitively, we would not classify them as behaviour. Dretske, however,
is prepared to say that events of that kind are instances of behaviour.9 He thinks that
every system of classification—at least as far as behaviour and action is
concerned—will have counterintuitive implications. Since no system will satisfy all
our intuitions, we should not dismiss a theory on that ground, provided that it captures
                                                 
6 Dretske, 1988, chapter 1.
7 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
8 Ibid., p. 3, my emphasis.
9 Dretske does not consider a distinction between the behaviour of the agent as a whole as opposed to
the behaviour of its parts. One could exclude things such as the beating of one’s heart on the ground
that it concerns the behaviour of a part (compare Goldman, 1970, p. 47). But that would not exclude all
counterintuitive cases, for events such as inhaling and sweating are agent-involving events that
constitute behaviour of the agent as a whole.
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the core of the concept of behaviour. Generally, I tend to agree with Dretske. But let
us nevertheless see whether we can find an alternative that preserves the proposed
characterisation and excludes at least some of the counterintuitive results.
One may, for instance, distinguish bodily movements as a subclass of agent-
involving events, and then define behaviour as internally produced bodily movement.
Berent Enç, for instance, has suggested a characterisation of the ‘basic behaviour
repertoire of organisms’ as ‘macro units of behavioural outputs’, which are triggered
by ‘higher centres of the organism’. An organism’s behaviour repertoire is relative
not only to species, but also to individuals. Most human animals, for instance, can
walk without actively monitoring each single step, let alone the muscle movements
involved. Rather, a decision or intention to walk triggers the ‘macro unit’ that is
associated with walking and that controls the individual steps and muscle
movements.10
Dretske acknowledges that the attribution of agency presupposes that the being or
system in question exhibits an internal structure. In particular, it must possess internal
mechanisms or sub-systems that are causally responsible for some of its movements.
But since Dretske wants his characterisation of behaviour to encompass the
movements of the simplest living creatures and organisms—he talks about plant
behaviour—, he would probably reject reference to a ‘higher-centre’ of the organism
and a restriction to movements of body parts.
I said that I tend to agree with Dretske’s stance concerning the interest relativity
of definitions and classifications. In the present case there seems to be no obvious
reason to prefer one of the offered proposals, as far as the characterisation of
behaviour is concerned. Things are different, however, if the aim is characterise
action as a subclass of behaviour. Because if action is defined as a subclass of
behaviour, we must ensure that the characterisation is wide enough as to encompass
all actions. The first worry with Dretske’s approach was that it is too wide. But when
we focus on the characterisation of action as a subclass of behaviour it seems that it is
actually too narrow.
Human action encompasses, possibly, both so-called overt and mental actions.
Overt actions essentially involve bodily movements; they are identical with or
constituted by agent’s moving their bodies. Mental actions do not involve bodily
                                                 
10 Enç, 2003, especially pp. 65-67.
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movements; rather, they are identical with or constituted by mental occurrences (by
the agent’s having of thoughts).11 Plausibly, things like making a decision or solving a
puzzle in one’s head are mental actions. In any case, we should not rule out the
possibility of mental action by beginning with a characterisation of behaviour and
action as a subclass of bodily movement.
At that point, one may wonder why we should characterise action as a subclass of
behaviour at all. Why can actions not be defined as a subclass of agent-involving
events? According to Alfred Mele, actions are like banknotes and sunburn in the
sense that their causal history is essential to their identity.12 A piece of paper is a
banknote only if it has been printed by the right institution, and an irritation of the
skin is sunburn only if it has been caused by exposure to sun. But the right causal
history is not sufficient. Not every piece of paper that has been printed by the right
institution in the right way is a banknote; it must be the right kind of paper that is
printed in that way. Likewise, exposure to sun can cause different kinds of skin
irritation; in order to be sunburn it must be the right kind of skin irritation that is
caused in that way.13 The same, Mele seems to suggest, holds for actions. Having the
right causal history is necessary, but not sufficient for an event to be an action: an
event, which is an action, is an action only partly in virtue of having the right causal
history. It is also necessary that it is an event of the right kind.14
Is that analogy sound? Is it possible that there are agent-involving events that are
not actions despite having the right causal history? If there are such cases, then the
range of agent-involving events must be narrowed as to exclude that possibility.15
That is why one might want to define actions as a subclass of behaviour. Defining
actions as a kind of behaviour, one excludes agent-involving events such as breathing,
sweating, and the like, provided that those events are not instances of behaviour. And
in order to cover the possibility of mental action, one may, accordingly, define a
                                                 
11 For more on mental action see Mele, 1997. Compare also Bishop, 1989, p. 195, and Enç, 2003, p. 78.
12 Mele, 2003, 51-52.
13 Note that the examples are not without problems. Of course, if the causal history of a banknote
involves only the printing process, then history alone is not sufficient. An ordinary piece of paper is not
a banknote just because it has been printed in the right way. However, if we include the causal history
of the paper itself, things are not so obvious.
14 Mele says that the causal theory does not identify actions with ‘nonactional events’, but he does not
explain how we can distinguish between actional and non-actional events (without circularity).
Compare, ibid., p. 52.
15 Enç, 2003, for instance, thinks that it is necessary to ‘narrow the class of event types that will
constitute the non-actional neutral events’ as to exclude sneezing, blushing, sweating and so on (p. 75).
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subclass of agent-involving events as, for instance, the union of the class of
behavioural outputs and the class of the relevant kinds of mental events (such as
formations of intentions and judgements). But is it correct that the right causal history
is not sufficient? Are there counterexamples to the claim that, in the case of action,
the right causal history is both necessary and sufficient: are there instances of agent-
involving events, which do not constitute actions despite having the causal history of
an action?
What distinguishes action, as specified above, is that it admits of true and
justified explanation in intentional terms. Actions can be rationalised by reference to
some of the agent’s mental states and events. On a widespread causal view, which I
shall defend, those mental states and events are also among the causes of the actions.
The fact that actions admit of rationalising explanation is thereby reflected in their
causal history, and they can, therefore, be characterised as being actions in virtue of
their causal history. According to that causal theory, the two mentioned features go
hand in hand: if an event admits of a rationalising explanation, then it is caused by
mental states and events that render it rational, and if an event is caused by such
mental states and events, then it can be explained in terms of reasons. (In the
following I shall call those mental attitudes the agent’s or agent-involving reason-
states.)16
Blushing, it seems, is also caused by agent-involving mental states and events
and it admits of psychological explanation. But such explanations are not of the same
kind as intentional explanations of actions. Explanations of actions are not just
psychological explanations. They are reason-explanations. They cite the reasons for
which the agent acted. Blushing, however, is typically not done for reasons at all.
Further, blushing is, typically, not goal-directed and motivated in the way actions are.
Now, blushing is typically not motivated and done for reason. But what if we
imagine someone who has sufficiently enough control over his reddening of the face
such that his blushing can be motivated or even be done for reasons? That may seem
far-fetched. A perfectly familiar and plausible borderline example, though, is crying.
An actor is supposed to be able to cry on stage at will, as it were. In that case, crying
is motivated, goal-directed and even performed for reasons. Given that all that holds
                                                 
16 Further, the reason-states and events must cause the action in the right, normal or non-deviant way. I
will say more on acting for reasons in chapter 2 and 4, and I will turn to causal deviance in chapter 4.
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in virtue of the causal history of the event in question, such an instance of crying
counts as an action in virtue of having the causal history of an action. But that is just
as it should be—for the actor is performing an action.
Whether or not there are counterexamples depends, of course, on how the
conditions for the causal history of action are formulated in detail. In particular, it
depends on whether all the mentioned features—being goal-directed, motivated and
done for reasons—can satisfactorily be characterised in causal terms only. It will
emerge in subsequent chapters—especially in chapters 2 and 4—that this can be done.
For the moment, note only the following two points. Firstly, it is difficult to see how
and why examples of blushing, sweating, crying, and so on, could constitute
counterexamples. Either they lack certain features of actions, which are features of
their causal history, or they possess all those features, in which case it is plausible to
say that they are actions—such as in the case of the actor’s crying on purpose. That
suggests, secondly, that in the case of action the right causal history is both necessary
and sufficient—what matters, in other words, is not what type of agent-involving
event is produced, but how it is produced. It may still be informative to specify which
types of agent-involving events typically constitute actions. But, as far as I can see, it
is not necessary to do that.
We started with Dretske’s characterisation of behaviour as internally produced
movement or change. So far, we have been concerned mainly with what is
produced—with behaviour and action construed as the effect or output of that
process. In the next section, I will turn to the question what it means that behaviour or
action is produced internally, which will lead us, eventually, to the two positions that
are the focus of this chapter—namely, reductionism and non-reductionism about
agency.
Reductionism and Non-Reductionism about Agency
The talk of agent-internal causes gives expression to the idea that agency has
something to do with self-movement—the idea that beings, which are capable of
agency, are able to bring about change by bringing about change in themselves.
Reformulating the proposal, Dretske says that behaviour has its ‘causal origin within
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the system whose parts are moving’.17 By that, though, he does not mean that the
causes of behaviour and action must literally originate within the agent, in the sense
that they are uncaused agent-internal causes—or first causes within the agent. What
does it mean, then, that behaviour is caused internally or that the causes are agent-
internal? We can distinguish between the following three interpretations, which
provide us with three main positions in the metaphysics of agency.
According to the first, action or behaviour is produced internally in the sense that
it is caused by agent-involving states and events. That is the kind of causal theory
aspects of which have already been introduced in the previous section. On that view,
there is no need to assume that actions literally originate within the agent, or that they
have their causal origin within the self. Rather, it suffices that action or behaviour is
caused by appropriate agent-involving states and events in the right way.
According to the second position, action or behaviour is internally produced in
the sense that it is caused by an agent-involving mental action of the right kind. Most
proponents of that view identify—or associate—those mental acts with acts of the will
and call them, accordingly, volitions or willings; others talk about decisions or tryings
as the appropriate mental acts. I shall use the term volitions in order to refer,
generally, to mental acts of that kind. Volitions are, firstly, not caused to occur. They
are acts in virtue of intrinsic rather than extrinsic or relational properties.18 They are
sui generis acts and a manifestation of spontaneous human agency. And, fourthly,
volitions are more basic—or fundamental—than overt actions in the sense that a
certain bodily movement is or constitutes an overt action just in case it is caused by a
volition.
According to the third position, action or behaviour is internally produced in the
sense that it is caused—or performed—by the agent, rather than being caused by
changes occurring in the agent or states of the agent. The action is caused—or
performed—by the being itself; by the agent as a whole, as it were. According to that
view, when an agent brings something about by doing something, the agent, literally,
brings it about by bringing about change in itself.
                                                 
17 Dretske, 1988, p. 2.
18 Definitions of the notion of intrinsic properties usually appeal to duplicates of individuals: a property
P is an intrinsic property of s if and only if s has P, and for all molecule-to-molecule duplicates x of s: x
has P. In the present context, the important point is, simply, that causal properties are extrinsic or
relational properties.
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The second and the third position take seriously the idea that action and
behaviour has its origin within the agent. Both positions are, usually, held only with
respect to human agency or with respect to distinctively human aspects or kinds of
agency, such as rational, free and autonomous agency. Human agents, it is generally
agreed, are capable of rational, free and autonomous agency. According to the second
and third position, that requires that actions are determined by the self, either in the
sense that the agent herself is its origin or in the sense that it is caused by an uncaused
agent-involving volition.
The second position, which I shall call volitionism, has been widely rejected for
the reason that it is subject to a vicious regress. At the end of this chapter I will return
to volitionism and the regress objection, and I will explain why I think that the view
should be rejected. I shall therefore focus on the first and the third position, which I
shall call the reductive or standard-causal model and the non-reductive or agent-
causal model of agency, respectively. Some clarifications and remarks are in place.
Note, firstly, that all three positions identify a process—that is, they identify an
instantiation of a relation that holds between an agent-involving event and an
antecedent (in virtue of which that event is or constitutes an action). Let us call the
former the effect-component, and the latter the antecedent-component of the process.
The offered positions suggest that action is identical with or constituted by one of the
components of the process. Alternatively, one might identify action with the whole
process, rather than one of its components. In chapter 2, however, I will argue that
there is no reason to endorse the process view, whereas there is some reason to prefer
the component view.19 At this point, note only that the problem of adjudicating
between reductionism, non-reductionism and volitionism is independent of the
question of whether actions are constituted by components or processes. At least, I
fail to see a significant connection between the two issues.20
Secondly, note that both the standard-causal and the agent-causal model are
compatible with the kind of reductionism presented in the previous section, which
reduces actions to events—or event-causal processes. But the standard-causal model
                                                 
19 See chapter 2, pp. 96.
20 Compare Clarke, 2003, for instance, who says that nothing of substance depends on whether one
assumes a process or a component view (p. 25 and p. 138). He opts for a component view—or product
view, as he calls it—but he says that this choice is ‘largely arbitrary’, and that the issue is ‘little more
than a verbal matter’ (p. 25).
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is a form of reductionism in the further sense that it reduces an agent’s role in the
production of action to the causal roles of agent-involving states and events. The
agent-causal model rejects that kind of reduction, which is why I call the former the
reductive and the latter the non-reductive model. Only volitionism is non-reductive in
both ways.21
Thirdly, note that both the standard-causal and the agent-causal model are,
strictly speaking, two versions of two positions. The two positions are the reductive
and the non-reductive model of agency. The former affirms and the latter denies that
the agent’s role in the production—or performance—of action is reducible. The two
outlined versions construe that role as a causal role; namely, as causation by agent-
involving states and event and as causation by the agent. I call the first the standard-
causal model, because that approach has been the standard approach in the analytical
philosophy of mind and action.22 And secondly, because it presupposes and
incorporates what can plausibly be called the standard view in the metaphysics of
causation, according to which all causation is efficient event-causation.23 The
introduced version of the non-reductive view, on the other hand, is called the agent-
causal model, for the obvious reason that it assumes causal relations between actions
and agents.24 Most proponents of that position identify the agent, which is the agent of
human agency, with the persisting human animal or organism—with the biological
substance that is the human agent or person.25 Further below I will say more about the
                                                 
21 Note that this corresponds to the fact that both the standard-causal and the agent-causal model
characterise actions in terms of their extrinsic or relational properties—namely, in terms of their causal
history—, whereas volitionism typically captures agency in terms of the intrinsic properties of mental
actions. I will say more on that at the end of this chapter.
22 Compare for instance Velleman, 2000, who calls it the ‘standard story of human action’ (pp. 5-7 and
p. 123) and Searle, 2001, chapter 1. Sometimes that view is called the desire-belief theory of action.
That label is misleading, though, since the theory may refer to mental attitudes other than desires and
beliefs as the relevant agent-involving mental attitudes.
23 That is why the view is sometimes called the event-causal theory of action. That is slightly
misleading as the causal history of an event might consist of events, states and other standing
conditions. To allow states and standing conditions as causes, however, is not to deny the central role
of events, which are the entities that trigger or initiate effects.
24 According to Chisholm, ‘the philosophical question is not […] the question whether or not there is
“agent causation.” The philosophical question should be, rather, the question whether “agent
causation” is reducible to “event causation”’ (1977, p. 622). The introduced distinction between
standard-causal and agent-causal theories is in line with that. The difference is merely terminological,
because I use the term agent-causation to refer to the position that causation by an agent is irreducible.
25 I use the term substance in the broadly Aristotelian sense as referring to something that persists
through qualitative change. The view that the agent is the persisting human organism—a biological
substance—is, according to O’Connor, the ‘official’ view (O’Connor, 2002, p. 343). Many proponents
of agent-causation think that their position is at least continuous with naturalism. In particular, they
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different versions of the non-reductive model. For the moment, note only that the
agent-causal theory is a version of the non-reductive approach, whereas the standard-
causal model can be considered as the version of the reductive approach. That is
because proponents of the non-reductive model may hold that the relationship
between agents and actions is not reducible to event-causation, but deny that the
relationship is one of causation—they may hold that agents perform rather than
produce or cause actions. However, if one thinks that the agent’s role can be reduced
to relations between agent-involving states and events, there is no reason to deny that
actions are caused by agent-involving states and events.
The Standard-Causal and the Agent-Causal Model
Both the reductive and the non-reductive position are compatible with a causal
approach in the theory of action—an approach that construes agency as a causal
phenomenon. When agents act, they bring something about—they cause something,
when they do something. According to the causal approach, that is not only a claim
about the consequences or outcomes of actions, but about the actions themselves.
When agents act, they cause their actions. In particular, agents cause their so-called
basic actions—or the basic act components of their actions. Very often, when agents
act they do something by doing something else. For instance, one gives a signal by
raising one’s hand. Basic actions are, roughly, the things an agent is able to do
without doing something else. They are things that one can do readily—and in
particular, without using knowledge about how to perform the action by doing
something else.26 When Sue raises her arm in order to give a signal, she brings it
about that her arm goes up in order to give a signal. Sue’s raising her arm is the basic
act component of the non-basic action of giving a signal, because she does not have to
do anything else in order to raise her arm. It is fairly uncontroversial that there are
basic actions and that non-basic actions are, in some sense, generated by basic
actions.27 I shall assume that that is correct.28
                                                                                                                                            
think that the theory is not committed to substance dualism. Compare Taylor, 1966; Chisholm, 1977;
Van Inwagen, 1977; O’Connor, 2000; and Clarke, 2003.
26 See, for instance, Danto, 1965; Goldman, 1970; Davidson, 1980, essay 3; Ginet, 1990; and Enç
2003.
27 Goldman, 1970, distinguishes between four different ways in which actions can be generated by
more basic actions. Ginet, on the other hand, proposes a ‘general generating relation’ (1990, pp. 19).
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So far, I have talked about agent-involving events in order to refer to both the
effect-component and the antecedent-component. It must be noted, though, that some
of the things that agents do may not be constituted or generated by agent-involving
events. Some actions and consequences that are caused or otherwise generated by the
performance of basic actions may not involve the agent, in the sense that the events
that constitute those actions are not instantiated by the agent—they are not changes in
that agent. Suppose that Sam intentionally sets off an alarm by unlocking a door
(which presupposes, of course, Sam knows that unlocking the door will set off the
alarm). Setting off the alarm is something that Sam does and which, arguably, does
not involve Sam in the same sense as the movement of his hand involves him.29 In the
following, though, I shall ignore all complications that arise in connection with the
distinction between basic and non-basic actions. All statements concerning agent-
involving events, as the constituents or antecedents of actions, must be understood as
being, strictly speaking, about the constituents and antecedents of basic actions. That
is unproblematic for the following reason. We are interested in the phenomenon of
agency—in particular, in human agency and the role of human agents in the
performance or production of actions. The distinction between basic- and non-basic
actions is uncontroversial. Further, it is generally assumed that non-basic actions can
be defined recursively, on the basis of a definition of basic actions, by adding clauses
concerning the generation of non-basic acts.30 Hence, to consider the relationship
                                                                                                                                            
Generally, note that generation can be causal, but need not be. In many cases, such as Sam’s voting by
raising his arm, conventions play a crucial role in the generation of non-basic actions.
28 Concerning the individuation of actions and events we can distinguish between three views: coarse-
grained or minimising views, fine-grained or maximising view, and mixed views. According to the
coarse grained view, actions are particulars (that is, events) with indefinitely many properties (see, for
instance, Anscombe, 1963; Davidson, 1980; and Enç 2003). In the example, it is one and the same
particular that is a raising of one’s hand and a giving of a signal. According to the fine-grained view,
two event-tokens are identical only if they involve one and the same property. So, being a raising of
one’s arm and being a giving of a signal constitute distinct tokens (see, for instance, Goldman, 1970). It
is common now to say that the dispute between the two positions is merely verbal, and that it is
therefore unproblematic to remain neutral (compare Enç, 2003, note 11, p. 85, and Mele, 1992, pp. 4-
5). What is important to note is, firstly, that both views are compatible with both the standard-causal
and the agent-causal model. And secondly, proponents of both positions may use the notion of
generation to formulate their view. Enç, for instance, thinks that non-basic actions are generated or
made the case by basic actions, and he thinks that they are identical with them (if they are generated in
that way).
29 Whether or not there are actions that do not involve agents at all depends on how actions and events
are individuated. But since I remain neutral on that issue, I have to explain why the possibility of such
actions is unproblematic.
30 For recursive definitions of non-basic act-tokens on the basis of definitions of basic act-tokens see,
for instance, Goldman, 1970; Ginet, 1990; and Enç, 2003.
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between agents and non-basic actions would complicate the issue without giving us
any additional insight concerning the agent’s role in the performance of action. We
can therefore restrict our investigation to basic actions, and I shall continue to talk
about agent-involving events as the antecedents and constituents of actions.
I shall defend the reductive standard-causal model of agency against various
objections and challenges from alternative approaches. In this chapter I will first
argue against the agent-causal theory in particular, and later on I will show that the
objections apply to the non-reductive model in general. Before that, though, I shall
say more about reductionism.
Reductionism and the Agent
The reductive model reduces not only actions, but also the agent’s role in the
performance of actions. That raises the following two questions. The view reduces the
agent’s role to the causal roles of agent-involving states and events. Does that mean
that the view literally reduces the agent to a sum or system of mental states and
events? Is the view committed to the claim that a human agent—or a person—is
identical with a sum or system of mental states and events?
Secondly, according to the non-reductive view, reference to agents—and to their
irreducible agential powers—is necessary for complete and true explanations of
actions (or, in general, for a complete and true description of the world).31 The
reductive view denies that. However, the reductive view talks about agent-involving
states and event—as being both the antecedents and constituents of action. Is the view
threatened by circularity? Is reference to the agent of actions necessary, after all?
Note, first of all, that the two questions are closely related in the sense that one
may reject what is suggested in the second by answering the first in the affirmative:
one may avoid circularity—or necessary reference to the agent—by identifying the
agent with a sum or system of mental states and events.32 Let us call that view
reductionism about the agent.
                                                 
31 Compare, for instance, Clarke, 2003, p. 180: ‘completely characterising what happens in the
world—saying all there is about what brings about what—will require reference to agent causation.’
32 It must be noted, though, that one can avoid reference to the agent in that way only if the
individuation of mental states and events does not require reference to the agent. It might be argued
that mental states and events are necessarily states and events of an agent—that they must be
instantiated by an active thinker or a person. I assume here that this is not so. But that is not to say,
firstly, that mental states and events are independent existences. It may well be true that mental states
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In her book The Bounds of Agency, which is on the problem of personal identity,
Carol Rovane argues that, before we ask what the identity or persistence conditions of
persons are, we should settle the question of what kind of thing we are dealing
with—that is, the first task is to define personhood. Rovane thinks that personhood
must be accounted for in normative terms; she argues, in other words, that person is a
normative kind. On her view, where there is a person, there is a rational point of view
that satisfies certain standards. The normative standards in question specify what it is
to engage in, what Rovane calls, ‘agency regarding relations’. Persons are beings
whose engagement with others is informed by ‘thoroughgoing regard for their rational
point of view’.33 And a rational point of view is, according to Rovane, nothing else
than a set of mental episodes that satisfies certain standards concerning unity, long-
term planning and future commitments. Whenever a person thinks about—or refers
to—herself, the first person pronoun refers to a ‘set of rationally related intentional
episodes via a token-reflexive thought that belongs to the set.’34
What is interesting for us is, firstly, that according to Rovane a person is,
metaphysically speaking, nothing but a set of mental episodes, and secondly that all
persons are agents. Rovane’s theory presupposes, naturally, that persons are capable
of engagement and interaction with others; they are rational and reflective agents with
certain capacities and attitudes.35 All persons are agents, but, possibly, only some
agents are persons. Since persons are nothing but sets of mental episodes, it follows
that some agents are nothing but sets of mental episodes. Namely, those agents that
are persons: every agent that is a person is, metaphysically speaking, nothing but a set
of mental episodes.36
                                                                                                                                            
and events must be instantiated or owned by some being—say by an organism or biological substance.
What is denied is only that they must be instantiated or owned by a being that is necessarily a human
agent—or a person. And secondly, that does not mean that mental states and events can exist in
isolation, as it were. That is, it may well be true that mental states and events are necessarily parts of a
rather complex system of mental and states and events—the view, in other words, is compatible with
holism about mental attitudes.
33 Rovane, 1998, p. 88.
34 Ibid., p. 223.
35 Ibid., chapter 3.
36 Rovane maintains that Derek Parfit defended that kind of reductionism in his Reasons and Persons
(1984)—a kind of reductionism according to which ‘persons are nothing but certain sorts of episodes
standing in certain sorts of relations’ (Rovane, 1998, p. 134).
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Rovane’s account of personhood is committed to reductionism about the agent.
Prima facie, that position is unattractive and implausible.37 I shall, however, not argue
against it. Instead, I will show that the reductive model of agency is not committed to
reductionism about the agent by providing an alternative proposal that avoids
necessary reference to the agent, and that does justice to our intuitions, as it identifies
the agent with the being that performs the bodily movements, which constitute its
overt actions—on that view the agent is, simply, the being that moves around.
The challenge is to avoid reference to the agent without literally reducing the
agent. The alternative proposal says, basically, that there is no problem of circularity
and that the challenge is misguided, because the talk about agent-involving states and
event is elliptical. Both the effect-components and antecedent-components of the
identified processes are agent-involving states and events. As explained above, the
effect-components—those events that are actions—are either behavioural outputs or
mental events of a certain kind. The individual being or system, which has or
instantiates such agent-involving events, is, therefore, a being or system, which is
capable of producing or performing behavioural outputs and of forming mental
attitudes, such as intentions and judgements. But, according to the reductive model,
that individual is not yet an agent. It is an agent only if those agent-involving events
are sometimes caused—in the right way—by reason-states. That means that by
referring to agent-involving events, we are, strictly speaking, not referring to events
that involve an agent. Rather, we are referring to an individual that has or instantiates
those events—events that are actions only if they are caused and rationalised by
mental states and events, which are owned and instantiated by the same individual.
                                                 
37 It might be instructive to compare reductionism about the agent with what is known as the Humean
bundle theory of the self (Hume, 1888, especially p. 252). It says, very roughly, that mental events are
not owned by a self or subject, but that they are part of a bundle or collection of mental events, and that
the self, therefore, is nothing but a bundle of perceptions or experiences—rather than a substance
(compare Shoemaker, 1963). There are, obviously, striking similarities between the bundle view and
reductionism about the agent. One point of difference is that the latter talks about the agent or the
active self, whereas the Humean view is apparently about a perceiving or passive self. That is why the
Humean bundle theory may appear more attractive than reductionism about the agent. However, we do
not want to say, presumably, that the active and the passive self are distinct entities. More plausibly,
activity and passivity are two aspects or modes of one and the same self. So, if one reduces the self to a
bundle, sum or system of mental states and event, one reduces thereby both the passive and the active
self. Compare, for instance, Owen Flanagan’s suggestion that ‘self-representation involves thinking
[…] in either of two modes: in the active agent mode or in the passive object mode—as seer or as seen’
(1992, p. 178).
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Something very similar holds for the agent-involving mental states and events,
which are the causal antecedents of action. The agent-involving states and events in
question are mental states and events, which rationalise the action and which are
owned or instantiated by the same individual that instantiates the action. Again, to
refer to that individual as the owner of those mental states and events is not
necessarily to refer to an agent. That individual is an agent only if those mental states
and events cause and rationalise actions. So, again, by referring to those agent-
involving states and events, we are, strictly speaking, not referring to states and events
that involve an agent. But we are referring to the individual that owns or instantiates
those states and events in question.
Given that, reference to agent-involving states and events is not necessarily
reference to an agent. Rather, it is reference to an individual that owns or instantiates
those states and event and that is an agent in virtue of having mental states and
events, which sometimes cause and rationalise events that are instantiated by the same
individual.38 (That proposal can be expressed a more straightforward manner, if we
assume, for the moment, that actions are a subclass of behaviour, and that we can
characterise behaviour independently. We can then say that agent-involving states and
events do not literally involve an agent, but an individual—being or system—that is
capable of behaviour. Accordingly, that individual is or counts as an agent in virtue of
having mental states and events that sometimes cause and rationalise its behaviour.)
The reductive standard-causal model of agency is reductive not only in the sense
that it reduces actions to events, but also in the sense that it reduces the agent’s power
or role in the production of action. The proposal just presented shows that it can do so
without circularity; that is, without presupposing reference to agents. In the following,
                                                 
38 There are, it seems, two problematic kinds of cases. In the first, the agent brings about change in its
environment by means of a prosthetic device, which is, say, connected directly to the relevant nerve
endings (as opposed to being controlled by, say, a remote control, which is controlled by the agent).
The second kind of case is collective agency, where distinct individuals collectively decide and act in a
way such that the collective can be held responsible. Concerning the device, I think we can allow a
spectrum of cases that ranges from cases in which the device is a mere tool to cases in which the device
is a part of the agent (such that the agent is the mereological sum of the device and the being that
instantiates the antecedents of actions). Whether the device is a tool or a part of the agent depends on
the details. (Is the connection between the mental antecedents and the movements of the device
reliable? Does the agent take responsibility for the actions that are brought about by the movements of
the device?) With respect to collective agency, I am not aware of a convincing argument to the
conclusion that collective agency is on a par with—or more fundamental than—individual agency.
Given that, it seems very plausible to regard collective agency as derivative—as a kind of agency that
presupposes agency exercised by individuals.
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though, I shall continue to talk about agent-involving states and events as the causes
of actions. One must keep in mind that this is elliptical in the sense explained. Those
states and events do not literally involve an agent, and they cause actions in the sense
that they cause events, which are actions in virtue of having the right causal history.
Note that according to that proposal the agent is the individual, but the individual
is not essentially an agent.39 It is an agent during some period—or periods—of its
existence in virtue of having certain accidental properties. If it loses some of those
properties, which are constitutive of its being an agent, it ceases to be an agent, but it
may well be the same individual being.40
Reductionism and the Self
Agency has something to do with self-movement. Generally and fundamentally, that
may be taken to mean that agents—beings capable of agency—are capable of
bringing about changes in their environment by bringing about changes in themselves
(either as a response to changes in their environment or in pursuit of some of their
goals). With respect to human agency, however, one may think about the related
notion of self-determination—self-governance or autonomy—in connection with that.
What is at the centre of the concept of human agency is that it is sometimes up to
oneself to choose what to do—freely and in the light of reasons. Human agents can
sometimes determine what to do, without being determined to do so—sometimes the
source or origin of their actions lies within themselves.
The non-reductive agent-causal model provides a straightforward interpretation
of the notion of self-determination as a causal relation that holds between the action
and the self (the human agent or person). An agent exercises the ability of self-
                                                 
39 Note that the individual being is not only the subject of mental states and events, but also a being
capable of behavioural output. In the case of a human agent, the agent is therefore not to be identified
with the human brain.
40 It seems clear that non-reductionism about agency must reject reductionism about agents. If the
agent’s power or role in the performance of action is not reducible, the agent cannot possibly be a sum
or system of mental states and events. It is not clear, however, whether the non-reductive model is
compatible with the view that some individuals are agents in virtue of some of their accidental
properties, or whether it is committed to the much stronger view that those individuals are essentially
agents. Timothy O’Connor, a proponent of the agent-causal theory, thinks that an adequate account of
human agency requires that human agents are ‘among the truly basic entities whose activities
determine the way the world is’ (O’Connor, 2000b, p. 115). But what does it mean to be among the
truly basic entities? One might think it means that we are essentially human agents. Construed in that
way, non-reductionism about agency seems incompatible with the view that some individuals are
human agents in virtue of their accidental properties.
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determination with respect to some action if and only if the agent agent-causes that
action. On that view, self-determination is literally causation by oneself as an agent.
But it is by no means obvious that the notion of self-determination must be
understood in that way. In particular, it is not obvious that it must be understood as a
relation between an action and the self at all. In the last chapter I will outline an
alternative account of autonomous agency that is compatible with the reductive model
of agency.41 For now, consider only the following remark concerning the notion of the
self.
Instead of asking what kind of thing the self is, or whether there is such a thing as
the self, one can ask in virtue of what features an agent is or counts as being or having
a self. Obvious starting points are self-referential mental abilities and properties. An
agent can be a self in the sense of being aware of itself as an agent, and in the sense of
having the capacity to refer to itself and to reflect on its own agency. Further, an agent
can have a self in the sense of having a conception of itself—a conception of what
kind of being it is, where it comes from, what it is up to, and so forth. According to an
account of that kind, the self is the same individual being as the agent. It is one and
the same individual that is an agent in virtue of having certain agential properties and
abilities, and that is a self in virtue of having certain self-referential properties and
abilities. But what is interesting, as far as self-determination is concerned, is not the
fact that the self is the same being as the agent, but in virtue of what properties and
abilities that being counts as being or having a self. What is interesting, in other
words, is not the fact that the autonomous agent is the agent, but in virtue of what
properties it is an autonomous agent and what role those properties play in the
performance or production of its actions.
Agent-Causation
According to some proponents of the agent-causal theory, all human actions are
caused by agents. According to others, only some distinctively human actions—such
as free or autonomous actions—are caused by human agents or persons.42 The human
                                                 
41 See chapter 4, pp. 196.
42 One can distinguish between more positions concerning the question what is caused by the agent and
with respect to what kinds of action the agent-causal power is exercised. I shall, however, distinguish
only between two main positions, which is sufficient for present purposes. For discussions of different
versions of the agent-causal theory see O’Connor, 2000 and Clarke, 2003.
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agent is usually identified with the human animal or organism—with a biological
substance.
The theory has been criticised and rejected mainly on the ground that it
presupposes an untenable—or at least a very contentious—conception of causation by
substances. I shall set aside the question whether the notion of substance-causation is
coherent or possible. Rather, I will focus on the motives behind the agent-causal
approach. Proponents of the agent-causal model argue that there is reason to endorse
their theory—and, hence, reason to assume substance-causation—because no other
theory of agency can capture or account for important aspects of human agency. In
the following, I will restrict my considerations to the standard-causal and the agent-
causal model, firstly because I will reject other alternatives in due course, and
secondly because my aim is to defend the reductive standard-causal approach against
the agent-causal challenge. Given, then, that the standard-causal and the agent-causal
models are the main contenders, we have to distinguish between two lines of
argument.
According to some agent-causalists, the standard-causal model of agency is
unsatisfactory. They acknowledge that the standard-causal model can capture some
aspects of agency. But they argue that it is unsatisfactory in the sense that it fails to
account for some crucial aspects of human agency, such as acting with free will. That
is the line of argument that I will reject in this chapter.
According to others, the standard-causal model of agency is altogether
inadequate. They think that the reductive approach of the standard-causal theory does
not capture the phenomenon of agency at all—let alone distinctively human kinds of
agency, such as rational and autonomous action. I will say more on that in the next
section, but my main response will be given in chapter 4.43
Further, we have to distinguish between two versions of the agent-causal theory.
The proponents of the model agree that some actions are caused directly by the agent.
But there is disagreement over the question whether an agent’s reason-states play any
role in the causation of action. (Recall that reason-states are those agent-involving
mental states and events in the light of which the performance of an action appears as
intelligible). According to one version, the agent is the sole cause of action—or free
and autonomous action. In particular, the agent’s reason-states are not among the
                                                 
43 See chapter 4, The Challenge of Disappearing Agency, pp. 155.
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causes of action. According to an alternative version, both the agent and agent-
involving mental states and events are among the causes of action. In particular, the
agent’s reason-states can contribute causally to the occurrence of an event that is or
constitutes an action. I shall follow Randolph Clarke in calling the former view the
traditional, and the latter the integrated agent-causal view.44
Proponents of an integrated model will, presumably, restrict their arguments to
the claim that the standard-causal model is unsatisfactory, since they acknowledge
that agent-involving states and events play a role in the causation of action—which is
a central element of the standard-causal account of acting for reasons. Proponents of
the traditional version, however, typically reject the standard-causal approach
altogether.
The Traditional Model
Proponents of the traditional model think that agents are the sole causes of actions.45
They deny that agent-involving mental states and events play any role in the causation
of action. The claim that reason-states are causally relevant in the production of
action, however, is central to the standard-causal account of rational action—of what
it is to act for reasons. Because of that, traditional agent-causalists reject the standard-
causal model not only because it fails to account for free will, but also because it
misconstrues our ability to act for reasons. They think that whenever we act for
reasons, we freely choose what to do on the basis of—or in the light of—reasons, and
that this feature is incompatible with the assumption that reasons for actions—or
reason-states—are among the causes of action. Claims of that sort are usually
supported by phenomenological reflections on deliberation and the act of choosing for
reasons. When we deliberate, we are, usually, aware of various reasons and motives.
But, as for instance O’Connor observes,
within the framework of possibilities [...] that these present conative and
cognitive factors set, it seems for all the world to be up to me to decide which
particular action I will undertake. The decision I make is no mere vector sum of
internal and external forces acting upon me during the process of deliberation
                                                 
44 See Clarke, 2003, pp. 135.
45 Proponents within analytical philosophy are, for instance, Chisholm, 1964 and 1975; Taylor, 1966
and O’Connor, 2000.
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[...]. Rather, I bring it about – directly, you might say – in response to the
various considerations [...].46
What O’Connor has in mind, when he talks about the internal ‘forces’ that ‘act upon’
the agent, are the mental states and events, which the standard-causal model construes
as the causes of rational action. Given that how the agent is going to decide is
determined only by mental causes and influences from the environment, rather than
the agent, the action appears as a mere vector sum of causal antecedent factors. The
agent does not have the power to decide on the basis of reasons, since the causal
power of the agent is nothing more than the balance of the causal forces of the reason-
states that ‘act upon’ the agent. If we take seriously the idea that the agent acts in the
light of reasons, we have to look for some causal factor other than the agent’s reason-
states. If the agent has the power to act on some of her reasons, she must have a
power that is distinct from any combination of the causal powers associated with her
reason-states.47 And only an agent-causal theory, as the argument goes, can account
for such a power.
There are three important things to note with respect to that argument. Firstly, if
the outlined case from acting for reasons were successful, it would support the
stronger claim that the standard-causal model fails to account for agency altogether.
According to the standard-causal model, certain events are actions in virtue of being
rationalised and caused in the right way. That is to say that all action is rational in the
sense that it can be rationalised in the light of some of the agent’s mental states and
events. In that sense, the model construes action as acting for reasons. If it fails to
account for acting for reasons, it fails, thereby, to account for action as such.
Secondly, the argument says, basically, that acting for reasons is necessarily
acting with free will: whenever we act for reasons we choose with free will in the
light of reasons. I will argue that the agent-causal theory fails to account for free
will—just as the standard-causal model does. That argument will also undermine the
outlined case from acting for reasons. If it is assumed that acting for reason is
necessarily acting with free will, and if the agent-causal model fails to account for
free will, then it also fails to account for acting in the light of reasons. (In the
                                                 
46 O’Connor, 1995, p. 257.
47 In chapter 4 I will argue that acting for reasons is not necessarily based on deliberation (see pp. 184).
There it will become clear that O’Connor’s comparison between the standard-causal account of
deciding and acting for reasons and ‘mere vector sums’ is unjustified and inappropriate.
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following I shall call the view that acting for reasons is necessarily acting with free
will libertarianism about acting for reasons.)
Thirdly, proponents of the traditional version deny that reason-states play any
causal role in the causation of action. But, of course, they do not deny that reasons
influence the actions of rational agents. Reasons do influence our actions, but not
casually and not directly. Rather, they influence the actions of rational agents by
influencing agents rationally.
The standard-causal model provides not only a causal theory of action and acting
for reason, but it provides also a causal theory of reason-explanation. One problem
for the traditional view is to provide an alternative account of reason-explanation. The
central claim of the causal theory is that reason-explanation is a species of causal
explanation: the reasons, for which an action is performed, cause and causally explain
that action.48 The only alternative to the standard-causal account is a non-causal—or
teleological—theory of reason-explanation. In chapter 2, however, I will discuss and
reject non-causal alternatives.49
In the following, I will therefore focus on Clarke’s integrated agent-causal
ftheory, which incorporates the causal theory of reason-explanation. However, the
main thrust of my objection applies, as will become clear, to the traditional version as
well. So, even though the focus will be on the integrated version, my objection will
address the agent-causal approach in general.
Clarke’s Integrated Model of Agent-Causation
Randolph Clarke has proposed an integrated model that combines a standard-causal
model of action and reason-explanation with the agent-causal theory. The integrated
standard-causal model allows for genuinely indeterministic—or probabilistic—causal
relations between the agent’s reasons and the action, and Clarke acknowledges that it
provides a viable account of action and reason-explanation. But that model, as Clarke
argues, cannot account for free will and moral responsibility; in particular, it cannot
account for the kind of control that is required both for acting with free will and for
                                                 
48 The most prominent statement of that view can be found in Davidson’s ‘Actions, Reasons, and
Causes’, reprinted in Davidson, 1980. For a desire-belief version of the view see, for instance,
Davidson, 1980,  and Goldman, 1970. For versions in which intentions play an additional and central
role see, for instance, Brand 1984; Bratman, 1987; Mele, 1992; and Enç, 2003.
49 Compare also Clarke, 2003, p. 21-24, where he presents arguments against non-causal accounts of
reason-explanation in support of his integrated version of agent-causation.
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being truly morally responsible. He thinks that the agent-causal model can account for
those features of human agency, and he suggests combining the two models. The
integrated view says that whenever an agent acts with free will, and whenever the
agent is morally responsible, the action is caused by the agent’s reason-states and by
the agent, such that the reason-states alone render the performance of the action only
probable.
Let us consider first the standard-causal component. Suppose that some agent,
call him Sam, has to decide whether to A or to B. Let R be the set of all reasons for
and against A-ing and B-ing, which Sam considers in his deliberation. Assume that A-
ing and B-ing are genuine alternatives for Sam in the sense that Sam is not coerced,
forced or otherwise constrained in making his choice, and in the sense that it is not
causally determined whether Sam will choose to A or B. In particular, assume that R
leaves it undetermined how Sam will decide and act.
It was a commonplace in the debate on free will to say that indeterminism
undermines an agent’s control over her choices and actions. The thought was, very
roughly, that what is not—or cannot be—determined, cannot be under anyone’s
control.50 Clarke, however, argues convincingly that indeterminacy does not
undermine control.
Control, as I shall assume with Clarke, is a causal phenomenon. According to a
causal theory of acting for reasons and reason-explanation, the explanatory and
motivational force of reasons is grounded in a causal connection between reason-
states and actions. In the second chapter I will discuss that point at great length.51 For
the moment note only that there is no obvious reason to think that the causal
connection between reason-states and action must be deterministic. All that is
required is that there is a causal connection—it may be deterministic or probabilistic.
Given that, there is no reason to deny that in the example Sam chooses and acts for
reasons in either case, since either alternative will be caused by Sam’s reasons for A-
ing or B-ing, respectively. But when an agent acts for reasons, then, clearly, that agent
exercises some kind of control (which can be called agential control—the kind of
                                                 
50 Kane, 2002, summarises that argument as follows: ‘An event that is undetermined might occur or not
occur, given the entire past. Thus, whether or not it actually occurs, given its past, would seem to be a
matter of chance. But chance events are not under the control of anything, hence not under the control
of the agent. How then could be free and responsible actions?’ (pp. 22-23). Van Inwagen, 1983,
discusses and rejects three versions of that argument (pp. 126-152).
51 See chapter 2, The Case for Causalism, pp. 73.
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control exercised by agents when they perform actions). That shows that the causal
processes that constitute control need not be deterministic and that indeterminacy
does not by itself undermine control.52 Clarke argues, furthermore, that indeterminacy
does not even diminish control. Whether control is exercised or not is a matter of what
actually causes what. In the example, whether Sam exercises agential control is a
question of whether the action that Sam actually performs is caused by his reason-
states, rather than a question of whether his reason-states might have caused the other
action instead.53
Further, Sam has open or alternative possibilities in an objective or metaphysical
sense due to the fact that Sam’s reason-states leave it undetermined whether he
chooses to A or to B . However, Sam’s agential control is restricted to the kind of
control associated with acting for reasons. If Sam decides to A, then his action is
guided by his reasons for A-ing. That kind of control, as Clarke argues, is compatible
with determinism. It is therefore compatible with Sam’s lacking alternative
possibilities in the indicated metaphysical sense. To assume indeterminism gives Sam
alternative possibilities, but it does not add anything in terms of control. Sam will
exercise control in the sense that both A-ing and B-ing will be done for reasons, but
the indeterministic standard-causal model, as Clarke says,
fails to secure for the agent the exercise of any further positive power to
causally influence which of the alternative courses of events that are open will
become actual.54
It is necessary but not sufficient to require openness. Rather, it must be shown that the
agent also has agential control over which of the alternatives will become actual. That
is why the integrated agent-causal theory assumes in addition to the kind of control
that is constituted by the agent’s acting for reasons,
a further power to causally influence which of the open alternatives will be
made actual. In exercising this further power, the agent is literally an originator
of her action, and neither the action nor her initiating the action is causally
determined by events.55
                                                 
52 It might be helpful to note that indeterminacy does not entail randomness, arbitrariness or
fortuitousness. Assume that the occurrence of an event e1 in circumstances C renders the occurrence of
e2 probable. It would obviously be a mistake to say that an occurrence of e2 is random or arbitrary,
given that e1 caused e2 in C.
53 Compare Clare, 2003, chapter 5.
54 Ibid., p. 133.
55 Clarke, 2003, p.151.
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The strength of this model—as opposed to the traditional version—is that it integrates
the standard-causal account of acting for reasons and reason-explanation. Clarke
acknowledges, thereby, that the standard-causal approach can capture an important
aspect or kind of human agency. What we have to ask is, firstly, whether the standard-
causal theory in fact fails to account for free will and moral responsibility, and
secondly, whether the agent-causal model can do any better.
The Case for Agent-Causation from Free Will
An agent who has free will, I take it, has the ability or power to do otherwise. It is
common to distinguish the following two necessary conditions.56
(AP) Open or Alternative Possibilities. It is open to the agent to decide and do
otherwise than she actually does. In the circumstances, the agent could have
decided and done otherwise.57
(SDO) Self-Determination as Origination. The agent herself determines the
decision and action. The agent is not only the cause, but the source or origin of her
action.58
The case for the agent-causal theory from free will goes along the following lines.
(1) Free will is worth wanting.
(2) Causation by a substance is possible.
(3) Incompatibilism about free will is true; that is, both AP and SDO are
incompatible with the thesis of causal determinism.59
                                                 
56 Compare, for instance, Kane, 1996 and Clarke 2003. Clarke maintains that the characterisation in
terms of alternatives and self-determination is shared by most incompatibilists and compatibilists (for
references in support of that claim see note 2, pp. 3-4). I assume that it is possible that the conditions
for free will are different from the ones for moral responsibility. Generally, free will is an agential
power or ability. According to a traditional characterisation, free will is whatever kind of agency that is
necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility: the conditions for free will are the conditions for
moral responsibility. According to the approach that I endorse, however, free will can be characterised
independently as the power to do otherwise.
57 This characterisation is supposed to capture an intuition concerning what having free will consists in,
and it is supposed to be compatible with all the traditional positions on free will. In particular, the
mentioned openness and the requirement that the agent could have done otherwise are not supposed to
rule out causal determinism (or any other forms of determinism).
58 Kane, 1996, offers four conditions for ‘sole authorship’ or ‘underived origination’, which ‘many
ordinary persons believe in’: ‘(i) The source or ground (arche) of action would be in the agent or self,
and not outside the agent. This would mean that (ii) if we were to trace back the causal or explanatory
chains of action backward to their sources, they would terminate in actions that can only and finally be
explained in terms of the agent’s voluntarily or willingly performing them […]. (iii) The agent would
be […] responsible to some degree for the self which was formed by them and for subsequent actions
issuing from that self. (iv) These self-forming actions would not be determined by anything within or
outside the self for which the agent was in no way responsible’ (p. 79).
59 Kane, 1998, distinguishes between different kinds of determinism, such as physical, psychological,
theological and logical determinism. He maintains that the core of the notion of determinism is the
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(4) A theory of agency is either a causal or a non-causal theory.
(5) Agency is a causal phenomenon; non-causal theories of agency are inadequate.
(6) There are two viable causal theories of agency: the standard-causal and the
agent-causal theory.
(7) Standard-causal theories are inadequate (with respect to either AP or SDO).
(8) Agent-causal theories can satisfy both AP and SDO.
(9) Hence, we have good reason to believe in agent-causation.
Many assumptions in that argument are controversial. I shall assume (1) to (7) for the
sake of the argument, as I will argue only against (8). But I shall add some remarks
with respect to some of the assumptions before turning to (8).
In chapter 4 I will argue that we do not have reason to believe in our having free
will. One part of my argument will show that our intuitions concerning the existence
and value of free will are not conclusive. The important point is that I shall argue and
present reasons for those claims. That is, nothing of what I shall say chapter 4 is
incompatible with the claim that free will is, prima facie, worth wanting.
As already indicated, the assumption that substance-causation is
possible—coherent or intelligible—is very controversial. Most objections to the
agent-causal model are, in effect, objections to that notion of causation. Many of
those objections focus on the fact that substances, unlike events, are not structured
entities.60 In particular, they are not in time like events; they do not occur. That fact
makes it rather difficult to understand, firstly, how reference to a substance can be of
explanatory relevance. For instance, it is central to the explanatory force of an event-
causal explanation that the occurrence of the cause explains the occurrence of the
effect—a feature which is lost when the cause is a substance.61 Secondly, the fact that
                                                                                                                                            
following: an event is determined just in case there are conditions ‘whose joint occurrence is (logically)
sufficient for the occurrence of the event’ (p. 8). Usually and generally, though, philosophers are
concerned with causal determinism, which is often characterised in terms of laws of nature and
possible worlds: the (possibly complex) causal antecedent c causally determines the occurrence of an
event e just in case in every possible world in which c and the actual laws of nature obtain, c causes the
occurrence of e. One may think that incompatibilism requires only that either AP or SDO is
incompatible with causal determinism. That is, strictly speaking, correct. However, incompatibilists
typically argue that both conditions are incompatible with causal determinism. Compare, for instance,
Kane, 1998, especially p. 75.
60 Events are structured in the sense that they have objects, properties and times as their constituents.
Substances are not so structured. For more on that compare Clarke, 2003, especially p. 204.
61 That point is independent from the following. The two main theories of causation are broadly
Humean and counterfactual theories; the former require law-like connections and latter are about
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substances are not structured entities makes it difficult to understand the metaphysics
of substance-causation, since causation seems to be essentially dynamic.62 However, I
shall not develop or discuss those points further and restrict myself to the observation
that agent-causation and substance-causation are problematic notions, since I will
argue against the agent-causal model on different grounds.
Assumption (3) says that incompatibilism about free will is true. In contrast to
the previous assumptions, I assume that not merely for the sake of the argument. I
think that free will, construed as the ability to do otherwise, is not compatible with
causal determinism, and I will explain why in chapter 4.63 For the moment note only
that incompatibilism does not assert that we have free will; it says only that having
free will is incompatible with causal determinism. If we add the claim that we have
free will to incompatibilism, we obtain libertarianism. Hence, libertarian free will is
incompatibilist free will, and given incompatibilism, having free will is having
libertarian free will.
Assumption (7) says that standard-causal theories are inadequate with respect to
either AP or SDO. Depending on whether the causal relations between reason-states
and actions are assumed to be probabilistic or deterministic, a standard-causal model
will violate either the second or both conditions for free will.
Consider first deterministic causal relations between reason-states and actions.
This version is directly ruled out by (3). How the agent is going to act is, in the
circumstances, causally determined by the balance of the agent’s reasons. In the
circumstances, which include the agent’s reason-states and character traits, there is no
objective chance that the agent will do otherwise than she actually does. That violates
                                                                                                                                            
counterfactual dependencies between types. Both theories, it seems, are incompatible with the agent-
causal model, which denies any kind of ‘constant conjunction’ between agents and actions. Humean
and counterfactual theories are reductive and anti-realist accounts of causation. They identify causation
with connections of a different kind (law-like regularity and counterfactual dependence). Provided,
though, that there are viable non-reductive or realist accounts of causation available, the fact that
reductive theories are incompatible with substance-causation is not decisive against substance-
causation. Compare O’Connor, 1995 and Clarke, 1993.
62 Proponents of agent-causation may reply that such objections are begging the question. For what
those objections say is, simply, that substances cannot be causes, because they are not events—or
because they are not sufficiently like events. However, the problem is not simply that substances are
not like events. One can refer to the differences between substances and events in order to explain why
we can understand event-causation, but not substance-causation. But it is the metaphysical nature of
substances, rather than those differences, which is at the root of the problem. For surveys and
discussion of arguments for and against substance- and agent-causation see, for instance, O’Connor,
2000, and Clarke, 2003.
63 See chapter 4, pp. 206.
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AP—given that incompatibilism is true. It is important to note, though, that the
deterministic version can account for self-determination in the sense that the actions
are determined by the agent’s own reason-states. But since the agent-involving
desires, beliefs and intentions are themselves caused by circumstances that are
external to the self, the action does not originate within the self—the agent is not the
origin or source of the action. We get self-determination, but not origination—SDO is
violated as well.
Now assume that the causal relations are probabilistic, and consider again Sam,
who has to decide whether to A or B. Let R be the set of reasons including all reasons
for and against A-ing and B-ing that Sam considers and suppose that the probability
that R causes Sam’s A-ing is the same as the probability that R causes Sam’s B-ing.
No matter which action Sam chooses to do, his action will be caused by his reason-
states and there is an objective chance that Sam does otherwise—for reasons. Hence,
AP is satisfied. But with respect to SDO, indeterminism cannot help. No matter how
the agent decides, the decision will be caused by the agent’s own reason-states. But,
for the same reasons as above, it is not the case that the agent is the origin or source of
the action. (Note that there is a close connection between that point and Clarke’s point
concerning control presented above, pp. 31. The agent is in control in the sense that
the action is caused by the agent’s reason-states in the right way. But since the reason-
states leave the choice undetermined, the agent does not determine—does not have
control over—which of the open alternatives will become actual. I shall say more on
the problem of control further below, and will return to that issue in chapter 4.)
We can conclude that neither the deterministic nor the probabilistic version of the
standard-causal model can account for origination; hence (7) holds. Proponents of
agent-causation think that their view can account for both AP and SDO—and for the
associated kind of control. For, if the agent has the power to cause an action directly,
the agent is, literally, the origin or source of that action. Given that, they can
conclude, in conjunction with the assumption that non-causal theories are inadequate,
that there is reason to endorse the agent-causal theory, as it is the only theory that can
account for free will.
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The Case for Agent-Causation from Moral Responsibility
The case for agent-causation would be considerably stronger, if it could be shown that
the agent-causal model is the only model that can account for moral responsibility.64
The presented argument from free will would show that under the additional
assumption that free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility—that AP
and SDO are necessary conditions for being morally responsible. (In the following I
shall call the view that being morally responsible presupposes libertarian free will
libertarianism about moral responsibility).
The conditions for moral responsibility, however, are more controversial than the
ones for free will. If moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, both
deterministic and probabilistic versions of the standard-causal theory might be
adequate—as far as moral responsibility is concerned. If it is incompatible, we need
an account of agency that satisfies AP. A probabilistic version of the standard-causal
model can satisfy this condition. The question would then be whether self-
determination without origination is sufficient for moral responsibility. If origination
is not necessary, the standard-causal theory remains an option.
The case for agent-causation stands here on rather weak grounds. Proponents of
the agent-causal theory could easily construct a case from moral responsibility by
reformulating the presented case from free will, if both AP and SDO were necessary
conditions for moral responsibility. However, Harry Frankfurt argued, convincingly
as I think, that AP is not necessary for moral responsibility.65 Further, since
probabilistic standard-causal theories satisfy AP and since they can account for self-
determination, proponents of agent-causation must assume that origination is crucial
to accountability. Further below, however, I will argue that origination does not make
a relevant difference, as far as moral responsibility is concerned.
                                                 
64 Of course, neither the agent-causal nor the standard-causal model provides an account of moral
responsibility. What I am assuming here is that an agent’s being morally responsible presupposes that
the agent exercises a certain kind of agency. The question is, then, whether that kind of agency can be
accounted for by the theory of agency in question. We can then say that a theory of agency can account
for moral responsibility, in the sense that it can account for the kind of agency necessary for moral
responsibility.
65 For the well-known counterexamples to the claim that alternative possibilities are necessary for
moral responsibility see Frankfurt, 1969, reprinted in Frankfurt 1988. For more on that, and for a
defence of a compatibilist theory of moral responsibility see for instance Fischer and Ravizza, 1998
and Haji, 1998. Compare also chapter 4, p. 197, note 78.
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The Case Against Agent-Causation
In his book Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Clarke has questioned the possibility
of causation by a substance. But he argues that an integrated agent-causal theory
would provide the best libertarian account of free will and moral responsibility, if
substance-causation were possible. Given that, libertarians about free will and moral
responsibility have good reasons to endorse the agent-causal approach, and to develop
and defend a theory of substance-causation. Against that, I will argue that agent-
causation does not help with libertarian free will and moral responsibility. (Note that
from that it follows that the agent-causal theory does not help with libertarianism
about acting for reasons either.)
Explanation and Control
Reference to an event-cause can explain why a certain type of effect occurred when it
occurred. Reference to substance-causes does not provide causal explanations of that
sort—it does not explain why certain types of events occur when they occur. Clarke
thinks that reference to agents as substance-causes can give us answers to some why-
question. If, for instance, Sue’s A-ing leads to a tragic accident, the question “Why
did that happen?” can sensibly be answered with “Because of Sue.” But Clarke
acknowledges that this falls short of the kind of explanation that we typically expect
in the case of human agency.66 In particular, reference to the agent as a substance-
cause does not explain why the agent did what she did—rather than something else.
But it does not follow, firstly, that agents cannot be causes. Causal explanation, as
Clarke points out, has many epistemic and pragmatic dimensions that are not shared
by the metaphysical relation of causation, and the connection between causation and
explanation ‘may not have to be as straightforward’ as is often assumed.67 And
secondly, it does not follow that substance-causation is worthless or unimportant
insofar as human agency is concerned. Appealing to agent-causation, the integrated
model goes beyond the standard-causal model not in terms of explanation, but in
terms of control.68 Adding a ‘further power to causally influence which of the open
                                                 
66 Compare Clarke, 2003, p. 200.
67 Ibid., p. 201.
68 Compare Clarke, ibid., p. 200: ‘substance causation is not appealed to by an agent causalist in order
to address any problem concerning explanation. The appeal is aimed at solving a problem of control,
[…] and the issue of control is different from that of explanation’.
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alternatives will be made actual’ it can account for the kind of control that is required
for libertarian free will and moral responsibility.69
Clarke thinks that control is a causal phenomenon, and he maintains that
causation by the agent is or constitutes a kind of agential control. But it is not so
obvious that the agent-causal power does in fact constitute an additional kind of
control, and it is not obvious that the approach can help us to understand libertarian
free will and moral responsibility. My objection to Clarke’s model, and to the agent-
causal theory in general, is that appeal to the agent—as a substance—cannot account
for control. It does not only fail to account for the kind of control that is required for
libertarian free will and moral responsibility, but it cannot account for the
phenomenon of agential control at all. Given that, it will become clear that it fails
thereby to account for SDO—self-determination as origination—as well.
Origination and Control
In chapter 4 I will explain how the standard-causal model can account for agential
control. In order to see why the agent-causal theory fails to account for control, it will
be instructive to anticipate some of the features of the standard-causal account.
On the standard-causal model, an agent’s exercise of control is constituted by
agent-involving event-causal processes. A necessary condition for such a process to
be an exercise of control is that the effect-component is caused by some of the agent’s
reason-states. However, as examples involving deviant—or wayward—causal chains
show, rationalisation and mere causation is not sufficient. Rather, the reason-states
must cause the action in the right—that is, non-deviant—way. Generally, a causal
chain leading from the agent’s reason-states to the action is deviant if it runs through
an event that undermines the agent’s control over the action.70 I shall argue that such
cases can be blocked if it is required that the action is in addition guided by and
responsive to the reason-states. In particular, the action must be guided by and
responsive to the contents of the relevant reason-state. In chapter 4 I will discuss the
notions of guidance and reason-responsiveness in more detail, and we will see that
they are compatible with the standard-causal approach.
                                                 
69 Clarke, 2003, especially chapter 9
70 In a much-discussed example (which is due to Donald Davidson, 1980) the reason-states cause a
state of nervousness, which then causes the movement that is rationalised by those reason-states. I will
discuss that example in chapter 4, pp. 160, and pp. 179.
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Let us turn now to the agent-causal model. Clarke argues that we have to
consider the issue of agential control alone—separated from the issue of the
explanation—in order to see the advantage of the agent-causal approach. The
problem, though, is that it is difficult to see how and why the agent-causal power
constitutes a kind of control at all—let alone the kind of control required for
libertarianism.
According to the reductive standard-causal model, an agent exercises control just
in case her actions are caused, guided by and responsive to some of her reason-states.
The theory explains what control consists in and how an agent’s exercise of control is
realised by event-causal processes. We can see or understand why that is an account
of control. A central role in the account is played by the intentional contents of agent-
involving reason-states. Nothing, though, plays a similar role in the agent-causal
theory. In fact, nothing can play such a role, simply because substances do not have
contents. Reference to guidance by and responsiveness to contents explains why the
causal process in question constitutes an exercise of control, and it explains particular
exercises of control—it explains why it is exercised in the particular way in which it
is exercised (by the agent in the circumstances).
The exercise of the agent-causal power, however, is not guided by the agent’s
reason-states, character traits or some other features of the agent. It remains therefore
unintelligible why the agent exercises that power in the particular way she does. The
theory, as far as I can see, cannot explain why an exercise of the agent-causal power
is an exercise of control at all—it does not have the resources to explain why, and in
what sense, the agent controls her actions. We can agree with Clarke that control is a
causal phenomenon, if that is supposed to mean that wherever there is control, there is
causation. The converse, it seems clear, does not hold. It is certainly not the case that
wherever there is causation, there is agential control. If we want to understand control
as a causal phenomenon, we must specify in virtue of what further features a given
causal process constitutes control—we must specify what distinguishes causal
processes that constitute control from the ones that do not. The agent-causal theory
fails in that respect. It does not explain why the agent-causal relation is not merely a
causal relation—it does not explain why it constitutes control. Now, Clarke is aware
of objections of that sort. In response he says that the
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[…] objection loses force when we note that the substance in question is the
agent and, moreover, one who has sophisticated rational mental capacities.71
Given those capacities, he says,
[…] it seems to me a credible claim that this individual’s causing that decision
partly constitutes the active control that she exercises in making that decision.72
That response is hardly convincing, though. The claim is that the agent’s causing the
action constitutes active control, because that very agent is a conscious and rational
being. But a well-developed standard-causal model can account for all such ‘rational
mental capacities’ and for their role in the production of action. Furthermore, by
requiring that the contents of mental attitudes are causally relevant it explains why the
mental states—and the involved dispositions and capacities—guide behaviour. It is
just not obvious that the exercise of an additional causal power is also guided by
those capacities, merely because it is one and the same agent who possesses both that
additional agent-causal power and the rational capacities. The guidance provided by
the mental and rational capacities may well be restricted to the kind of control
described by the standard-causal model.
Clarke thinks it is credible to think that agent-causation provides the kind of
active control required for free will, because the agent is, literally, an originator of
her decisions and actions. We saw that standard-causal theories fail to account for free
will, since they fail to provide an account of self-determination as origination—all
they can account for is self-determination without origination. Let us grant Clarke that
the agent is the originator of the action, because the agent causes it directly. The
crucial question is, though, whether origination amounts to, or counts as, self-
determination—for what is required it not brute origination but self-determination as
origination.73
Recall that, according to the standard-causal model, the action is determined by
the agent himself, because it is caused, in the right way, by the agent’s reason-states.
In accounting for self-determination in that way, we are referring to mental aspects of
                                                 
71 Clarke, 2003, p. 162.
72 Ibid.
73 By ‘brute origination’ I mean a primitive metaphysical relation of causation that holds between the
agent and an action (performed by that agent), which is distinct from all causal relations that hold
between (events of) the agent’s having of certain properties and actions (performed by that agent). In
other words, that relation holds between actions and the substance simpliciter—as opposed to the
substance’s having or instantiating some property.
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the agent. What we get is a plausible account of self-determination without
origination.74 But if we identify the self with the agent—construed as the human
organism—we get nothing like that. We lose the features of the agent that help us to
understand why the causal processes in question constitute self-determination; we get
origination without self-determination. Self-determination cannot just be a brute
relation of causal determination that holds between the self and the action—at least
not if the self is construed as the human animal. Clearly, agents who govern
themselves—who act autonomously—know what they are doing and they are in
charge of what they are doing. Self-determination cannot be mere causation. It must
be causation that constitutes agential control. But being a causal origin of something,
as we have seen, is not the same as having agential control. (It seems to me that the
point about control and the point about self-determination are two sides of the same
coin, as it were. The agent-causal relation does not constitute control, because it is not
causation that is guided by and responsive to relevant mental features of the self, and
it does not constitute self-determination, because it does not constitute agential
control.)
One may respond that the integrated agent-causal model establishes the desired
synthesis of self-determination and origination. But that is not convincing. The
aspects of self-determination and control are accounted for by the standard-causal
component of the model. The agent-causal component provides the aspect of
origination. What must be shown is that the agent-causal component constitutes
agential control and self-determination by itself, which cannot be achieved by merely
supplementing it with a standard-causal account of control and self-determination.
Origination and Moral Responsibility
Clarke concedes that the direct relevance of agent-causation to free will is neither
obvious, nor certain. In connection with that, he says that is difficult to directly settle
questions such as whether an agent is able to decide otherwise or whether it is really
up to an agent to do otherwise, because we do not have ‘sufficiently robust intuitions
                                                 
74 Note that this a rather weak conception of self-determination, which must be distinguished from the
stronger account of autonomous agency, which will be outlined in chapter 4, pp. 196.
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on the matter’.75 We should, therefore, try to find another way to settle the issue.
Clarke says that
the best way that we have to address the question whether the account at issue
secures the exercise of sufficient active control for free will is by turning to the
things for the sake of which we value free will, and in particular to moral
responsibility.76
Turning to moral responsibility, however, Clarke does not really offer anything new.
The idea seems to be that the appeal to the agent as originator is more convincing in
the case of moral responsibility than in the case of free will. Clarke, of course, is not
alone in having this intuition. In fact, the idea that one is truly responsible for an
action only if one has initiated it—only if one was its origin—seems to be a central
motive behind the agent-causal approach. Roderick Chisholm, for instance, argued
that an agent is not responsible for the things that are caused by her desires and
beliefs, since she is not responsible for the desires and beliefs she ‘happens to have’.77
An agent is responsible for an action, only if the agent herself causes it. But an agent
is not identical with her desires and beliefs. Chisholm says that ‘if I am responsible
for an event, then I initiate a causal chain [...].’78 And an agent initiates a causal chain
leading to an action, only if the agent is the uncaused cause or causal origin of it.79 In
support of this view, Clark invites us to consider the following example.80
Compare the two agents Sam, and his counterpart Sammy. Both Sam and Sammy
have to decide whether to A or B. Sam lives in a deterministic world; how he is going
to decide is causally determined by antecedent events. The world of Sammy is
indeterministic and he causes the action in accordance with the integrated agent-
causal view. Assume further that Sam is not morally responsible. Do we have reason
to believe that Sammy is morally responsible? Clarke says that it ‘strikes’ him that
Sammy ‘may well be responsible’ for the following two reasons. Firstly, the decision
made by Sammy is not determined; he has alternative possibilities. And secondly,
                                                 
75 Ibid., p. 160.
76 Ibid., p. 161.
77 Compare Chisholm, 1964, p. 29.
78 Chisholm, 1977, p. 624.
79 Compare, for instance, van Inwagen’s reading of Chisholm. He says that, according to Chisholm,
‘for an act to be [agent]-causally determined is just what it is for that act to be such that its agent is
responsible for it: produced by the agent himself, and by nothing else’ (van Inwagen, 1977, p. 570).
80 Clarke, 2003, p. 160.
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he exercised greater active control; he exercised a further power to causally
influence which of the open alternatives would come about. In doing so, he was
literally an originator of his decision [...] This is why [Sammy] is morally
responsible for his decision [...].81
The first of the two reasons is irrelevant in the given context. As Clarke himself
argues, we do not have to assume agent-causation in order to account for alternative
possibilities, because a probabilistic standard-causal theory can satisfy AP as well. As
with respect to the second reason, I do not find the appeal to origination more
convincing than in the case of free will. The suggested kind of origination may
account for causal responsibility. But when the question who caused something is
settled, it may still be an open question whether the person in question is morally
responsible. When we try to settle that question we are, usually, interested in the
person’s intentions, or, for instance in cases of negligence, whether the person paid as
much attention as it can reasonably be expected. Our judgement whether an agent is
morally responsible depends on such information about the agent, rather than on the
information that this agent, rather than somebody else, caused the action in
question—in philosophical debates on moral responsibility we usually assume that we
already know that.82
Conclusion
To construe self-determination and an agent’s exercise of control as a causal
phenomenon works in the case of the standard-causal theory, because non-deviant
causation of actions by reason-states requires guidance by and responsiveness to the
contents of those states. Nothing can account, in a similar way, for control in the case
of agent-causation. The exercise of the stipulated additional causal power remains
mysterious, and it cannot be explained why having that power amounts to having an
additional source of agential control.
The case for agent-causation is based on the assumption that causation by a
substance is possible, that libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility is
                                                 
81 Ibid.
82 Apart from that, there are at least two further problems with Clarke’s approach. Firstly, the argument
is circular with respect to the traditional approach, according to which accountability is grounded in
free will, rather than the other way round. Clarke, though, treats being responsible as a criterion for
having free will (and for having the required kind of agential control). Secondly, it seems that there is
no way of finding out whether or not the person in question agent-caused the action, in the
circumstances. But whether the conditions for a person’s being morally responsible apply or not must
be knowable, for we are, after all, dealing with a practical issue.
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true, and that only agent-causal theories can account for libertarian free will and moral
responsibility. I argued that agent-causation fails in that respect. It cannot account for
libertarian free will and moral responsibility, because it cannot account for self-
determination as origination and the associated kind of control. Given that, the case
for agent-causation collapses.
Now we can see that the objection addresses the agent-causal view in general,
rather than just the integrated version. Two points must be noticed here. Firstly, the
case for the traditional agent-causal model adds to the case for the integrated model
only the argument from libertarianism about acting for reasons. On that view, acting
for reasons is choosing in the light of reasons with libertarian free will. But, given that
the case from libertarian free will fails, the case from acting for reasons fails as well.
Secondly, the objection says that the agent-causal model fails to account for self-
determination and agential control. That, of course, is an objection against the agent-
causal approach as such—it applies to both the integrated and the traditional model.
I shall close this section with a remark concerning the overall dialectic of the case
against the agent-causal theory. We assumed, for the sake of the argument, that
causation by a substance is possible. That assumption, as I noted, is very
controversial, and usually it is motivated by the endeavour to defend an agent-causal
theory. That is to say that belief in the possibility—coherence or intelligibility—of
substance-causation is, usually, motivated by belief in agent-causation. The outlined
arguments from libertarian free will, moral responsibility and acting for reasons are
supposed to provide independent reason to believe in agent-causation. However,
given that those arguments fail to support the agent-causal model, the troubles with
the notion of substance-causation strengthen the case against agent-causation.
The Metaphysics of Agency
We have distinguished between three positions in the metaphysics of agency: the
reductive model, the non-reductive model and volitionism. What is of great
importance, in connection with that, is the metaphysical status of reasons for action.
In particular, the question whether the reasons for an action are among its causes, and
the closely related question whether reason-explanations of actions are causal
explanations. We saw that reductive positions go hand in hand with a causal theory
about acting for reasons and reason-explanation, whereas non-reductive views are
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compatible with both causalism and non-causalism.83 In the second and third chapter I
will defend causalism about reasons and reason-explanations. In connection with that,
I will argue against another position concerning the metaphysics of agency; namely,
pluralism. According to pluralism, the endeavour to provide an account of the relation
between reasons for action and the causes of bodily movements is a misguided
project. Scientific explanations and reason-explanations are different in kind and
entirely independent. Once the endeavour to account for the relationship between
them is given up, the questions and problems entailed by the causal approach
disappear. We can, then, distinguish between the following positions.
Reductionism about agency: the ability or power to choose and act—possibly in
the light of reasons—can be reduced to and explained by reference to agent-
involving states and events and the causal and causally explanatory relations
that hold between them.
Non-reductionism about agency: the ability or power to choose and
act—possibly in the light of reasons—is irreducible and primitive; in particular,
it cannot be reduced to or explained by reference to agent-involving states and
events and the causal and causally explanatory relations that hold between them.
Volitionism: the ability or power to choose and act—possibly in the light of
reasons—cannot be understood as a causal or otherwise relational phenomenon.
Rather, an agent manifests that power or ability by performing spontaneous
mental acts, which are sui generis acts.
Pluralism: The attempt to account for the ability or power to choose and
act—possibly in the light of reasons—is a misguided metaphysical project,
which stems from the equally misguided attempt to specify the interrelations
between the space of reasons and the space of causes.
In the next chapter I will say more about causalism and non-causalism about reason-
explanations and about the pluralist stance. In the following last sections of this
chapter I will, firstly, present objects to volitionism. Then I will turn to further
versions of non-reductionism. And finally, I will briefly discuss two further
approaches; namely, emergentism and the Kantian approach. I will show that the
different versions of emergentism and the Kantian model fall under the introduced
positions—that they fall under reductionism, non-reductionism or pluralism.
                                                 
83 Prima facie, reductionism about agency is also compatible with non-causalism about reasons. But it
is difficult to see why anyone would endorse and defend this position. I will say more on that in
chapter 2, pp. 108.
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Volitionism
Volitionism says that all actions issue from certain basic mental acts—from volitions
or acts of the will. Construed in that broad sense, the view is compatible with the
reductive standard-causal and with the non-reductive agent-causal model of agency,
since it may construe volitions either as being caused by agent-involving reason-states
or as being caused by the agent. However, I take volitionism to be the view that
volitions are not caused at all; neither by events nor by substances.84 Further, volitions
confer agency on other mental events and on bodily movement. That is, they are
voluntary mental and overt actions just in case they are caused by volitions.85
I said that volitionism is widely rejected, since it is subject to a vicious regress
argument.86 That argument goes roughly as follows. According to volitionism, bodily
movements and mental events are or constitute voluntary actions only if they are
caused by agent-involving volitions. What about the volitions themselves? By
definition, they are volitional acts themselves—otherwise they could not ground
voluntary action. But if they are voluntary acts, they must themselves be caused by a
volition, and so on—ad infinitum.
Even opponents of the view, though, have pointed out that the regress argument
is by no means decisive.87 The argument assumes that all voluntary actions must be
caused by volitions. But that is not what volitionism says. Volitionism says that only
those voluntary actions, which are not themselves volitions, must be caused by
volitions. It divides voluntary action into two sub-categories: actions, which are
voluntary actions in virtue of being caused by volitions, and volitions, which are
voluntary actions in virtue of intrinsic properties. The regress argument, however,
imposes the assumption that all voluntary actions are voluntary actions in virtue of
causal—that is, extrinsic—properties. Given that, the objection seems plainly to beg
the question.
However, things are not so straightforward; neither for nor against volitionism. I
agree that the regress argument alone is not decisive. Furthermore, I think that there is
no single objection to volitionism that is by itself decisive. But there are a number of
                                                 
84 That is why Clarke, 2003, calls it a ‘noncausal’ and O’Conner, 2000, the ‘simple indeterminist’
view.
85 Recent defenders of the view include Hornsby, 1980, McCann, 1998, and Ginet, 1990.
86 That argument is usually credited to Gilbert Ryle, 1949.
87 Compare Brand, 1984; Enç, 2003.
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further points, which jointly provide good reason to reject the view, and which help to
restore the force of the regress argument—at least to some extent.
Firstly, to require an extrinsic or relational account of agency is not simply
begging the question. Only a relational characterisation allows us to reduce actions to
events, and there are independent reasons why such a reduction is worth wanting. To
be sure, a position should not be rejected just because it is non-reductive, or just
because it commits us to an additional ontological category—a category of sui generis
acts. Generally, reductive accounts provide a better explanation of phenomena of a
certain kind by reducing them to—and thereby explaining their relationship
with—phenomena of a different kind. In order to see why that is the case with respect
to agency, consider the following two claims. Firstly, it is very plausible to assume
that both mental and overt actions are realised by events (say, by brain events and
bodily movements). Secondly, it is widely held among contemporary philosophers
that the order of physical events—generally, the order of events as opposed to sui
generis acts—is causally closed. Given those two assumptions, it seems that a
reductive account of agency is worth wanting, because it locates agency within the
order of events—it shows us how actions relate to events by showing how agency can
be realised by event-causal processes.88 A non-reductive account faces the burden of
explaining how sui generis acts relate to events, which constitute or realise them, and
of explaining how such acts can interact with events without violating the closure of
event-causation. No non-reductive theory of agency, as far as I know, has yet
provided satisfying answers to those questions. Given that, we have good reason to
prefer reductive accounts.89
Secondly, an extrinsic or relational characterisation is to be preferred for the
further reason that intrinsic characterisations are implausible and problematic. Some
philosophers have described volitions as efforts of the will or as tryings. But that
seems misguided—at least as far as our common sense concepts of trying and making
                                                 
88 I will say more the on that in chapter 2 and 3.
89 Jonathan Lowe, 1993, has suggested an emergentist account of mental causation according to which
mental acts are causally efficacious not as events, but as enabling causes; they coordinate rather than
initiate causal chains. Lowe argues that enabling causes can be causally efficacious without being
reduced to physical events and without violating the causal closure of the physical. But that proposal
misses the very nature of volitions. Recall that volitions are a manifestation of the agent’s ability to
perform acts spontaneously: they are mental actions by virtue of which the agent can initiate actions
spontaneously. To construe them as enabling causes—and deny their power to initiate—cannot rescue
their efficacy as volitions.
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an effort are concerned. Typically, one tries to—or makes an effort to—bring
something about, which involves the performance of an overt action. Playing
basketball, for instance, one tries to make a basket by doing it—by throwing the ball.
It seems plainly wrong to say that, in such cases, the effort or the trying is the mental
component that remains when the bodily movement is subtracted.90
According to Ginet, the feature that distinguishes volitions from events is what he
calls an ‘actish phenomenal quality’, and he says that it is part of this ‘I-directly-
make-it-happen phenomenal quality of my mental act that I determine that it occurs
precisely then, when it does.’91 It has been pointed out, though, that this approach is
hopelessly subjective.92 That point becomes most obvious when one considers the
notion of agential control. According to Ginet, an agent exercises control just in case
it seems to the agent that she exercises control. But introspective judgements can be
false. And if they are correct, there should be something in virtue of which they are
correct. Introspection may reliably track or indicate control, but, clearly, we do not
want to say that the fact that something seems or feels like being in control constitutes
control. What further counts against volitionism, in connection with that, is that the
theory does not provide an account of control—it merely provides a description of
how it seems or feels like to be in control.
Thirdly, volitionism is problematic, because it is committed to a non-causal
theory of reason-explanation. It denies that desires and beliefs are among the causes
of both mental and overt actions, and it is therefore not compatible with the causal
theory of reason-explanation. Given that non-causal alternatives are problematic, as I
will argue in chapter 2, volitionism is problematic as well.
Finally, volitionism misconstrues agency. According to the view, volitions are
more basic or fundamental than overt actions in the sense that the latter are actions in
virtue of being caused by the former. Let us assume that mental and overt actions are
not on a par: one of the two kinds of action is more basic than the other one. There is
a strong prima facie case for claim that overt actions are in fact more basic than
mental acts. What is, among other things, central to the concept of human agency is
                                                 
90 To put that point in mathematical terms is of course inspired by Wittgenstein’s question: ‘What is
left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raised my arm?’ (Wittgenstein,
1953, 622).
91 Ginet, 1990, p. 14.
92 Compare O’Connor, 2000, pp. 25-26; Clarke, 2003, pp. 19-21 and Enç, 2003, pp. 18-19.
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the notion of goal-directedness and the notion of doing something for reasons. Agents
perform actions in order to achieve or attain some of their goals, and those actions are
subject to explanations in terms of reasons. Now, hardly ever, if ever at all, one’s end
is to make up one’s mind—to decide or will something. And hardly ever, if ever at
all, we have reasons to decide or will something, which are not in the first place
reasons to bring something about (by performing an overt action). Our goals and ends
are, typically, things that can be achieved or attained only by performing overt
actions, and our reasons for action are, typically, reasons for overt actions. That is, of
course, not to say that we make decisions for no reason. Rather, the reasons for which
we decide are, typically, the reasons for which we perform overt actions. Decisions
are, typically, instrumental in the sense that we must make decisions in order to move
from states of indecision to states in which we are settled on pursuing one course of
action.93 Those observations support the claim that overt rather than mental actions
form the more basic or fundamental kind of action.
None of those objections is by itself decisive against volitionism. But taking all
of them together gives us good reasons to reject volitionism. At the very least, it gives
us reason to prefer alternative accounts that do better with respect to all or some of
those points.
The Non-Reducible Self
I rejected the agent-causal theory, which is a version of the non-reductive approach to
agency. Now I shall explain why the presented argument applies to non-reductionism
in general. Most philosophers who reject the agent-causal theory do so because they
reject the notion of causation involved—they reject agent-causation because they
think that causation by a substance is impossible. Others are dissatisfied with the way
in which the agent-causal theory construes the agent. They reject the view that the
human agent is the human animal or organism.94 So, the former object to the idea that
                                                 
93 Compare, for instance, Mele, 1992, chapter 9.
94 As already noted, according O’Connor it is the ‘official’ agent-causal view that the agent is the
human organism. It might be questioned, though, whether that is possible at all. One may think that the
human agent is essentially a person, and that a person is essentially a self-conscious, rational and
responsible agent. Given that, the human animal is certainly not essentially a human agent, because the
human animal can survive change that the human agent cannot survive. The human animal and the
human agent, in other words, have different persistence conditions. If one thinks that different kinds of
substances are distinguished by their persistence conditions, then it seems that the human agent cannot
possibly be identical with the human animal (compare for instance Lowe, 1996 and 2003b). Prima
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actions are caused by substances, and the latter reject the idea that human actions are
caused by the human organism.
The non-reductive approach says, generally, that whenever a human agent
performs an action—possibly in the light of reasons—the agent stands in a
metaphysically irreducible relation with that action (or with an event that is or
constitutes that action). One may, then, reject agent-causation and endorse the non-
reductive approach by denying that the irreducible relation in question is causal in
nature. Or one may endorse a different version of agent-causation that does not
identify the agent with the organism.
But if the relation is not causal, of what kind is it? And if the self is not the
organism, what kind of thing is it? A possible answer to the latter question is to say
that, since we are concerned with intentional, rational and possibly free agency, the
agent must be an entity that is psychological or mental in kind. With respect to the
former, one may stipulate a primitive and irreducible relation—say the relation of
performance. We obtain, then, three further versions of non-reductionism about
agency. The first says that mental substances irreducibly cause actions. The second
says that human organisms irreducibly perform actions, and the third version says that
mental substances irreducibly perform actions. The first option has recently been
defended by Jonathan Lowe and William Hasker.95 John Searle has suggested a
position that is in line with the third version.96 The second option is not currently held,
as far as I know.
Let me now explain why my argument against agent-causation can be generalised
to an argument against non-reductionism about agency. That argument says,
basically, that appeal to agent-causation does not account for self-determination as
origination and for the associated kind of control that is required for libertarianism. I
                                                                                                                                            
facie, it is not open to proponents of agent-causation to identify the agent with an individual that is an
agent in virtue of having the right accidental properties. Causation by the agent is causation by a
substance. The causal work is done, as it were, by the substance, rather than by the substance’s having
of a certain property—which would be tantamount to event-causation. The outlined argument, though,
suggests that the human animal cannot be that substance. The agent must therefore be identical with a
substance distinct from the human animal—say, a psychological rather than a biological substance
(Lowe, 2003b, argues that this view does not entail that persons are immaterial substances). I shall not
pursue this line of argument. Rather, I will assume, for the sake of the argument, that the official view,
according to which the agent is the human animal, is coherent.
95 See Lowe, 2003b, and Hasker 1999.
96 Searle, 2001, thinks that we must postulate an irreducible ‘self that combines the capacities of
rationality and agency’, that decides and performs actions on the basis of reasons and that is the ‘locus
of responsibility’ (p. 95 and p. 89).
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argued, furthermore, that it does not provide an account of control at all. Rather, it
simply maintains that the irreducible agent-causal power constitutes control. The
standard-causal approach can account for control. According to that theory, the agent
exercises control by virtue of being guided by and responsive to the contents of the
relevant mental states and events. The fact that the contents of mental states and
events play a causal role is crucial to that account. Nothing, though, plays a similar or
comparable role in the agent-causal theory. The theory, I argued, does not have the
resources to tell us why and in what sense the agent controls or guides her actions. It
is quite obvious, I think, that the alternative versions of the non-reductive view fail as
well in that respect. It does not matter whether one refers to a biological or mental
substance, for what is responsible for the failure is reference to a substance
simpliciter.
In response one may say that mental substances, as opposed to biological
substances, have mental properties that can explain the required kind of control.
However, if it is a mental property that can be associated with a mental attitude that is
of the same kind as familiar propositional attitudes—such as beliefs, desires and
intentions—then the theory collapses into the reductive approach. For then there is no
obvious reason to deny that it is the substance’s having or instantiating that
property—an event—that does the causal work. Furthermore, in chapter 4 I will argue
that control constituted by mental attitudes of that kind is not the kind of control that
is required for libertarianism.97
If, however, that mental property is supposed to constitute the having of a mental
attitude of a different kind, then we would need to know more about it. Is that mental
attitude a propositional attitude? Is it a cognitive or a conative attitude? Does it have a
so-called direction of fit? In what relationships does it stand with the familiar
propositional attitudes—what is its functional role? Can it explain the required kind of
control? There are, as far as I can see, no mental attitudes for which questions of that
kind can be answered and which do not fall under one of the familiar types of mental
attitudes. But assume, for the sake of the argument, that mental substances have
mental properties that can explain the exercise of the required kind of control. Even
then, any particular exercise of that kind of control could as well be explained by
referring to the substance’s having or instantiating that property. And, again, there
                                                 
97 See chapter 4, pp. 198.
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would be no obvious reason to deny that it is the substance-involving event, rather
than the substance, that does the causal work—the theory would, again, collapse into
the reductive account.98
Kantian Psychology
Kantian and neo-Kantian moral theories feature distinctive accounts of the nature of
practical reasoning, reasons for action, personal autonomy, and moral responsibility. I
do not think, though, that they provide an alternative position in the metaphysics of
agency. Rather, different versions or interpretations of the broadly Kantian moral
psychology can be subsumed under reductionism, non-reductionism or pluralism
about agency. I shall restrict my considerations to the claims that are central to
Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian theory and to some aspects of Kant’s own
position.
What is central to Korsgaard’s position—central for our purposes, at least—is the
role of reflection in the performance of action. Korsgaard says that desires and
inclinations do not lead directly to action, if the agent is acting for a reason. When
acting for reasons, agents endorse given desires as reasons. That means that the agent
reflects on the normative status of what is desired, and endorses it as a reason—or as
giving her a reason—by deciding to act on it.99 Further, by endorsing a desire as a
reason, the agent adopts or applies a principle of choice—a principle that says that
incentives of that kind constitute reasons for action, in the circumstances. And by
acting in accordance with it, as Korsgaard argues, the agent identifies herself with that
principle of choice.
[When you deliberate and when you act for a reason] it is as if there were
something over and above all of your desires, something which is you, and
which chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by
which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of
yourself.100
                                                 
98 Clarke speculates that there might be, what he calls, an ‘agent-causal property’ that confers an
irreducible power directly onto the substance, such that the exercise of that power can only be
attributed to the substance, rather than the substance’s possession of that property (Clarke, 2003, p.
145). Something similar might be maintained with respect to a mental substance’s performing or
causing an action. But still, as long as we are not being told more about that special property, we
cannot even assess whether or not the non-reductive view can thereby explain control.
99 Korsgaard, 1996b, pp. 94-97.
100 Korsgaard, 1996b, p. 100.
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[At] the moment of action I must identify myself with my principle of choice if
I am to regard myself as the agent of the action at all.101
Does such a neo-Kantian position constitute an alternative position in the metaphysics
of agency? According to the view, the agent is able to choose to act on certain
motives in accordance with—or in the light of—principles of choice. If we want to
know more about the role of the agent, we have to ask whether or not the agent’s
ability or power to choose in accordance with principles can be reduced to the role of
the motives and principles involved. Either the agent’s role can be understood in
terms of—and reduced to—the role of the motives and principles in question, or it
cannot. If it can be reduced, we obtain a version of the reductive view, and if it
cannot, the view is a version of the non-reductive approach.
In the former case, it may well be that principles of choice assume a special role
in comparison to other mental attitudes, since they are, as Korsgaard says, expressive
of oneself. But there is no reason to think that their contribution in the production of
action is different in kind than the one from other mental attitudes (such as desires,
beliefs, and intentions). In particular, if the influence of mental states and events is, in
general, construed as causal, then there is no reason to think that the influence of
principles of choice is non-causal.102
The only way to avoid the disjunction that the theory falls under either the
reductive or the non-reductive approach is to deny both that the influence of mental
states and events is causal in kind and that agents have an irreducible power to act in
the light of reasons. But, as will become clear in the next chapter, such a non-causal
position is committed to pluralism. That shows, then, that Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian
model of agency falls under reductionism, non-reductionism or pluralism about
agency. I shall close this section with a remark on Kant’s own theory of agency.
A purported advantage of neo-Kantian theories is that they avoid all the problems
that stem from Kant’s doctrine of the two worlds: the noumenal and the phenomenal
world. Very roughly, every person has a noumenal and a phenomenal self in virtue of
participating in—or being a member of—both worlds. Phenomena are ruled by causal
necessity and by the laws of nature, whereas noumena are free from them; they are,
rather, ruled by the norms of reason and morality. Christine Korsgaard suggested
                                                 
101 Ibid., p. 241.
102 Arguably, principles of choice are beliefs with certain contents; namely beliefs about what
considerations or motives count as—or should be treated as—reasons for action.
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replacing this doctrine by a theory of two standpoints.103 From a theoretical standpoint
we are, as all members of the natural world, subject to causal forces and our
behaviour admits of scientific explanations in causal terms. From a practical
standpoint, however, we can—in fact, we have to—regard ourselves as the free,
rational and truly responsible sources of our own actions. Certainly, the talk about
different standpoints or perspectives sounds less problematic than talk about two
worlds. And it may well be that neo-Kantian positions can avoid difficult
metaphysical questions and problems by adopting that move. But there is one
problematic feature of the doctrine of the two worlds that a theory of two standpoints
cannot avoid. Commenting on Kant, Korsgaard says that
[to] ask how freedom and determinism are related is to inquire into the relation
between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds, a relation about which it is
in principle impossible to know anything.104
But something similar can be said about the two standpoints as well. In fact,
Korsgaard says that the theoretical and the practical standpoint ‘seem strangely
incongruent’, and that these ‘two enterprises […] are mutually exclusive’.105 Now, all
that suggests that both the Kantian and the neo-Kantian position are best interpreted
as versions of pluralism—a position which I shall reject in the next chapter.
Emergentism
In this final section I will set out how emergentism relates to the introduced positions
in the metaphysics of agency. According to John Searle, we can distinguish between
                                                 
103 My aim, obviously, is not to engage in Kant exegesis. But it must be noted that Kant’s doctrine can
plausibly be interpreted as a theory of two standpoints rather than, ontologically, of two worlds.
Korsgaard acknowledges that (compare Korsgaard, 1996a, pp. 200-205), and there is textual evidence
to support this reading. In the Groundwork, for instance, Kant says that the ‘concept of a world of
understanding is thus only a standpoint that reason sees itself constrained to take outside appearances
in order to think of itself as practical, as would not be possible if the influences of sensibility were
determining for the human being’ (Kant, 1997, p. 62).
104 Korsgaard, 1996a, p. 203. For textual evidence compare the section ‘On The Extreme Boundaries of
All Practical Reason’ in Kant’s Groundwork. Kant says that reason would ‘overstep all its bounds’ if it
wanted to explain how pure reason can be practical—how, in other words, the noumenal self interacts
with the phenomenal world (Kant, 1997, p. 62).
105 Korsgaard, 1996a, pp. 204-205. Korsgaard says that the difference between an ontological doctrine
of two worlds and the theory of two standpoints is that according to the former the question of the
relationship between the worlds cannot be answered, whereas on the latter that question cannot be
coherently asked. In the next chapter I will turn to the closely related question of how reasons for
actions relate to the causes of bodily movements, and it will became clear that this question can
coherently be asked.
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the following two senses of emergent.106 The features of some systems can be
deduced from—figured out or calculated, as Searle says—from the features of the
entities that compose the system. Searle mentions shape, weight and velocity as
examples. The features of other systems, though, cannot be explained in that way.
Rather, in order to explain them we have to take into consideration not only the
features of its constituents, but also the causal relations in which they stand. In other
words, the features of such systems must be explained in terms of the intrinsic and
extrinsic properties of the entities that compose it. Searle calls system features of that
kind ‘causally emergent system features’.107 Examples are liquidity and solidity, and
Searle maintains that consciousness is an emergent property in that sense.
According to a second, ‘much more adventurous conception’, as Searle says, an
entity is emergent just in case it has—or confers—causal powers that cannot be
explained by the causal interactions between its components. That there is emergence
in the first sense seems entirely uncontroversial—most philosophers would not even
call it emergence. I shall therefore focus solely on the second conception. What is
central to emergence, in that sense, is the notion of irreducible or emergent causal
powers.
Consider a system S that is composed of the entities a1, … an. S is a higher-
level—or macro—entity that has higher-level properties, and the a i are lower-
level—or micro—entities that have lower-level properties. Suppose that S has, or
instantiates, the property P. Then, P is an emergent property of S just in case the ai are
caused to behave differently in virtue of S’s instantiating P—differently than they
would have behaved, if S had not instantiated P. In that case, S has irreducible or
emergent causal powers in virtue of instantiating P. Since the cause of the relevant
causal relations is located at the higher-level, and since the effect is located at the
lower-level, it is common to call that kind of causation downward causation.108
That characterisation is about emergent properties. There are, however, versions
of emergentism according to which the emerging entity is not a property but an
                                                 
106 Searle, 1992, p. 111.
107 Ibid., my emphasis.
108 There is, of course, disagreement concerning the details of emergentism. In particular, it is not clear
whether an emergent property changes the behaviour of some lower-level entities by conferring
emergent causal powers onto the lower-level entities (and by ‘superseding’ the lower-level laws), or
whether it confers the emergent causal powers onto the higher-level entity, which then literally causes
the lower-level entities to behave differently. Compare Hasker, 1999, especially pp.174-177 and
Clarke, 2003, pp. 177-178 and the appendix to chapter 10.
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individual—an object or substance. Further, we can distinguish between two versions
of property emergentism. We obtain, then, the following three—relevant—versions of
emergentism. Each version, as we will see, falls under either reductionism or non-
reductionism about agency.
According to the first version, there are emergent properties the instantiations of
which constitute an agent’s having or being in a familiar mental attitude, such as
believing, intending, feeling, hoping, and so forth. This version of emergentism is
compatible with reductionism about agency, since it concerns only the causal powers
of agent-involving mental states and events. It makes no claims about irreducible
powers of the agent, since it is about the causal powers of the agent only indirectly by
being about the causal powers of agent-involving states and events. That kind of
emergentism received considerable attention in the so-called mental causation debate.
Some philosophers have argued that non-reductive theories of the mind109 are
committed to emergent causal powers and downward causation.110 But since that
concerns only the causal properties of mental states and events, rather than the agents
themselves, that first version of emergentism falls under reductionism about agency.
According to a second version, there are emergent properties in virtue of which
an agent has downward agent-causal powers. Such properties, it seems obvious,
cannot be associated with familiar types of mental attitudes and events. This version
is about irreducible and emergent causal powers of the agent, rather than of agent-
involving states and events, and it falls therefore clearly under non-reductionism
about agency. (Note that this version is compatible with both the view that the agent
is the human organism and the view that the agent is a mental substance).
According to the third version, what is emergent is the higher-level individual or
substance, rather than some property. What emerges, in other words, is the agent—the
person or the self.111 On that view it is not only the case that the higher-level
individual has emergent downward causal powers in virtue of having emergent
properties. But it is the individual itself that is emergent—its mode of existence is
being emergent from, rather than being composed by lower-level entities. Given that
                                                 
109 Reductive and non-reductive theories of the mind are, first and foremost, about agent-involving
mental states and events, and they must be strictly distinguished from reductive and non-reductive
theories of agency.
110 Kim, most prominently, has argued along that line. See for instance essay 17 in Kim, 1993.
111 Compare Hasker, 1999; especially, p. 194.
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this view also recognises the human organism as a substance, it is a kind of substance
dualism. William Hasker describes it as follows.
Emergent dualism […] recognises that a great many mental processes are
irreducibly teleological and cannot be explained by [brain processes]. [The]
power attributed to matter by emergent dualism amounts to this: when suitably
configured, it generates a field of consciousness that is able to function
teleologically and exercise libertarian free will, and the field of consciousness in
turn modifies and directs the functioning of the physical brain.112
From what has been said so far, and from that passage, it is clear that the third version
of emergentism falls under non-reductionism about agency.
Emergentism, then, is not an alternative approach in the metaphysics of agency.
Rather, by specifying the relations between higher- and lower-level properties and
causal powers, it provides ways to explain how reductionism or non-reductionism
about agency works. It must be noted that it is not obvious whether or not non-
reductionism is committed to emergentism. There is disagreement over the question
whether the theory of agent-causation requires that agents have emergent downward
causal powers and whether it requires the so-called supersession of lower-level laws.
Most proponents of agent-causation think that the theory is committed to emergent
downward causation and supersession of laws.113 Clarke, however, argues that it is not
committed to emergentism in that sense.114 Further, the relevant kind of emergentism
is essentially a view about causal properties, causal powers and the special kind of
downward causation. But we saw that proponents of non-reductionism about agency
may deny that an agent’s irreducible powers are causal powers. Finally, note that it is
also not obvious that reductionism about agency is committed to downward causation
or irreducible causal powers (of agent-involving mental states and events). In fact, in
chapter 3 I will defend a version of the reductionism about agency that is not
committed to emergentism in that sense.
                                                 
112 Ibid., p. 195.
113 Compare O’Connor, 2000; Hasker, 1999; and Dupré, 2001.
114 Clarke, 2003, pp. 177-181
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Chapter Two: Reasons and Causes
To decide whether or not reasons are causes is of central importance in the philosophy
of action and in the philosophy of mind. Approaching that question, it is important to
distinguish between the extensional relation of causation and the intensional relation
of causal explanation.1 Accordingly, we can distinguish between the following two
claims concerning the question whether or not reasons are causes. Firstly, there is the
claim that the reasons for which an agent performs a certain action are among the
causes of that action, and secondly, there is the claim that explanations of actions in
terms of the agent’s reasons are causal explanations. On the face of it, those two
claims are saying the same. Or, if they do not claim the same, it seems that they stand
and fall together. In the first part of this chapter I will consider some ways in which
the two claims may come apart. I will defend both claims against objections and I will
argue that there is no reason to think that they do not stand and fall together. In the
second part, I shall present arguments for causalism about reasons and reason-
explanation and I will argue against non-causalism on the ground that it fails to
provide a satisfactory account of the metaphysics of agency.
Two Kinds of Causalism, Reasons and Mental Attitudes
Let us first distinguish between two kinds of causal theories—two kinds of
causalism—that correspond to the two claims introduced. The first claim says that the
reasons for which an agent performs a certain action are among the causes of that
action. That is a claim about the metaphysics of agency, as it concerns the
metaphysical relation between actions and reasons—it concerns the efficacy of
reasons and the causal history of actions. I endorsed and defended that kind of
causalism—call it causalism about reasons—in the previous chapter by defending the
reductive standard-causal model of agency.
The second claim concerns the nature of reason-explanations. When we give a
reason-explanation of an action we explain the performance of that actions in terms of
some of the agent’s mental states and events that rationalise its performance.
Consider, for instance, an ordinary action such as Sue’s opening her handbag. Sue
                                                 
1 Compare, for instance, Davidson, 1980, essay 7 and Strawson, 1985.
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wants to get her keys in order to unlock the door, and she thinks that the keys are in
her handbag. Why did Sue open her handbag? She opened it because she intended to
get her keys and because she believed that she would find them in her handbag. And
she intended to get her keys, because she wanted to unlock the door. Sue opened the
handbag for those reasons—because she had the mentioned intention, belief and
desire. The performance of the action can be rationalised in the light of those mental
attitudes. The second kind of causalism—call it causalism about reason-
explanations—says that rationalising explanations of actions in terms of the agent’s
reasons are causal explanations, which is to say that the explanatory force of reason-
explanations is partly causal.
Given the distinction between the extensional relation of causation and the
intensional relation of explanation, it would be wrong to think that causalism about
reasons and causalism about reason-explanations are saying the same. Nevertheless, it
seems clear that they stand and fall together. In the previous chapter we saw that
action can be defined in two different ways. It can be characterised as goal-directed
and motivated activity that admits of rationalising explanation, or it can be
characterised in terms of its causal history. We saw that, according to the standard-
causal model of agency, the two characterisations are equivalent: to provide a
rationalising explanation of an action as goal-directed and motivated activity is to
refer to mental states and events that played a causal role in the performance of the
action. That means that the standard-causal model and causalism about reason-
explanations stand and fall together, and since causalism about reasons is part of the
standard-causal model, causalism about reasons and causalism about reason-
explanations stand and fall together as well.
A further reason to think that the two claims—and the two kinds of
causalism—must stand and fall together is provided by the following simple
argument. To say that a reason-explanation is a causal explanation is to say its
explanans causally explains the explanandum. A necessary condition for that is that
the explanans refers to a cause—or to causes—of what is explained. The explanantia
of reason-explanations are the agent’s reasons for the action. Therefore, in order to
explain actions causally, reasons must be among the causes of those actions. Consider
Sue’s opening her handbag. A causal explanation of that action in terms of Sue’s
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desires, beliefs and intentions is true only if those mental attitudes were among the
causes of the action.
Given that, it seems clear that the two kinds of causalism stand and fall together,
and that the standard-causal model of agency goes hand in hand with causalism about
reason-explanations. In the following, I shall consider three positions on related issues
on the basis of which one may argue that the two claims can come apart. Given the
apparent connection between them, the result that the two claims do not stand and fall
together would be of considerable significance. In particular, it would open the
possibility of mixed views—of positions that are causal with respect to either the
metaphysics of agency or reason-explanation, but not both. Further, those three
positions are of interest, since they give raise to three different objections to
causalism.
Anomalous Monism
According to a traditional model of causation—the covering law model of
causation—, an event-token of type C causes an event-token of type E only if there is
causal law that relates instantiations of C and E as cause and effect. In other words,
the two event-tokens must instantiate a law by instantiating types that are, as a matter
of nomological necessity, related as cause and effect. If that is the case, the two events
are covered by a law. According to one version of the covering law model, only strict
generalisations count as laws, and only strict laws can ground singular causal claims.2
The covering law model is a theory of causation and causal explanation. It says
that an event is a cause and causally explanatory only if it is covered by a strict law. It
is commonly accepted, though, that there are no strict intentional laws that cover
reasons and actions.3 Assuming that the covering law model holds for causation and
causal explanation in general, it follows that reasons are not causes and that reason-
                                                 
2 That view has been introduced as the covering law model by Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948. The
underlying regularity view, of course, goes back to Hume, 1748.
3 By intentional laws I mean laws that are formulated in psychological or intentional terms. Reason-
explanations are rationalising explanations. In order to rationalise the performance of an action in terms
of reasons, both the action and the reason must be described in intentional or mental terms. Hence,
generalisations that cover reasons and actions have to refer to reasons and actions under their
intentional descriptions. So, intentional laws are laws that refer to reasons and actions under their
intentional descriptions. This point is of importance, if it is assumed that reasons and action have both
intentional and non-intentional descriptions. If it assumed, for instance, that overt actions are token-
identical with bodily movements, then reason-explanations must refer to it as an action, rather than as a
bodily movement. Compare, for instance, Stoutland, 1986.
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explanations are not causal explanations. Donald Davidson, however, showed that
one can coherently accept that there are no strict intentional causal laws connecting
reasons and actions and deny that conclusion—he showed, in other words, that
anomalism about the mental neither entails that reasons cannot be causes, nor that
reasons cannot causally explain actions.4
Central to Davidson’s argument is the aforementioned distinction between the
extensional relation of causation and the intensional relation of causal explanation.
The former is a metaphysical relation and holds between particular events or event-
tokens, whereas the latter explanatory relation holds between descriptions of those
events or event-types. Davidson endorsed the Humean claim that every true singular
causal claim entails a covering law, but he also pointed out its ambiguity.
[The Humean claim] may mean that ‘A caused B’ entails some particular law
involving the predicates used in the description ‘A’ and ‘B’, or it may mean that
‘A caused B’ entails that there exists a causal law instantiated by some true
description of A and B.5
According to Davidson, the second interpretation is the correct one. That is, for two
events to stand in the relation of causation, it is required that there is only some
description of them under which they instantiate a causal law.
Suppose, then, that an agent’s A-ing can be explained by referring to the agent’s
having the reason of type R. Suppose further that the intentional description of the
action refers to the event e, and that the intentional description of the mental event R
refers to the event c. According to Davidson’s interpretation of the Humean claim, c
can be the cause of e even if there is no law that relates them as cause and effect under
their intentional descriptions. All that is required is that there is some description of c
and e, respectively, bringing them under a covering law.6 That is sufficient to show
that reasons can be causes of actions, even if there are no intentional laws—laws that
cover them as reasons and actions.
According to Davidson, reasons are causes and they causally explain actions.
One may, however, use parts of Davidson’s position in order to argue in the following
way that reasons fail to explain actions causally. What Davidson’s position—which is
                                                 
4 Compare Davidson, 1980, essay 11 and 12.
5 Davidson, 1980, p. 16.
6 Davidson thought that strict laws are only to be had in the physical sciences. Hence, what is required,
according to Davidson, is not just some description, but a physical description of both c and e that
instantiates a strict law.
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known as anomalous monism—shows is that mental events can be the causes of
actions, even if, firstly, mental event-types are not identical with physical event-types,
secondly, even if there are no psychophysical laws that correlate mental and physical
events, and thirdly, even if there are no laws covering the events under their
intentional descriptions.7 However, for a mental event-token and an act-token to be
related as cause and effect, there must be some causal law that covers them. Given the
claims of anomalous monism, that must be a non-intentional law. To say, however,
that there are no causal laws covering the events under their intentional descriptions is
just to say that there are no causal laws covering them as reasons and actions. And
that just means, so the argument goes, that reasons do not causally explain actions.
Rather, descriptions of reasons merely refer to the event-tokens that are the causes of
actions.
That argument, if correct, shows not only that the two kinds of causalism do not
stand and fall together. But it also provides a straightforward objection to causalism
about reason-explanations. In a recent book, G. F. Schueler has advanced such an
argument against causalism in his defence of a teleological account of reason-
explanation. Since causalism, as Schueler argues, cannot establish that reasons
causally explain behaviour it fails to provide an account of the ‘explanatory force’ of
reason-explanations. And since one of the prime objectives of the causal approach is
to provide an account of the explanatory force of reason-explanation, causalism fails
in its own terms.8
One important assumption of that argument says that there are no strict
intentional laws. That assumption, as already mentioned, is generally accepted.
Another assumption says, roughly, that reference to an event under a certain
description causally explains another event under a certain description only if there is
a strict causal law that covers the events under those descriptions. In our case, the
assumption is that reasons causally explain actions, only if there are strict laws that
cover the events in question under their intentional descriptions—as reasons and
actions. That assumption, however, is very controversial.
                                                 
7 The position is a form of anomalism in the sense that it denies the existence of psychological laws
and in the sense that it denies the existence of psychophysical bridge-laws. It is a form of monism in
the sense that it assumes token-identity: mental event-tokens are identical with physical event-tokens.
Compare Davidson, 1980, essay 11 and 12.
8 Compare Schueler, 2003, especially pp. 8-12.
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Already in his ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Davidson argued that it is an
‘error to think that no explanation has been given until a law has been produced’.9 All
we need to notice is that many ordinary explanations, which are clearly causally
explanatory, are not grounded in strict causal laws. Davidson’s example is a
catastrophe that can be explained simply by citing the event of an earthquake as its
cause—and it would, as Davidson says, be ridiculous to think that there are strict
physical laws that connect hurricanes and catastrophes. Countless further examples of
that sort could be put forward, which, I think, shifts the burden of argument to the
opponent. Given that point concerning common causal explanation and knowledge,
the assumption that causal explanations presuppose strict causal laws is in need of
independent justification.
Others have argued that it is unreasonable to require strict causal laws in the case
of intentional explanation, given that many scientific laws—typically the laws of the
so-called special sciences—hold only ceteris paribus. Louise Antony, for instance,
argues that nothing in our actual scientific practice ‘lends support to the idea that the
laws backing causal claims must be strict—there’s nothing inadequate or insufficient
about ceteris paribus laws from a pragmatic point of view’.10 Given that, one cannot
plausibly demand that reason-explanations must be grounded in strict intentional
laws.
On the basis of that, one may then provide an alternative account of causal
explanation. It is common to appeal to intentional ceteris paribus laws, the fact that
reason-explanations support counterfactuals, or the fact that intentional regularities
are backed and mediated by underlying physical mechanisms. Many proposals in
recent philosophy of mind develop either one of those options or they feature a
combination of some or all of them.11
Given, then, that causal reason-explanation does not presuppose strict intentional
laws, it does not follow that reasons fail to explain actions causally, and the outlined
case against causalism collapses. What opponents of causalism would need to show is
                                                 
9 Davidson, 1980, p. 17.
10 Antony, 1995, p. 438. The source of that position is Fodor 1974. For a defence of ceteris paribus
laws against the charge that they are vacuous and uninformative see Fodor 1989 and 1991, Antony
1995, and Pietroski 2000, Chapter 4.
11 For an account of causal reason-explanation in counterfactual terms see Schiffer, 1991, Sosa 1984,
Mele, 1992 and Ruben, 2003, Chapter 6. For positions that appeal to ceteris paribus laws and to
underlying physical mechanisms see, for instance, Fodor, 1989, Segal and Sober, 1991, and Antony,
1995.
64
either that strict laws are necessary for causal explanation or that none of the
alternative accounts—in terms of ceteris paribus laws, counterfactuals or underlying
mechanisms—can ground causal reason-explanations. I am not aware of any
convincing non-causalist argument in support of either of the two claims. We can
conclude, then, that the argument from anomalous monism does not show that the two
kinds of causalism can come apart, and that the outlined argument against causalism
fails as well.
Externalism About Content
The argument discussed in the previous section was supposed to show that reasons do
not causally explain actions, even if they are among their causes. The following
position about the nature of mental content grants that reason-explanations are causal
explanations. Given that position, though, one may argue that reasons cannot be
causes of actions.
Let us assume that well-known twin earth thought experiments show that the
contents of some mental attitudes are not determined by agent-intrinsic states only,
because they are partly dependent on and determined by environmental or
circumstantial states.12 While Oscar on earth wants a glass of water, his intrinsically
identical twin on twin earth, Toscar, wants a glass of twater, due to the fact that the
substance that tastes and smells like water on twin earth is not H2O. Oscar and Toscar
are in different mental states, due to different mental contents, even though there is no
difference in intrinsic properties between them.13 That means that the contents of
some mental states are not determined by agent-intrinsic states only, and that some
mental states do not supervene on—and are not realised by—agent-intrinsic states
only. In other words, some mental states are environment-dependent. That view is
known as externalism about content.
Consider, then, the following argument against the claim that reason-states are
causes of action. Assume, firstly, that externalism about content is true. Secondly,
assume that an agent’s causal powers are determined by its intrinsic properties only.
(That means, roughly, that an agent’s bodily movements are determined by
                                                 
12 For the notion of intrinsic property compare chapter 1, p. 15, note 18.
13 The original arguments for that position can be found in Putnam, 1975, pp. 251-271. Compare also
Burge, 1979.
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instantiations of some of its intrinsic properties only—by agent-intrinsic states and
events only.)14
According to the standard causal model, overt actions are bodily movements,
which are caused by appropriate mental states and events in the right way. So, if
reasons are causes of overt actions, they are causes of bodily movements. By
assumption, the causes of bodily movements are agent-intrinsic states and events. In
other words, if something is not an agent-intrinsic state or event, then it is not a cause
of the agent’s moving her body. By assumption, reason-states are not realised by
agent-intrinsic states only. Therefore, neither reason-states nor their physical
realisations are among the causes of bodily movements. Hence, neither reason-states
nor their physical realisations are among the causes of overt actions.
Given that, one may argue against causalism about reason-explanation in the
following way. It is plausible to assume that a causal explanation of an action of type
A in terms of reason-states of type R presuppose that the description of the agent’s
being in R refer to a cause of the agent-involving event that is or constitutes the
agent’s A-ing. The argument from externalism about content shows that reasons are
not among the causes of the relevant agent-involving events (bodily movements).
Therefore, reasons do not explain actions causally.15
The argument from externalism, however, is a bad one. Its conclusion is
ambiguous, and it follows from the assumptions only if interpreted in a certain way.
Consider the following case. Suppose some agent, S, performs a bodily movement m,
which is or constitutes an A-ing, for the reason R. And assume that m is caused by the
agent-intrinsic event n. The argument from externalism grants that actions are bodily
movements—it grants that m’s being caused in the right way is an A-ing.16 It grants
                                                 
14 The idea is to treat the powers of an agent just like the powers of any other object, and the causal
powers of objects are, presumably, determined by their intrinsic physical properties. Compare, for
instance, Child, 1994: ‘Everything we know from the sciences of matter supports the view that a
thing’s causal powers are exhaustively determined by its internal physical make-up’ (p. 187).
15 Can one possibly deny that reasons are causes and hold that reason-states causally explain actions?
One may argue that the explanatory relevance of reasons in causal explanations of actions is grounded
in, for instance, intentional ceteris paribus laws and the fact that reason-explanations support the right
counterfactuals. And one may deny that the causal relevance of reasons is in need of further
metaphysical vindication by grounding it in the causal efficacy of physical events (compare, for
instance, Burge, 1993 and Baker, 1993). I will return to this position, which I call pluralism, later in
this chapter, pp. 102.
16 The assumption that actions are bodily movements is not essential to the argument, nor to the
response. Similar considerations apply in case actions are construed as being constituted or realised by
bodily movements. Further, nothing depends on the fact that we focus on overt actions and bodily
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that reasons are agent-involving mental states and events, that mental states and
events are realised by physical states and events, and it grants that the causal efficacy
of mental events consists in the efficacy of the physical events that realise them.17 It
denies only that mental states and events are realised by agent-intrinsic states and
events alone.
Assume further that p, an instantiation of the physical state P, realises S’s being
in R. Given externalism, p is not an agent-intrinsic state. It follows that p is not
identical with the cause of m. What follows, in other words, is that p is not identical
with n, since n is agent-intrinsic, whereas p is not. From that it follows that S’s being
in R is not a cause of m, and, therefore, S’s being in R is not a cause of S’s A-ing.
However, it is misleading to present that as a conclusion against causalism for the
following reason. It is certainly possible that both n and p are complex or structured
events—events that have events as their parts or constituents. Given that, it is possible
that the events that constitute n are among the events that constitute p. And, if that is
the case, it is trivially true that the event that realises S’s being in R is not identical
with n, simply because the physical events that constitute n are among—that is, are a
proper part of—the events that realise S’s being in R.
What is important to note is that causalists do not have to reject the principle that
a causal explanation of an action of type A in terms of reason-states of type R
presupposes that the description of the agent’s being in R refers to a cause of the
agent-involving event that is or constitutes the agent’s A-ing. All they need to reject is
a narrow reading of that principle, according to which the whole complex event that is
the realisation of S’s being in R  must be the cause of the movement, m , that
constitutes the A-ing.
Alternatively, causalism can subscribe to an interpretation that says, roughly, that
a causal explanation of A-ing in terms of the agent’s being in R presupposes, firstly,
that the description of the agent’s being in R refers to the physical realisation of the
agent’s being in R, and, secondly, that this realisation is partly constituted by events
which are among the causes of m—and which are, therefore, among the causes of the
                                                                                                                                            
movements. Similar considerations apply to mental actions and the agent-involving events that
constitute or realise them.
17 It grants what Kim calls the causal inheritance principle: ‘If M is instantiated on a given occasion by
being realised by P, then the causal powers of this instance of M are identical with (perhaps, a subset
of) the causal powers of P’ (Kim, 1993, p. 355, and compare Kim, 2000, p. 54). I will return to the
problem of mental causation in chapter 3, pp. 142-153.
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agent’s A-ing. If that principle holds, then we refer—among other things—to the
events that are among the causes of the bodily movement m, which is or constitutes
the agent’s A-ing, whenever we give a true reason-explanation of a performance of an
action of type A  in terms of R .18 The opponent’s argument does not show that
causalism is committed to the mentioned narrow interpretation. In the absence of
other arguments for the narrow reading, the causalist is justified in employing the
alternative interpretation.
Are reasons, then, the causes of action? Given externalism, reasons are not the
causes of action in the sense that the whole complex physical realisation of a reason-
state is not the cause of the movement that is or constitutes the action. But, as we have
seen, causalism does not depend on the truth of the claim that reasons are causes in
that narrow sense. Reason-states are realised by complex physical states and events. If
the causes of the relevant bodily movements are among those states and events, then
descriptions of reason-states refer to the causes of the relevant movements, and they
can, thereby, be causally explanatory of action. According to causalism, reasons are
causes of actions in that sense.
Do the two claims—the claim that reasons are causes of actions and the claim
that reasons causally explain actions—stand and fall together? Given the
considerations of this section, we can say that they do stand and fall together insofar
as causalism about reason-explanations presupposes that reasons are causes in some
sense.
Externalism About Reasons
The following position on the nature of normative reasons for action does not directly
challenge the claim that the two kinds of causalism stand and fall together. Rather, it
challenges the way in which claims about reasons and reason-explanations have been
interpreted. We assumed, so far, that explanations of actions in terms of reasons are
explanations in terms of mental states or events. We assumed, apparently, that reasons
                                                 
18 Compare, for instance, Kim (1993, p. 304), Segal and Sober (1990, p. 19) and Noordhof (1990, p.
312) who argue that it is sufficient that physical micro-properties of the agent form only part of the
supervenience base of mental properties. Compare also with Shoemaker’s distinction between the total
and the core realisation of a mental state (Shoemaker, 1981). A certain brain event, for instance, would
be the core realisation of a belief state, but it would only be part of the total physical realisation, which
involves both the brain state and certain environmental states (the brain state, in other words, is not
sufficient for the agent to be in the belief state). For general discussion of externalism about content in
connection with the problem of mental causation see Jackson and Petit, 1988 and Mele, 1992.
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for action are mental attitudes. The rationale behind that assumption is, roughly, that
the performance of certain actions appears as rational and intelligible in the light of
mental attitudes, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, and that, when we refer to
rationalising mental states, we are, therefore, referring to the agent’s reasons for the
action. When we were asking whether reasons are causes and whether reason-
explanations are causal explanations, we were, in effect, asking whether an agent’s
reason-states are causes of the action and whether explanations in terms of those
mental attitudes are causal explanations. Let us a call the view that an agent’s reasons
for actions are agent-involving mental states and events internalism about reasons for
actions.19
The negation of that view—externalism about reasons—says that reasons are not
identical with the agent’s mental attitudes. Jonathan Dancy has recently developed
and defended such a position. Dancy argues that the normative nature of reasons rules
out that they can be psychological entities of any kind. Because our beliefs might be
false and our desires inappropriate, the mere fact that we happen to believe this, or
happen to desire that, does not, as Dancy argues, give us any reason, let alone good
reason, to do anything.20
Let us assume that Dancy is right. Reasons are not mental states. What else may
they be? Dancy discusses two suggestions. On the first, reasons are the contents of
mental states. On the second, they are facts or states of affairs.21 Dancy argues that
neither suggestion supports the claim that reasons are causes, and he thinks that
reason-explanations are, therefore, not causal explanations.
Dancy does not question that the two kinds of causalism stand and fall together.
Rather, he seems to presuppose that they go hand in hand. What is important to notice
is that Dancy’s view on the nature of reasons entails neither that reason-states cannot
                                                 
19 Despite some affinities, that kind of internalism must be sharply distinguished from what is known
as internalism about reasons in normative ethics—a view that is due to Bernard Williams, 1981, essay
8. According to Dancy, that view says that an agent S has a good reason to A only if, were S to know
all the relevant facts, and deliberate rationally, S would be motivated to A (compare, Dancy, 2000, p.
15). The central idea is that whether an agent has normative reasons to A depends—in some sense—on
which pro-attitudes (desires, motives, or values) the agent actually has. What I call internalism,
however, makes no such claim about normative reasons. It requires that the performance of the action
can be rationalised in the light of some of the agent’s mental attitudes, but it leaves it open whether the
agent actually had normative reason to perform the action.
20 See Dancy, 2000.
21 What reasons really are, on either view, depends of course on what theory of mental content, facts,
or states of affairs one endorses. For present purposes the offered formulations should be good enough.
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be causes of actions, nor that they cannot be causally explanatory. It does, in other
words, not entail that explanations of actions in terms of mental states and events
cannot be causal explanations. That is because all that Dancy’s position claims and
entails is about reasons, rather than reason-states.
Dancy is aware of that and he considers the possibility that there are two distinct
intentional explanations of one and the same action; a normative and non-causal
reason-explanation and a causal explanation in terms of the agent’s mental states and
events. But, eventually, Dancy rejects that possibility.22 He argues that externalism
about reasons is incompatible with both causalism about reasons and causalism about
reason-explanations. Dancy’s reasoning, however, is based on an overly narrow
interpretation of the claims of causalism. I shall now suggest an alternative
interpretation of causalism, which is compatible with externalism about reasons.
The suggestion is that we can plausibly call certain kinds of explanations reason-
explanations, if their explanantia stand in some appropriate relation with the agent’s
reasons for the action. What I mean by that should become clear in due course, when I
consider each of the three views concerning the nature of reasons—the view that
reasons are mental attitudes, contents of mental attitudes, and the view that they are
facts. What we have to assess, in each case, is whether the relation between mental
attitudes and reasons is such that a causal explanation of an action in terms of mental
attitudes can plausibly count as a reason-explanation.
Firstly, if one assumes internalism about reasons, the relation in question is
identity. Reasons are mental states, and causal explanations of actions in terms of
those mental states can therefore be called reason-explanations.
Secondly, assume that reasons are the contents of the agent’s mental states. The
relation in question is then the relation that holds between mental attitudes and their
contents. I think we do not have to go into any detail concerning the nature of mental
content and the relationship between attitudes and their contents, for it seems
                                                 
22 The basic structure of Dancy’s argument (which can be found in Dancy, 2004) is the following
reductio ad absurdum. Assume that there are causal explanations of actions in terms of mental states
and events in addition to reason-explanations. Dancy argues that such explanations must be normative
explanations. Normative explanations of actions give the agent’s reasons for the action. But that cannot
be right, because, firstly, mental attitudes are not reasons for action, and secondly, because the
‘normative underpinning’ of explanations in terms of mental attitudes is ‘at odds with their supposedly
causal nature’ (p. 39). Dancy’s argument is of course more sophisticated than that, and it draws on
results from Dancy, 2000, where it is argued that the reasons for which an agent acts are not
psychological states and events.
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straightforward that this view supports the claim that causal explanations of actions in
terms of mental states can reasonably be called reason-explanation. The view
construes reasons as the contents of mental states. Hence, to cite reason-states is to
cite reasons as their contents.
That view says that causal explanations in terms of mental states can be called
reason-explanations, even though reasons are, as the contents of mental attitudes, not
causes. It would be a mistake, though, to think that that shows that the two kinds of
causalism can come apart. We assumed, initially, that reasons are mental states. This
assumption has been suspended for the sake of an assessment of the present view.
Without that assumption, the present view has no direct bearing on causalism. Given
the initial assumption, the claim that reasons are causes is the claim that reason-states
are causes and the claim that reasons causally explain actions is the claim that reason-
states causally explain actions. However, if we dismiss the assumption, which claims
should be regarded as distinctive of causalism? On my view, causalism says that
reason-states cause and causally explain actions and that causal explanations in terms
of reason-states can be called reason-explanations. On that construal, causalism is not
committed to the claim that reasons are causes in its literal and strict sense (provided
that reasons are not identical with reason-states).23
Let us now turn to the third view, which says that reasons are facts. Dancy arrives
at the conclusion that reasons cannot be mental states by stressing their normative
nature. But he acknowledges that reasons have a motivational aspect as well. In order
to be explanatory of the performance of an action, reasons must have motivated the
agent to perform the explained action. That motivational requirement is a necessary
condition for something to be explanatory as a reason for action.
In order to be motivated by a reason, as it seems very plausible to assume, the
reason must in some way play a role in the psychological process that leads the agent
to the performance of the action. Even if we assume that reasons are facts, rather than
mental attitudes, we must account for their motivational role in psychological terms.
                                                 
23 Note that on the present view reasons can nevertheless be construed as being causally explanatory, if
it is granted that the contents of mental states are causally relevant, in the sense that mental states have
their effects in virtue of their contents. Given that, one can hold that reasons are causally relevant and
explanatory without being—strict speaking—causes. For defence of the claim that mental events are
efficacious in virtue of their contents (or in virtue of those properties in virtue of which they possess a
certain content) see Jackson and Petit, 1988; Segal and Sober 1990; Mele 1992; Braun, 1995; and
Noordhof, 1999.
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The obvious way to do so is to say that reasons, as facts, can motivate the agent to do
whatever they recommend or favour, if the agent has—or is in—a mental state that
represents the reason. Construed in that way, the present view is actually very close to
the previous one. The difference is that reasons are not identified with the contents of
mental states, but with whatever is represented by them—with the facts or states of
affairs that mental states are about. Fortunately, that difference does not prevent us
from drawing the same conclusion as in the previous case. A reason is explanatory of
the performance of an action only if having the reason motivated the agent to act for
it—or in accordance with it. This motivational aspect is best understood in terms of
psychological states that play a role in the agent’s motivational economy and that
represent the relevant reason-facts. A successful reason-explanation, it seems, must
refer to a mental state or event that motivated the agent and that represented the fact
that was the agent’s reason for the action.
Given that, we can see that causalism about reason-explanations is in fact
compatible with externalism about reasons. According to causalism, explanations in
terms of mental states and events, which render the performance of an action rational
and intelligible, are causal explanations. According to externalism about reasons,
reasons are facts. In order to see why they are compatible let us consider two ordinary
examples in which a reason-explanation is given solely in terms of facts—without
mentioning any of the agent’s psychological states. “Why did you stop the car so
abruptly?”—“Because there was a child crossing the street.” “Why did you take that
medicine?”—“Because my doctor recommended it.” In cases like that we can provide
a broader explanation, which mentions some of the agent’s mental states. The driver
stopped, because she noticed that a child was crossing the street. The patient took the
medicine, because he wanted to do whatever fosters the healing process, and because
he believed that the doctor gives good advise on that. Quite often, of course, we do
not mention the psychological states that mediate between the facts and the agent’s
awareness of them, simply because the way in which the non-psychological
explanation is formulated implies such a mediation. However, when we say that the
driver stopped, because there was a child crossing the street, it is not only that
everyone will assume a connection between that fact and the driver’s response, which
is psychological in kind. But we have to assume such a connection—otherwise the
explanation would not make any sense. Reason-explanations that are given merely in
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terms of facts or states of affairs are, in general, condensed versions of reason-
explanations that feature mental states and events.24 Often the condensed version is
sufficiently explanatory for everyday and practical purposes—only because, though,
we know that we could easily produce a fuller story featuring psychological states.
That shows, firstly, that rationalising explanations in terms of mental states are
compatible with reason-explanations in terms of facts. Secondly, that causalism about
reason-explanations is compatible with externalism about reasons. And it shows,
thirdly, that rationalising explanations and reason-explanations in terms of facts are
not distinct at all. Rather, the latter are elliptical—they are short and condensed
versions of the former.25
In conclusion we can say, firstly, that none of the views and arguments discussed
in this and the previous two sections constitutes or supports a convincing objection to
causalism. Secondly, we have no reason to deny that the two kinds of causalism stand
and fall together. Thirdly, each of the three discussed positions on the nature of
reasons is compatible with causalism about reason-explanations. And that shows,
fourthly, that there is no need to argue for—or commit ourselves to—one of the
discussed views on the nature of reasons.26 I shall, therefore, in the following abstract
from the distinctions made in this section. All claims about reasons and reason-
explanations may be taken to be, literally, about reasons or they may be interpreted as
being about reason-states.
                                                 
24 That claim concerns reason-explanations that are given in retrospect and from a third-person
perspective—from an explainer’s points of view. It does not concern the agent’s point view at the time
of deliberation or action. Further, the claim that explanations in terms of facts are short and condensed
versions does not entail that explanations in terms of reason-states are primary or more fundamental.
25 What about cases in which the agent did not have good reason to perform an action that can be
rationalised in the light of the agent’s mental states? For instance, assume that Sue’s A-ing can be
rationalised by reference to her believing that p, and that is not the case that p. The reason-state does
not represent a reason—it does not represent a fact at all. Such cases are not a problem for causalism.
Rather, they are a problem for the view that reason-explanations explain in terms of facts. Causalism
does not require that every reason-state refers to a reason-fact. An explanation of Sue’s A-ing in terms
of her false belief is a reason-explanation, because her A-ing appears as rational and intelligible in the
light of her believing that p. According to causalism, a reason-explanation may be a mere rationalising
explanation—not a proper reason-explanation, if you like. The important point is that, if an agent was
acting for good reasons, then there is no proper reason-explanation in terms of facts, which is distinct
from a causal explanation in terms of reason-states, because the reason-states represent the reasons and
because the former is a condensed version of the latter.
26 A view that has not been discussed is based on a rejection of the dichotomy between internalism and
externalism about reason. On that view, it is mistake to assume that reasons are either mental entities
(attitudes or their content) or facts. Reasons, rather, should be construed as relations holding between
facts, actions and the agent’s mental attitudes (compare, for instance, Skorupski, 1999, essay 2).
Construed in this way, the question whether reasons are mental states or facts does not arise. This view,
it seems clear, is compatible with causalism.
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The Case for Causalism
I will now argue for causalism about reason-explanations. That case for causalism
comes in three parts. Firstly, I will outline and discuss the standard argument for
causalism, which is due to Donald Davidson. Then I will turn to—and argue
against—non-causalist challenges and alternatives to the causal theory. And in a third
part I will present another argument for causalism that relies partly on the results from
the previous chapter, and that will not be complete until the end of the next chapter.
That argument says, roughly, that we should prefer causalism to non-causalism for the
following two reasons. Firstly, I will show that, in conjunction with the standard-
causal model of agency, causalism provides an integrated account of agency by
locating agency in the causal order of events. And secondly, I will argue that non-
causalism fails to provide a satisfying alternative account of agency.
Davidson’s Challenge
Davidson asked what the ‘mysterious connection’ between reasons and actions
consists in and how the ‘explanatory force’ of the ‘because’ in reason-explanations is
to be understood.27 Following Davidson, causalists maintain that only a causal theory
can provide informative and non-circular answers to those questions. Non-causalists
have criticised the causal theory and they have put forward alternative non-causal
accounts.
Let us begin by considering one common way of providing a reason-explanation
of an action. Suppose that Sam opens the window. Someone else asks him why he is
doing that. Sam says that he opens the window in order to let in some fresh air; that is
the reason why he opens it. That kind of reason-explanation has the following form.
(RE) S A-ed in order to B.
What non-causalists will point out is the teleological character of RE. We explain
why S A-ed by pointing out that is was S’s goal or end to do or to bring about B. In
other words, S A-ed for the purpose of doing or bringing about B. They will say that
the teleological character of reason-explanation stems from the goal-directedness and
purposefulness of rational action, and that the burden of argument lies, therefore, with
                                                 
27 See Davidson, 1980, especially p. 9 and p. 11.
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the causalists who claim that the explanatory force of a reason-explanation has to be
understood in terms of causation.28
Causalists, however, can suggest another way of construing the reason-
explanation. In answering the why-question raised above, we may as well say that
Sam opened the window because he wanted to let in some fresh air. That is a
perfectly natural and equally good way of giving a reason-explanation. We obtain the
following form.
(REC) S A-ed because he wanted to B.
And, without committing themselves to the view that all actions issue from desires,
causalists can reformulate REC in the following way.
(REC*) S A-ed because he desired, intended or had some pro-attitude to B.
What is the relation between RE and REC? What are the truth-conditions for
statements of each form? Can statements of one form said to be true in virtue of the
truth of the corresponding statement?
But let us begin with the question in virtue of what statements of the form REC*
are true—assuming that the truth-conditions for REC* are the same as for REC, since
the former is just a reformulation of the latter. Given that S performed an action of
type A, and given that S had the attributed pro-attitude, what makes it true that S A-ed
for—or because of—the attributed reasons? That, I take it, is one way in which
Davidson’s question for the explanatory force of the ‘because’ can be understood: to
ask for the explanatory force of the ‘because’ in a reason-explanation is to ask in
virtue of what the explanation is true.
According to the causal theory, the explanatory force of the ‘because’ is, partly at
least, causal. That is, statements of the form REC* are true only if the mentioned pro-
attitude caused the explained action. Non-causalists will respond by pointing out that
the explanatory force of ‘because’ is not always causal in kind; there are all sorts of
                                                 
28 One may object that a teleological theory is not necessarily a non-causal theory, because purposeful
activity can be understood in terms of final causation. But that point is merely terminological, and it
presupposes the traditional—Aristotelian—terminology that distinguishes between final and efficient
causation. In contemporary philosophy, however, causation usually means efficient causation. To say
that reasons are causes is, then, to say that reasons are efficient causes. And given that all causation is
efficient causation, to deny that reasons are efficient causes is to deny that they are causes—without
qualification. Nothing, though, depends on the assumption that all causation is efficient causation, as
all the claims and arguments could be reformulated in terms of final and efficient causation.
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non-causal explanations. The question, then, is how to decide whether reason-
explanations are causal or non-causal in kind.29
One way to settle the disagreement would be to show that reason-explanations
cannot possibly be causal. An alternative and more modest strategy pursued by non-
causalist is the following. First, problems that trouble any causal theory are
highlighted.30 Then, a non-causal alternative account of the explanatory force of
reason-explanations is presented. And then it is argued that we have good reason to
prefer the non-causalist alternative, since it avoids the problems of the causal
account.31 The first strategy was the preferred one among non-causalists before
Davidson’s ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes.’ In that article, Davidson compellingly
rejected the most influential arguments to the conclusion that reason-explanations
cannot be causal explanations.32 After that, most non-causalists focused on the second
strategy—pointing out the following.
The causal theory provides an account of the explanatory force of reason-
explanations and of the connection between reasons and actions. Without further
argument, however, that constitutes a case for causalism only if there is no alternative
account available. But that is not really an argument for causalism—what favours
causalism here is merely the lack of an alternative. Hence, the case for causalism
collapses, if it can be shown that there is a viable non-causal theory of reason-
explanations. I will consider and reject three non-causalist alternatives. Before that,
though, let us have a closer look at the challenge that Davidson identified for any
theory of reason-explanation.
Two Aspects of Reason-Explanations
Assume that an agent performs an action for which she has reasons in the sense that
she has intentional attitudes, which allow us to rationalise the performance of the
action—the performance of the action appears as intelligible in the light of those
                                                 
29 Compare Wilson, 1989, who argues along those lines; pp. 175-183.
30 The most troublesome problem for causal theories is probably the problem of deviant causal chains. I
will turn to that problem in chapter 4, pp. 175.
31 Compare, for instance, Sehon, 2000, who argues that non-causalism is to be preferred because it is
not troubled by the problem of deviant causal chains.
32 See Davidson, 1980, especially pp. 12-19. The most influential argument rejected by Davidson is the
so-called logical connection argument, which was supposed to show that the logical or conceptual
connections between reasons and actions exclude the possibility of them being related as cause and
effect. See also Goldman, 1970, pp. 109-116 and Audi, 1993a, chapter 4.
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attitudes. Davidson pointed out that to cite such attitudes does not guarantee that a
successful reason-explanation is being given. He noticed that
[…] something essential has certainly been left out, for a person can have a
reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason [may] not be
the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action
it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the
reason.33
Having a reason in favour of an action has to be distinguished from acting for or
because of that reason. In other words, for a reason to be truly explanatory, it is not
sufficient that it rationalises the action. It must also be case that the reason motivated
or moved the agent to perform the action. It is common to make that point by using
examples in which an agent had two reasons in favour of performing one and the
same action. Consider an example involving an unintended outcome. Let’s say that
Sam opened the window, because he wanted to let a bee out of the room. The attempt
failed; the bee was still around and Sam closed the window. Later on, Sam opened the
window again in order to let in some fresh air, and, guess what, the bee flew out.
Assuming that Sam still had the desire to let the bee out, he had reasons for the action,
which are not the reasons he acted for.34 In such cases we can ask in virtue of what
only one of the two reasons the agent had for the action is the reason the agent acted
for. The agent had two mental states that rationalise the performance of the action, but
he acted only because of one of them. Davidson asked what the explanatory force of
reasons and reason-explanations consists in. It is clear now that we have to distinguish
between two aspects of that explanatory force.
Firstly, true reason-explanations explain actions in the sense that they rationalise
their performance. Generally, it is rational or intelligible to perform an action only if
there is something to be said for doing it—only if there is something that favours
doing it. Only if, in other words, there is reason to do it. However, rationalising
explanations can also be given even if there is, objectively, no reason to perform the
action, because they rationalise subjectively—in the light of the agent’s reasons. They
                                                 
33 Davidson, 1980, p. 9.
34 Different kinds of examples could be brought forward. Consider, for instance, a case of weakness of
the will. Susan had good reasons to vote for K. in the presidential elections—she believed that K. is the
better candidate and she wanted to go the elections. Further, a friend of hers promised to take her out
for dinner, in case she voted for K. Assume that Susan did vote K., but that she would not have gone to
the elections, had she not been promised the dinner. Sue wanted go to the election and believed that K.
is the candidate to vote for, but she voted because she fancied a nice dinner with her friend.
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explain in the light of what the agent took to be a reason or, simply, in the light of
what the agent wanted, believed and intended.35 That aspect—call it the rationalising
aspect—concerns explanatory relations between types of actions and reasons, because
it is having reasons of a certain type that rationalises the performance of a certain type
of action.
Secondly, reason-explanations explain actions in the sense that they explain why
the reason motivated the agent—why the agent’s being aware of certain things or
being in a certain mental state motivated the agent to perform the action. We can call
that aspect the motivational or metaphysical aspect, as it concerns the relation
between tokens, rather than types. It concerns the connection between the
performance of a particular action and the agent’s being in a particular reason-state.36
Those two aspects can be regarded as aspects of reasons or reason-states. If an
agent acts for good reasons, the corresponding reason-states rationalise and motivate
the agent. If an agent acts for merely rationalising reasons, but not for good reasons,
then the reason-states rationalise and motivate the agent. The two aspects, however,
can also be regarded as two aspects of reason-explanations and of the explanatory
force of the ‘because’. A reason-explanation is true only if it rationalises the
performance of the action, and only if it refers to reason-states that motivated the
agent to perform the rationalised action. In other words, it must be true that the agent
did the action because of the reasons in both the rationalising and the motivational
sense of because.
Davidson pointed out that the explanatory force of reason-explanations is twofold
in the sense explained. A theory of reason-explanation must explain what the
difference between having a reason and acting for it consists in by providing an
                                                 
35 In other words, it is not required that the agent has good reason to perform the action. Performing a
certain action may be not the best, the wrong, an imprudent, or, simply, a stupid thing to do. But we
may still be able to rationalise its performance in the light of what the agent believes, desires, intends,
and so on. The kind of rationality could also be called internal or relational as it concerns the relations
between the contents of mental attitudes and types of actions, rather than the correctness of the agent’s
beliefs and judgements or the rationality of desires and intentions themselves.
36 It is very common to introduce a distinction of that sort. The most common distinction is probably
the one between normative and motivating reasons. See, for instance, Smith, 1994, and for a summary
of the history of that distinction see Dancy, 2000. I find that distinction slightly misleading in two
ways. Firstly, no reason is only normative or only motivating. In order to be explanatory, a reason must
both rationalise the action and it must have motivated the agent. It is therefore better to talk about
aspects of one and the same reason. Further, not all rationalising explanations of actions refer to
normative reasons, but to what the agent took to be a reason for the action, or to reason-states in the
light of which the performance appears as intelligible. It is therefore better to contrast the motivating
aspect with the rationalising aspect, rather than a normative aspect.
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account of the ‘mysterious connection’ between reasons and action. The challenge, in
other words, is to account for both the rationalising and the metaphysical aspect of
reason-explanations. In the following, I will focus on the metaphysical or
motivational aspect. Causalism about reason-explanations—in conjunction with the
standard-causal model of agency—construes that aspect in causal terms. An agent
acted for a certain reason only if the associated reason-state caused the performance
of the action, and a reason-explanation of that action is true only if that reason-state
causally explains the action. Now I will turn to three non-causal alternative theories,
and I will argue, partly in connection with the results from the first chapter, that all of
them fail to account for the metaphysical aspect of reason-explanations.
A First Alternative
Consider again the three suggested forms of reason-explanation:
(RE) S A-ed in order to B.
(REC) S A-ed because she wanted to B.
(REC*) S A-ed because she desired, intended or had some pro-attitude to B.
According to a first non-causal alternative, statements of the form REC* (or REC) are
true, only if the corresponding statement of the form RE is true; it is true that S A-ed
because she wanted to B, only if it is true that S A-ed in order to B.
This proposal, it seems, provides a straightforward way to meet Davidson’s
challenge. It is true that the agent acted for the reasons cited in statements of the form
REC*, only if the corresponding teleological explanation of the form RE is
true—only if it is true that the agent had the goal of B-ing by A-ing. That is, if the
agent had the mental attitudes mentioned in REC*, and if the corresponding
teleological statement RE is false, then the agent merely had the reasons, but did not
act for them.37
                                                 
37 George Wilson discusses and rejects the following response to this suggestion. Some causalists argue
that statements of the form RE entail, analytically, statements of the form REC*. Moreover, our grasp
of the former presupposes a grasp of the latter. If that is correct, the non-causalist alternative is
profoundly mistaken, since it gets the direction of justification wrong. It is RE that needs to be
grounded in REC*, rather than the other way round. Against that, Wilson argues that the non-causalist
can hold that RE ‘guarantees’ the truth of REC* without being committed to the claim that the meaning
of RE is given by—or has to be explained by—the meaning of REC*. Explanations in terms of desires,
beliefs and intentions are available to the non-causalists, but such explanations are, according to
Wilson, just redescriptions of the agent’s goal or purpose of A-ing in order to B (see Wilson, 1989,
chapter 7). I can agree with Wilson that statements of the form RE can usually be reformulated using
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Does that constitute an alternative account of the metaphysical aspect of reason-
explanations? Two points must be established. Firstly, the theory must account for the
metaphysical connection between reasons and action—it must explain why a reason-
explanation explains the performance of a particular action by reference to an agent’s
having a particular reason. Secondly, the non-causalist must explain why that
alternative does not merely defer the problem. The causal theory grounds the truth of
statements of the form REC* in causal connections. The alternative grounds it in
statements of the form RE. But in virtue of what is a statement of the form RE true?
Should we accept the fact that the agent pursued some goal or end as a bare
teleological fact?
According to the causal approach, actions are events with the right kind of causal
history. The performance of an action is, metaphysically speaking, nothing but the
occurrence of an event. The only way to explain the occurrence of a particular event,
it seems, is to provide a causal explanation. Given that, it is difficult to see how a non-
causal alternative could possibly account for the metaphysical aspect of reason-
explanations. However, construing the issue in that way, non-causalists will object, is
to beg the question. The causalist, it seems, merely affirms the causal approach,
assuming that actions are events and that only causal explanations can explain the
occurrence of events.
Nevertheless, let us ask why causal explanations explain the occurrence of
events. Answering that question, one may refer to causal laws. The occurrence of an
event-token can be explained by pointing to, firstly, the occurrence of another event
and, secondly, to a law according to which tokens of the latter type are followed by
tokens of the former type. To require reference to laws, however, is also question-
begging from the non-causalist’s point of view. Another way of answering the
question is to say that causal explanations explain the occurrence of events, because
they support counterfactuals of the right sort; in our case, counterfactuals of the
following form.
(CF) Given relevantly similar circumstances, had S not desired or intended to
B, then S would not have A-ed.
                                                                                                                                            
statements of the form REC*—and vice versa. However, I do not think that dealing with this particular
issue is a promising way of assessing the disagreement between causalist and non-causalist positions.
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The suggestion here is to understand the ‘mysterious connection’ between reasons
and causes as counterfactual dependence. That is clearly compatible and in line with
the causal theory, since causal claims entail or support counterfactuals. Further,
construing it in terms of counterfactuals does not by itself rule out non-causal
theories. Rather, the suggestion is that any theory that supports counterfactuals of the
form CF provides an account of the connection between reasons and action just by
virtue of supporting those counterfactuals.
So, a non-causal alternative could account for the metaphysical connection
between actions and reasons by showing how and why non-causal explanations
support counterfactuals of the right kind. George Wilson and Scott Sehon, for
instance, have pursued that strategy. Wilson thinks that teleological explanations of
the form RE support counterfactuals of the form CF, and that the truth of
counterfactuals of the form CF is grounded in the truth of the corresponding
teleological explanation in conjunction with some fundamental and ‘simple facts
about an agent’s power to act or to refrain from acting’, such as the fact that ‘agents
normally have it in their power not to perform an action of a type that they have no
adequate reason to perform’.38 Given, furthermore, that they are rational agents, they
usually refrain from performing actions they have no reason for: rational agents,
typically, would not have A-ed, had they not had reason to do so. According to
Wilson, it is simply a fundamental fact about genuinely rational agents that, if the
agent S has no goal that would be promoted by A-ing, then S would not even try to A.
These claims are made in the light of what Wilson takes to be further fundamental
facts about agents. Firstly, human agents have the ability to guide and regulate their
behaviour in a manner appropriate to the content of the desires and beliefs they have.
Secondly, they can reflect on the value of what is presented by their desires as
attractive, and, thirdly, they can choose whether they act on a given desire or not.39
Sehon’s account of the explanatory power of the teleological alternative is very
similar to Wilson’s. Sehon discusses the role of mental states in the explanation of
action and argues, partly with Wilson, that the teleological alternative can incorporate
reference to desires and beliefs.40 Sehon, however, considers different counterfactuals;
                                                 
38 Wilson, 1989, p. 198.
39 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
40 See Sehon, 1994 and 2000.
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namely, counterfactuals that serve to characterise, as Sehon says, the explanatory
power of the teleological connective in order to. They are of the following form.
(CF*) Had S not directed her behaviour towards B, S would not have A-ed.
But Sehon’s explanation of why counterfactuals of that form hold is, basically, the
same as given by Wilson in support of CF. Sehon argues as follows.
Given (i) that it is within S’s power to refrain from A-ing, and (ii) that A-ing
would serve no purpose toward which S is directing her behaviour, S will
typically not A. That is a fundamental fact about the behaviour of teleologically
explicable agents: so long as it is within their power to refrain, agents will
typically not do things that serve no purpose of theirs.41
One may wonder why, exactly, such observations concerning some ‘fundamental
facts about agency’ in conjunction with teleological statements of the form RE
support the relevant counterfactuals. Why is it that the agent would not have done the
action, given the antecedent? The offered answer, as I understand it, is just that
rational agents will, usually, refrain from performing an action for which they have
no reason—given that they have it in their power to refrain. And since it is, usually,
within their powers to refrain, a rational agents, who A-ed for the reason R, would not
have A-ed, if they had not had R.
I shall grant that the teleological alternative supports the right counterfactuals. My
objection is that the proposal merely defers the problem. The proposal says that
statements of the form REC* are grounded in statements of the form RE, and that the
latter are grounded in the mentioned facts about rational agents; in particular, the fact
that rational agents have the power to act and refrain from acting in the light of
reasons. But that power is itself in need of explanation. My objection to the
teleological alternative is, then, the following.
In the previous chapter I distinguished between four different positions in the
metaphysics of agency: the reductive and the non-reductive approach, volitionism and
pluralism. I rejected both the non-reductive approach and volitionism. In the second
part of this chapter I will argue against pluralism and I will explain why the power to
choose and act for reasons is in need of explanation. Finally, I showed in the first part
of this chapter that the reductive approach stands and falls with causalism about
reason-explanations. Given all that, we can say that there is only one viable account
                                                 
41 Compare Sehon, 1994, p. 66.
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of the powers of rational agents available; namely, the account provided by the
reductive standard-causal model of agency, which is, apparently, incompatible with
non-causalism. That leaves non-causalism without an account of the metaphysics of
agency; in particular, without an account of an agent’s power to choose and act in the
light of reasons.42 We should, then, reject non-causalism about reason-explanations
because it fails to account for the metaphysical aspect of rational action and reason-
explanations.43
Wilson responds to an objection that is, in spirit, similar to the one just outlined.
The causalist, Wilson says, may insist that the performance of an action has to be
understood as the occurrence of an event, which, in turn, has to be explained in terms
of causation. The causalist, as Wilson thinks, is in effect
[…] maintaining that the power to act in order to promote a valued objective is
nothing more than the potentiality that the agent’s having of the relevant reason
will be an efficient cause […].44
Against that, Wilson makes the point that I indicated above. The causalist, it seems, is
begging the question, since she merely reiterates, as Wilson says, the causal approach,
according to which the powers of rational agents have to be understood in terms of
event-causation. There is no further argument for the causal approach. Hence, all the
non-causalist needs to do is to provide an alternative account of the powers of rational
agents.
Is there a viable alternative account that is compatible with non-causalism?
Wilson does not develop an alternative account. However, he offers the idea for an
alternative theory, and he thinks that is sufficient to rebut the causalist’s contention
that the powers of agents must be understood in event-causal terms.45 Wilson’s idea
                                                 
42 Both Wilson and Sehon say that the mentioned facts about rational agents are fundamental facts, but
they do not clarify what they mean by ‘fundamental’. One might think that means, firstly, that the
mentioned facts cannot be explained (at least not reductively), which does not matter, since, secondly,
the mentioned facts are not in need of explanation. Whatever Wilson and Sehon mean by
‘fundamental’, they merely maintain that the mentioned facts are fundamental—that is, they do not
argue that, or explain why, we should accept them as fundamental. I will argue further below that the
efficacy of reasons and an agent’s power to act on them is in need of explanation (see especially pp.
107), and the reductive account of that power presented in the first chapter will be further developed in
the following two chapters.
43 I will return to this argument at the end of this chapter.
44 Wilson, 1989, p. 199.
45 Wilson’s aim is to offer a ‘prima facie alternative’ to the ‘causalist views about the relation of
reasons and the powers of agency’ (p. 199). That suggests that Wilson does not regard the facts about
agents and their powers as fundamental, in the sense that they are not in need of explanation (compare
note 42).
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builds on Leibniz’s doctrine that reasons ‘incline without necessitation’. If the reasons
for which an agent acted merely inclined the agent to act in a certain way, then, as
Wilson says, their ‘motivating force […] has not necessitated the act, i.e., has not
been among its efficient causes’.46
Wilson, however, is mistaken in several respects. Firstly, the causalist does not
merely reiterate the original position. We have to distinguish between causal theories
of reason-explanation and causal theories of agency. It is true that the causal theory of
reason-explanation presupposes the standard-causal model of agency. But neither
does the causalist simply assume that reason-explanation is a species of causal
explanation, nor is it simply assumed that the standard-causal model is true. In the
previous chapter, for instance, I did not assume that the powers of rational agents can
only be understood by reducing them to causal relations between agent-involving
states and event. Rather, I argued against the non-reductive model and against
volitionism—and I will argue against pluralism in due course.
Secondly, it is not obvious at all that the idea that reasons incline, without
necessitation, is incompatible with the causal approach. One would have to show that
the notion of inclination cannot be understood in dispositional terms, or in terms of
probabilistic causation—something Wilson has not even attempted to argue for.
Thirdly, and most importantly, it is difficult to see why Leibniz’s claim
constitutes by itself an alternative account of an agent’s power to choose and act for
reasons. Suppose that an agent S has reasons in favour of A-ing and reasons in favour
of B-ing, and that both reasons merely incline S to choose and act. Suppose, then, that
S A-s. How do we explain that? Do we seek to explain S’s choice and act by pointing
out that the reasons in favour of A-ing were better or stronger than the ones in favour
of B-ing, or do we say that S A-ed because it was within S’s power to choose and act
in the light of reasons? What Wilson and Sehon suggest is, clearly, the latter. They
think that an exercise of the power to act for reasons cannot be reduced to relations
that hold between the agent’s reasons and actions. Because of that, though, the
qualification that the relation is one of inclination rather than necessitation does not
make a relevant difference. Wilson and Sehon do not suggest that reasons render the
performance of certain actions merely probable. They think, rather, that, since reasons
merely incline, it is within the power and up to the agent to choose to act on them. But
                                                 
46 Compare ibid.
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that is just to assume that rational agents have the ability to choose and act for
reasons, rather than to provide an account of it. Far from providing the idea for an
alternative theory, Leibniz’s claim merely highlights what has to be explained by a
theory of rational agency.
A Second Alternative
Let us now turn to another non-causal proposal. Carl Ginet has suggested another
non-causalist account of reason-explanations that is teleological in character. But it
differs in some respects significantly from the proposal discussed in the previous
section. Consider again our reason-explanation.
(RE) S A-ed in order to B.
Instead of referring to RE as grounding the truth of other statements, Ginet offers the
following non-causal—or ‘anomic’, as Ginet says—condition for its truth.
(NC) Concurrently with her A-ing S intended of that A-ing that by it (and in
virtue of its being an A-ing) she would B (or would contribute to her B-ing).47
According to Ginet, the truth of NC—‘besides the occurrence of the explained
action’—is sufficient for the truth of RE. When these conditions are satisfied, then it
was ipso facto, as Ginet says, S’s purpose that by A-ing she would B, which is, in
turn, just to say that S A-ed in order to B . Ginet, obviously, assumes an analytic
relationship between the notions of acting with a purpose and acting with an
intention—an assumption that I shall not contest. Does Ginet’s proposal do better
than the first teleological alternative? Let us first ask whether the proposal can
account for the difference between having a reason in favour of an action and acting
for it.
In a first response I am tempted to say that it is just obvious that Ginet’s proposal
fails in that respect. What Davidson’s challenge highlights is that an agent’s reasons
may merely rationalise the performance of an action—they may merely accompany
its performance without motivating it. But all that NC requires is that the intention
occurs concurrently with the action—it leaves open the possibility that their
concurrent occurrence is a mere coincidence.
                                                 
47 Compare Ginet, 1990, p. 138 and 2001, p. 388.
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Alfred Mele makes a related point using the following example. Suppose an
agent had concurrently with A-ing two intentions, I1 and I2, that satisfy a condition of
the form NC—say that according to the content of I1, A-ing contributes to B-ing, and
according to I2, it contributes to C-ing. Suppose further that I1—or its neural
realisation—was causally relevant to the occurrence of the bodily movement that was
or constituted the particular A-ing. Mele asks to which of the two intentions we would
refer in order to explain the agent’s A-ing. We would, clearly, refer to I1, rather than
I2. That shows, according to Mele, that ‘the mere presence in the agent of an
intention’ is not sufficient for that intention to be explanatory of the performance of
an action.48
In a response, Ginet rejects Mele’s example as question-begging. Asking which
intention is causally explanatory, it just assumes that intentions—or their neural
realisations—usually play a causal role in the performance of actions. Further, Ginet
makes the epistemological point that we are, usually, ignorant about the neural
processes occurring in our brain. But we are, usually, not ignorant about the truth
conditions of reason-explanations, which are formulated in common-sense
psychological and teleological terms.49
The second point is hardly convincing, though. Firstly, we are—or can
be—justified in believing ordinary causal statements, such as ‘the earthquake caused
the catastrophe’ or ‘the stone caused the breaking of the window’, even though we are
ignorant about the underlying physical mechanisms. Secondly, Ginet assumes,
apparently, that the neural realisations of intentions, rather than the intentions qua
intentions, cause and causally explain behaviour. Causalism, however, is not
committed to that claim.50
My response to Ginet’s first point—the objection that the causalist is begging the
question—is basically the same as above. Causalists do not simply presuppose the
causal framework. Rather, they insist that the counterfactual dependence between
reasons and causes is in need of explanation. Rejecting reference to causal
connections, non-causalists have to provide an alternative account of the metaphysical
connection between reasons and action that explains why the relevant counterfactuals
                                                 
48 See Mele, 1992, p. 253.
49 See Ginet, 2001, pp. 389-390.
50 I will say more on that in chapter 3, especially pp. 117, and in chapter 4, especially pp. 183.
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are true. Ginet’s proposal falls short of that. According to his view, the truth of
statements of the form RE requires the truth of statements of the form NC together
with the occurrence of the explained action. Ginet, naturally, presupposes that the
action has in fact been performed. But more is needed. We want to know why the
particular performance depends counterfactually on the agent having the particular
intention, for instance. The fact that, on that particular occasion, the agent,
concurrently with performing the action, intended of that action that by doing it she
would pursue a certain goal, does not explain the dependence between that intention
and that action. Ginet’s proposal fails, therefore, to account for the ‘mysterious
connection’ between reasons and actions—it fails to account for the metaphysical or
motivational aspect of reason-explanation.
A Third Alternative
What causalists and non-causalists can agree on is that, when we explain the actions
of human agents, we describe their behaviour in intentional terms and attribute
intentional states to the agent, in the light of which their behaviour appears as
intelligible. Seeking a rationalising explanation, we try to understand and make sense
of their actions. Some philosophers think that this practice of interpretation and
attribution is indeterminate, open and holistic in nature.51 And some non-causalists
think that we can distinguish between having a reason and acting for it by providing a
sufficiently detailed and comprehensive narrative—without presupposing or
appealing to causation by reasons. Frederick Stoutland, for instance, says that
[to] determine the reasons which do explain [the agent’s] behaviour, when this
is not clear, we first have to determine how to describe it. This may be a
complex process: we may have to ask him some questions, we may have to
check out what else he did before […]; we may have to see how he behaved
afterwards […].52
Stoutland, however, does not make explicit how such a narrative is structured and to
what facts it must appeal in order to explain an action. In another article Stoutland
says that the non-causal theory ‘gives no explanation of why the agent’s behaviour
occurs or comes about’. Rather, it ‘gives the attitudinal conditions in terms of which
                                                 
51 See, most prominently, Davidson, 1980, essay 11 and 12. Compare also Child, 1994.
52 Stoutland, 1986, p. 48.
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to derive the understanding of the agent’s behaviour as the act that he performed’.53
That, it seems, is just another description of what we do when we rationalise the
performance of an action in the light of some of the agent’s reason-states. But that
means that Stoutland does not offer an alternative account at all. Rather, he merely
denies that the explanatory force of reason-states must be grounded in the fact that
they played a causal role in the causation of the action.
In a recent book, G. F. Schueler agrees with Stoutland on the point that a non-
causal theory can account for the difference between having a reason and acting for it
by virtue of providing a richer narrative. Schueler, however, makes clear that such a
narrative refers to some of the agent’s mental states and events and to certain features
of the agent’s character—possibly also to the agent’s history of socialisation and
personal development. Schueler thinks that non-causalism can provide an alternative
by analogy with a solution to a ‘puzzle’ concerning free rational choice. He cites
Thomas Nagel, who describes that puzzle as follows.
When someone makes an autonomous choice such as whether to accept a job,
and there are reasons on both sides of the issue, we are supposed to be able to
explain what he did by pointing to his reasons for accepting it. But we could
equally have explained his refusing his job, if he had refused, by referring to the
reasons on the other side […]. Intentional explanation […] can explain either
choice, […] but for that reason it cannot explain why the person accepted the
job for the reasons in favour instead of refusing it for the reasons against.54
Without getting into detail, let us agree that in such cases we cannot explain why the
agent does one thing rather than another in terms of the agent’s reasons. According to
Schueler, though, when we explain actions in psychological terms, we are not
restricted to giving the agent’s reasons. We might be able to explain a choice or action
by referring to the agent’s character or personality. By pointing out what ‘kind of
person’ the agent is, as Schueler thinks, we may be able to understand why one action
was chosen rather than another. Reference to the agent’s personality can tell us why
the agent took something as a reason for action. Reference to character traits can
therefore be part of reason-explanation, because it can help us to understand why the
agent choose and acted on one set of reasons rather than another.55
                                                 
53 Stoutland, 1976, p. 302, my emphasis.
54 Nagel, 1990, pp. 115-116. Cited in Schueler, p. 50 and p. 84.
55 Schueler, 2003. For a summary of the view that reference to character traits can explain why the
agent takes something to be a reason see p. 81.
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Schueler’s suggestion is to make use of the same explanatory resources in order
to meet Davidson’s challenge. The thought is, it seems, that we can explain the
difference between having a reason and acting for it in the same way as we can
explain why an agent acted for one reason rather than another.56 Both questions can
be answered by supplementing the reason-explanation with considerations concerning
the agent’s character, which tell us why an agent took something to be a
reason—which is to say that Davidson’s challenge can be met without appeal to
causation or causal explanation.57
I think, though, that Schueler misses the point. The first thing to note is that in the
case of rational free choice the agent has different reasons in favour of different
courses of action, whereas the question for which reason an agent has acted arises
also when the agent has different reasons in favour of one course of action. Far more
importantly, though, Davidson’s challenge does not concern the question why an
agent acted for one reason rather than another. Rather, it asks what acting for a reason
consists in: given that the agent acted for a reason, what makes it true that the agent
acted for that reason? What is the metaphysical or motivational connection between
that reason and the performance of the action in virtue of which it is true that the
agent acted because of having that reason? Examples in which an agent has more than
one reason in favour of one action can be used to illustrate the problem. But the
challenge concerns acting for reasons in general—it concerns just as well cases in
which there is only one reason that favours the performance of one action.58 Schueler
thinks that the challenge is about ‘gaps’ in intentional explanations of action. But that
is a misunderstanding. The challenge is neither to fill in explanatory gaps, nor to
explain how we can provide richer explanations of actions. Rather, given that
reference to a certain mental attitude is explanatory, the challenge is explain why
                                                 
56 For the analogy between ‘Davidson’s challenge’ and the problem of rational free choice see ibid., pp.
84-87.
57 Note that it is far from obvious that explanations in terms of character traits, construed as
dispositional properties, cannot contribute to causal explanations (reference to an object’s fragility, for
instance, can contribute to a causal explanation of that object’s breaking under certain conditions).
58 Compare Child, 1994, who points out that the problem does not only arise in cases in which we have
to judge which reason the agent for, but it arises for every case in which an agent acted for a reason
(especially p. 96).
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referring to it is explanatory—the challenge is to provide an account of the
rationalising and the motivational aspect of reason-explanations.59
Agreement between Causalists and Non-Causalist?
In a more recent article Stoutland acknowledges that point. Reference to causation is
not supposed to help us to find out which reasons an agent acts for, nor is it supposed
to explain why the agent acted for one reason rather than another. It is not even meant
to explain why the agent acted for a reason, in case there was only one reason
favouring one action. Rather, causalism says that a causal relation is a necessary
condition for acting for a reason. It is a condition, as Stoutland says, that ‘must be met
if the claim [that the agent acted for a reason] is to be true, not an explanation of why
it is true’.60
Curiously, Stoutland does not argue against that claim, and he does not attempt to
provide an alternative. Rather, Stoutland considers Davidson’s position in comparison
to intentionalism, which is the version of non-causalism that he holds, and he argues
that there is hardly any disagreement between the two views—at least far less
disagreement than it is usually thought. In particular, intentionalists need not deny
that there is a causal connection between some mental events and actions that are
done for reasons. This is because intentionalism denies only that there are causal
connections between actions and the mental attitudes that rationalise their
performance. These claims require clarification.
Stoutland agrees with Davidson that actions are events, and that the occurrence of
an event has to be—or is best—explained by citing its cause. He agrees, further, that
causal relations hold only between events. That is, to refer to an event’s cause is to
refer to another event. Given that, it is only plausible to assume that actions are
caused by events, and it is plausible to assume that those events are mental events,
                                                 
59 One may think that the difference between having a reason and acting for it can be explained in
terms of the agent’s treating the corresponding consideration as a reason. But that is not very
promising. Reference to a particular treating of a consideration as a reason raises more questions than it
answers, and it merely defers the challenge. If we say that the agent performed a particular action
because she treated a certain consideration as a reason, the question is what the explanatory force of
that ‘because’ consists in. Further, the proposal raises the question whether treating as a reason is itself
an action. If so, is that mental action itself done for reasons? Finally, the present proposal is, basically,
the same as the neo-Kantian proposal that acting for reasons consists in the agent’s endorsement of a
certain motive as a reason. I argued in the first chapter that this view does not give us a real alternative,
because the agent’s power to act in accordance with the endorsement is itself in need of explanation.
60 Stoutland, 1998a, p. 197.
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since we are concerned with intentional action. Further, Stoutland agrees with
Davidson on the point that intentional actions are explained in terms of the agent’s
reasons, in the sense that the explanation attributes mental attitudes that rationalise the
performance of the action—in the circumstances. According to Davidson, though, the
mental attitudes that rationalise actions are dispositional states and not events. So,
why does Davidson think that reason-explanations are causal explanations?
According to Davidson, the mental attitudes that rationalise the action can
usually be ‘associated with’ the mental event that causes the action.61 There are two
obvious ways in which that relation can be construed. Either the event is associated
with an attitude in the sense that the event is the becoming occurrent of a standing
attitude—the manifestation of a disposition to desire to A in certain circumstances, for
instance.62 Or the event is associated with the agent’s having of a certain attitude at a
time.
Stoutland assumes that, for every action A and for every mental attitude R that
rationalises A-ing, there is a mental event that can be associated with R and that
causes the A -ing.63 He points out, though, that it does not follow that the
corresponding reason-explanation in terms of R is a causal explanation, since it is not
obvious that the attitude is causally explanatory just because it can be associated with
the event. Further, he thinks that there is no need for intentionalists to deny that
actions are caused by mental events (which can be associated with attitudes that
rationalise them). But Stoutland also thinks that there is no reason to assume that
either, because he fails to see what would be gained by insisting on it.64
However, I think that there is good reason to endorse that claim. What is gained
is an account of the metaphysical relation between reasons and actions: actions are
caused by mental events, which can be associated with mental attitudes that
rationalise the performance of that action. That account is certainly not
unproblematic. But having a problematic account, it seems to me, is preferable to
having no account at all.
                                                 
61 Stoutland refers to Davidson, 1980, p. 12.
62 I think that is what Davidson had in mind when talked about the onslaught of mental states or
attitudes (1980, p. 12). For the notion of occurrent mental states see, for instance, Goldman, 1970, pp.
86-89, and Mele, 2003, pp. 30-33.
63 Stoutland is sceptical whether there is in fact for every action, which can be rationalised by
attributing a mental attitude, a mental event that can be associated with that attitude. However, he does
not argue against it, and he assumes it for the sake of the argument.
64 Stoutland, 1998a, especially pp. 204-205.
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Stoutland does not offer an alternative non-causal account of the metaphysical
aspect of reason-explanation, nor does he argue against the need of an alternative
account. That alone, I think, gives intentionalists good reason to endorse the outlined
causal account. Another reason is that the causal theory provides an integrated
account of rational agency, in the sense that it tells us how the causes of the agent-
involving event that constitutes an action relate to the reason-states that rationalise its
performance.65 Given that, a lot is gained by endorsing the causal account of the
metaphysical aspect of reason-explanation. There is, then, good reason for
intentionalist to endorse that account, given the absence of non-causal alternatives.
Reasons and Causes
Causalism says that reason-states causally explain actions. That presupposes that
reason-states are causes in some sense. Apart from the suggestion that reason-states
can be associated with mental events that cause the action, the following two further
options are available to causalism.66
Firstly, one may deny that only events are causes. Standing dispositions, states
and other background conditions often play an important role in the production of an
effect. Often, reference to an event is explanatory only because we know that certain
other conditions obtained. These standing background conditions, so the suggestion
goes, are not merely explanatory, but they play a role in the causal history of the
effect. And often it is relative to interest whether we refer to an event or a standing
condition as a cause—or the cause—of the effect.67
Secondly, one may deny that there is a clear distinction between events and
states. It has been suggested to construe both events as states as instantiations of
                                                 
65 I will develop this point in more detail in the next section and in chapter 3.
66 In the following, one must bear in mind the conclusion of the section on externalism about content
(pp. 64). In particular, a reason-state may be a cause of an action only in the sense that the description
of that state refers to a physical event part of which is the cause of the agent-involving event that
constitutes the action. In other words, the cause of the agent-involving event that constitutes the action
may only be part of the supervenience base of the reason-state.
67 That point goes back to John Stuart Mill, 1846, at least. Compare, for instance, also Lewis, 1986, p.
162, and Dretske, 1988, who argues that ‘we can divide things up as we please. The fact is that in
ordinary affairs we seldom, if ever, regard the cause of an event as the totality of conditions relevant to
the occurrence of the effect. Instead, we pick out some salient parts of this totality and designate it as
the cause’ (pp. 39). According to Dretske, both standing conditions (states and dispositions) and events
are part of the totality of an effect’s causal history; he calls the former the ‘structuring causes’ and the
latter the ‘triggering causes’ of the effect (pp. 42).
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properties (by a substance at a time).68 On that view, the only difference between
events and states is that states are instantiated over some extended period of time. But
since events and states fall under the same ontological category, there is no obvious
reason to deny that they can be causally efficacious and relevant in the same
way—namely, as instantiations of properties.69
The Metaphysics of Reason-Explanation
I argued that Davidson’s challenge has to be understood as a metaphysical challenge.
It concerns the motivational efficacy of reasons and the metaphysical connection and
dependence between reasons and actions. A response to the challenge must show why
and how reasons influence the actions of rational agents and what the connection and
dependence between them consists in. I argued that none of the non-causal proposals
provides a viable alternative to the causal theory.
Non-causalists, though, may respond as follows. It is true that non-causal
alternatives do not show what the ‘mysterious connection’ between reasons and
actions consists in—they do not provide a metaphysical account of the influence or
efficacy of reasons. But why is the metaphysical connection between reasons and
action in need of explanation at all? And secondly, if it is in need of explanation, why
must a theory of reason-explanation provide an account of the metaphysical
connection between reasons and actions?
One answer to the first question has already been given in the response to the first
non-causal alternative. Non-causalists do not deny that actions depend
counterfactually on reasons. Why are those counterfactuals are true—what makes
                                                 
68 Compare Kim, 1993, pp. 33-34.
69 According to an alternative, it is sufficient to point out that states, dispositions and other standing
conditions are causally explanatory in the sense that they play an indispensable role in causal
explanations. Usually, reference to the event that triggered the effect is explanatory only in
combination with the background conditions. Often the background conditions are not mentioned in
causal explanations. But that is only because we take the presence of the right conditions for granted.
(Suppose one explains that lighting of the fire by that striking of the match. The fact that we do not
have to mention the presence of oxygen in the explanation does not mean that it is not causally
explanatory. It means only that common sense takes it for granted that this condition obtained.)
Endorsing that third position, causalists need not abandon the assumption that only events are proper
causes, but they must give up the claim that reason-states are causes altogether. That is why the other
two options are preferable. Reason-states, it seems to me, should not merely be causally explanatory,
but they should be causes, in the sense that they initiate or trigger actions. Note, though, that mixed
views are possible. One may hold, for instance, that an agent’s standing background beliefs and desires
are merely causally explanatory, whereas formations of intentions are causes of actions.
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them true? The metaphysical connection between reasons and actions is in need of
explanation, because the counterfactual dependence between them is in need of
explanation. In the following, I will provide another response to the first question and
the second part of my response to the second question. The first part of that response
goes as follows.
We can grant that a theory of reason-explanation need not itself provide an
account of the metaphysics of acting for reasons. However, a theory of reason-
explanation presupposes a metaphysical connection between reasons and actions—it
presupposes that reasons are motivationally efficacious in the production or
performance of actions. Explanations in terms of reasons make sense only if it is
assumed that the reasons motivated the agent. The fact that reasons influence the
actions of rational agents is a presupposition without which reason-explanations
would be entirely unintelligible. That is not to say that we cannot make sense of an
agent’s behaviour without knowing what she actually had in mind when she was
acting. We may try to interpret her actions by attributing mental attitudes in the light
of which the agent’s behaviour makes sense. But in doing so, we assume that the
agent was motivated by those attitudes—we are assuming a metaphysical connection
and dependence between reason-states and actions.
A theory of reason-explanation does not stand on its own feet. It is part of a
theory of agency in general, and part of a theory of acting for reasons in particular. In
the first chapter we saw that only some positions in the metaphysics of agency are
compatible with the causal theory of reason-explanations, and that others are
committed to non-causalism. So, even if a theory of reason-explanation need not itself
provide an account of the metaphysics of acting for reasons, it must be compatible
with such an account. And, in general, a theory of reason-explanation should not be
assessed as a freestanding theory, but as part of a theory of agency.
Causal Closure and the Efficacy of Reasons
Consider now another explanation of why the efficacy of reasons and the
metaphysical connection between reasons and actions is in need of explanation. Let
me begin by introducing the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The
principle says, according to Kim, the following.
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If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry […], that will
never take you outside the physical domain.70
Non-causalists, usually, have no intention to deny or question the closure principle.
And together with that principle they usually accept that bodily movements can be
explained in scientific—and causal—terms.71 The closure principle leads to very
difficult problems concerning the causal role of reason-states and concerning the
status of reason-explanations. Given that the causal history of every instance of
behaviour can be spelt out in purely physical—or, say, neuro-physiological—terms,
there is, it seems, no causal role left that reason-states could play in the production of
action. And given that behaviour can be fully explained in scientific terms, reason-
explanations appear to be redundant. The first problem is known as the problem of
causal exclusion, and the second as the problem of explanatory exclusion.72
One may think, though, that the exclusion problems arise only for causal theories
of agency and reason-explanation. The closure principle threatens to exclude the
efficacy of reason-states only if their efficacy is construed as causal efficacy. Further,
it seems that two explanations can exclude each other only if they explain the same
phenomenon and only if they are explanations of the same kind—only if they are two
causal explanations of one and the same event, for instance. Non-causalists may
argue, then, that the closure principle does not pose a problem for their view for the
following reasons.
Kim, for instance, argued that two causal explanations of one and the same
phenomenon create an unstable situation—an epistemic tension.73 The reason for that
is that both explanations explain the occurrence of one and the same phenomenon.
According to non-causalism, however, scientific and reason-explanations of
behaviour are not of the same kind. The former explain why certain events occurred
in causal terms, whereas the latter explain why certain actions have been performed in
terms of the agent’s reasons. The former explain an occurrence by reference to other
events, and the latter rationalise the performance of an action by an agent. Given that,
                                                 
70 Kim, 2000, p. 40.
71 Dupré, 2001, and Merricks, 2001, deny the causal closure of the physical. Both advocate an agent-
causal theory of agency. It is not clear, though, whether they are causalists or non-causalists about
reason-explanation. But that does not matter, since I rejected agent-causation on different—and
independent—grounds.
72 I will turn to the problem of causal exclusion in chapter 3. For the problem of explanatory exclusion
see, for instance, Kim, 1997.
73 Kim, 1997, p. 265 and p. 272.
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it is not obvious at all that the two explanations exclude each other—or that they are
somehow in competition—simply because reason-explanations do not explain
occurrences at all. A closely related second reason is that, according to non-
causalism, scientific and causal explanation do not explain one and the same thing.
Reason-explanations explain the performance of actions, whereas scientific explain
the occurrence of bodily movements.
For the moment, let us set aside considerations about causal and explanatory
exclusion.74 Given the causal closure of the physical, we can see why the efficacy of
reasons and an agent’s power to act on them is in need of explanation. In particular, it
is in need of explanation how the efficacy of reasons relates to the causal efficacy of
the causes of bodily movements.75 Further, it seems clear that the two non-causalist
responses, which have just been outlined, do not help in that respect. Reasons
undoubtedly do influence our actions. We do certain things, rather than others,
because of the reasons we have—because we believe, desire and intend this rather
than that. And had we had, in a particular situation, different reasons, we would have
acted differently. In that plain and straightforward sense, reasons are efficacious.
Given, though, that the causal history of behaviour consists only of non-mental states
and events, the question how and where reason-states enter into the picture is only a
natural question to ask. How is their influence is to be construed? How do they relate
to the causes of movements? What does an agent’s power to act on them consist in?76
Now we can see that the response that reason-explanations are not causal in kind
is beside the point. The question how the influence of reasons is to be understood
arises for every theory of agency. Further, the point that reason-explanations explain
actions rather than bodily movements is also of little help. Actions, it seems obvious,
stand in some intimate relationship with bodily movements; overt actions are identical
with or in some sense constituted or realised by bodily movements. Given that there is
an intimate relationship between how we act and how we move, it is seems natural to
think that reasons must influence movements insofar as they influence actions—in
                                                 
74 In chapter 3 I will return to the problem of causal exclusion and the question whether reason-
explanations are reducible to non-psychological explanations.
75 Compare also Kim, 1997, who argues that the tension between two competing explanation can be
resolved by providing an explanation of how they are related to one another (p. 272).
76 Making that point, the causalist is not begging the question. It is not assumed there that must be a
causal connection between reasons and actions, since reasons must have an effect on the way we move
and act. The causalist merely highlights that reasons do influence movements and actions. To say that
this motivational influence is causal influence is a further and independent claim.
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order to have an effect on the way an agent acts, reasons must have an effect on how
that agent moves. Several clarifications are in place, though.
Overt Actions and Mental Actions
We distinguished between overt and mental actions. The former are actions that
involve bodily movements such as raising one’s arm, and the latter are acts such as
making a decision or solving a puzzle in one’s head. The relationship between reasons
for actions and the causes of movements concerns, therefore, only overt actions.
However, in the first chapter I pointed out that both kinds of actions can be construed
as being identical with or constituted by agent-involving events. In the case of overt
actions the relevant agent-involving events are bodily movements, and in the case of
mental actions the relevant agent-involving events are mental events (mental
occurrences or the agent’s having of thoughts). Given that, it seems clear that all
considerations concerning overt actions and bodily movements can be carried over to
mental actions and the relevant agent-involving mental events. In particular, given
that mental actions are identical with or constituted by mental events just as overt
actions are identical with or constituted by movements, mental actions stand in the
same intimate relationship with agent-involving events as overt actions.77 In general
terms, our question is, then, how the relationship between reasons for action and the
relevant agent-involving events has to be construed. (Given that straightforward
connection, I will restrict my considerations to overt actions and bodily movements.)
Events and Processes
In the first chapter I pointed out that we have to distinguish between component and
process versions of, for instance, the standard-causal and the agent-causal model of
agency. Both the standard- and the agent-causal theory identify causal processes
constituted by, what I called, an effect-component and an antecedent-component.
According to the standard-causal model, the antecedent-components are agent-
involving reason-states, and according to the agent-causal model, the antecedent-
component is the agent—the person or the self. The effect-component is on both
views an agent-involving event—a bodily movement, for instance. According to the
                                                 
77 One dissimilarity is that the events that constitute mental actions are mental events, whereas the ones
that constitute overt actions are bodily movements (that is, non-mental events). However, provided that
mental events are realised by physical events, that difference is not significant.
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component version of either model, the action is identical with or constituted by the
effect-component. The action, for instance, is identical with or constituted by a bodily
movement with the right causal history. According to the process versions, the action
is identical with or constituted by the process—the antecedent’s causing a bodily
movement in the right way, for instance.78 One may think that the process view, if
correct, raises a difficulty for causalism. According to the causal theory, reason-states
cause and causally explain actions. However, that claim is plainly false, if actions are
constituted by the causal processes in question.
My response to that challenge is that there is no convincing reason to adopt the
process view.79 The only obvious reason for non-causalists to adopt the view is that it
raises an apparent problem for causalism. But that, of course, is not a reason to
endorse the view, as it is, in the present context, not an independent reason. Dretske,
however, argued that the process view is preferable, because it captures better where
action ‘begins’ and where it ‘ends’. He says that to identify behaviour
[…] with a process avoids [problems] by making behaviour begin where it
should begin (with those efferent activities that bring about movement) and end
where it should end (with those external events or conditions that the behaviour
requires for its occurrence). A person’s moving his arm is then a piece of
behaviour that begins with those internal events producing arm movements and
ends with the arm movements they produce.80
However, as Alfred Mele as pointed out, a proponent of the component view need not
deny at all that action begins with ‘efferent activities that bring about movement’,
                                                 
78 Note that there are two notions of constitution in play here. According to the first, an action is
constituted by an event, according to the second, it is constituted by an event-causal process. I say that,
according to the component view, actions are identical with or constituted by events, because
according to a fine-grained view of events (compare note 28, pp. 19) actions cannot be identified with
non-actional events. I will say more on that further below, pp. 99.
79 Another possible response is to reject the assumption that actions are, metaphysically speaking,
either processes or components. In the first chapter we compared actions to banknotes and sunburn.
What they have in common is that their causal history is constitutive of their identity. Segal and Sober,
for instance, suggest that it is a mistake to ask with respect to such historical phenomena whether they
are processes or products. Rather, they are both processes and products (see Segal & Sober, 1991, p.
22). The fact that sunburn is a condition of the skin that is, essentially, caused by exposure to sunlight
suggests that it is a process. However, it is also undeniable that exposure to sun causes sunburn, which
suggests that it is a product. We should accept, therefore, that terms like ‘sunburn’ denote
ambiguously; we can use them in order to refer to the process or the product. Given that, it would be
foolish to stipulate that sunburn is a process in order to show that exposure to sun does not cause or
causally explain sunburn. And it would be equally foolish to stipulate that action is a process in order
to show that causalism is false. According to that view, it is correct to say that actions are processes.
But it is also correct to say that reason-states cause and causally explain them, because actions can also
be identified with the effect-components of the processes in question.
80 Dretske, 1988, p. 17- 18.
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because the ‘efferent events’ that trigger bodily movements may be part of a causal
chain that is caused by the reason-states (they may be part of the causal process that is
caused by agent-involving reason-states). In that case it is, strictly speaking, true that
action is a causal process. But it is not a process that involves the mental antecedents
of action. Rather, it is a process that is constituted by the bodily movement and, say,
certain events involving the agent’s nervous system. On that view, the effect-
component is a process rather than an event. It is, therefore, a component rather than a
process view.81 Proponents of the component view are not committed to the claim that
actions are simple events. Actions may well be complex processes or chains of
events.82 All the components view denies is that the mental states and events that
cause and rationalise actions are part of the processes that constitute actions.83
Another possible argument for the process view says, roughly, that reason-states
cannot be causal antecedents of action, because an agent’s reason-states guide
intentional actions, rather than merely causing or triggering them.84 The thought is
that reason-states cannot be causal antecedents, which precede actions, because the
performance of the action must be guided and monitored by the agent’s mental states
and events.
Let us can grant that this is required with respect to some actions—it is rather
questionable that the performance of all actions must be guided and monitored. It is
difficult to see why that would favour the process view. The mental antecedents of
actions are not necessarily antecedents, which literally precede the action in the sense
that they cease to exist at the time the action begins. According to causalism, actions
are, typically, caused and rationalised by desires, beliefs and intentions. It would be
absurd to think that the agent ceases to have the relevant desires, beliefs and
intentions as soon as she starts to perform the action, which is caused and rationalised
by them. Some of those mental attitudes are dispositional states, which contribute
                                                 
81 Brand, 1984, has suggested such a view. Brand, though, thinks that the processes that constitute
actions are themselves complex or structured events (p. 16).
82 In particular, some non-basic actions may well be construed as causal processes involving more
basic actions, rather than as simple events. For instance, Brutus’ killing Caesar can be construed as a
process involving Brutus’ stabbing Caesar and Caesar’s death.
83 Searle, 1983, distinguishes between prior intentions and intentions-in-action and he thinks that the
former cause the latter, which in turn cause bodily movements. The action is identified with the causal
process between the intentions-in-action and the movement. That is also not a proper processes view,
as the prior intention, which causes the action, is not construed as being part of the process that
constitutes the action (see especially p. 94).
84 Compare, for instance, Frankfurt, 1988, pp. 73-75.
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causally in the performance of the action, and others are proper events, such as an
agent’s believing or intending something at a time. Even for reason events, there is no
reason to think that the agent ceases to have the belief and intention, for instance, as
soon as the action is caused. Rather, the reason-states and events may causally sustain
the action, which would account for their guiding and monitoring its performance.85
Or the action is construed as a chain of events, the progression of which is guided and
monitored via so-called causal feedback loops that hold between those events and the
agent’s having the belief and intention in question.86
The two considerations presented do not give any independent reason to prefer
the process view, and I am not aware of any other argument for it. Is there any reason
to prefer the component view? Consider an agent, Sam, who had to decide whether to
A  or B . After considering the reasons for and against both A-ing and B-ing, Sam
judged that would be better to A; he then formed an intention to A in appropriate
circumstances; and, finally, he carried out that intention accordingly. According to the
standard-causal theory, that process is a causal process in which the reasons cause the
judgement, which causes the intention and finally a bodily movement. If we construe
all actions as processes, we face difficult questions concerning the beginning and the
end of those processes. In the example, Sam performed two actions: he made a
decision and he performed an overt action. Where do the two actions begin and end?
If the antecedents of the overt action are the reason-states on which the judgement is
based, is then the decision a proper part of the overt action? Given that there is no
independent reason to prefer to process view, I think we have reason to endorse the
component view just in order to avoid such questions. For, on the component view,
the decision is, simply, the formation of the intention, and the overt action is the
bodily movement.
Actions and Events
In the previous section I argued for the component view, according to which actions
are either identical with or constituted by non-actional events. Whether or not actions
can be identified with non-actional events depends on how events are individuated.
Let us first have a closer look at the identity view. What does it mean to say that
                                                 
85 For more on the notion of sustaining causation see, for instance, Audi, 1993b.
86 For more on the notion of guidance by causal feedback loops see, for instance, Bishop, 1989, pp.
168-171, and Mele, 2003, pp. 55-58. See also chapter 4, p. 178, note 49.
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actions are events? Consider, once more, the action of Sue’s raising her arm and the
event of Sue’s arm rising. Does the event occur whenever Sue performs the action: is
Sue’s arm rising whenever she raises it? The answer, it seems, is clearly yes. The
identity view does justice to that intuition. According to that view, the agent-
involving act-neutral or non-actional event of Sue’s arm rising is an action in virtue
of being caused in the right way by some of Sue’s reason-states. The particular
action—the act-token—is identical with the event-token, and the fact that a token of
the type raising one’s arm has been performed entails that a token of the type an
arm’s rising has occurred. The agent-involving event-token, as John Bishop has put
it, is a token of an event-type that is intrinsic to the action-type:
Each type of action is a bringing about by the agent of a specific type of event
or state, and this is what counts as the event- or state-type intrinsic to that
action. […] Thus, events and states intrinsic to action are always open to
descriptions under which they have an unproblematic place in a naturalist
ontology […]. A reference to an event-type intrinsic to an action is not a
reference to any kind of action.87
An identification of act-tokens with non-actional event-tokens, however, presupposes
a theory of events which is not entirely unproblematic. According to that view, events
are concrete particulars, which not only can be described and referred to in different
ways, but have different properties. In the example, the particular has the property of
being a raising of one’s hand and it has the property of being a rising of an arm.
                                                 
87 Bishop, 1989, p. 105. Compare also Enç, 2003, who uses the more technical notion of the result of
an action, which is taken from von Wright and McCann, in order to capture the idea that actions are
constituted by events (see Enç 2003, p. 9 and pp. 85-88). Moya, 1990, argues that there are many
actions, which do not have intrinsic events, such as making an offer or giving a lecture (pp. 38-40).
There are two responses. Firstly, the fact that we find it difficult to describe the intrinsic event in such
cases is a linguistic obstacle; it does not show that there is no such event (compare Enç, 2003, p. 87,
note 87). Secondly, the mentioned actions are non-basic actions. There is, however, no reason to deny
that all basic actions have intrinsic events. We may modify the thesis accordingly and say that all
actions either have intrinsic events or are generated by actions that have intrinsic events. That is
sufficient to rebut the challenge.
Further, one may think that omissions or so-called negative actions, such as not voting or not saving
the person in need, raise a problem for that view, as there is no positive occurrence that is caused by
the agent’s reason-states. However, I think that talk about ‘negative actions’ is elliptical. In some cases,
the action is simply the agent’s deciding not to perform an action (or to do something else instead). The
remaining cases can be divided in basic and non-basic cases. Basic omissions, such as not raising one’s
hand, are usually constituted by the agent’s actual bodily movements (whereby the “movement” may
be simply holding the body still). Non-basic omissions are, generally, generated by basic omissions;
not voting, for instance, may be generated by not raising one’s hand. There are, no doubt, many subtle
and difficult questions concerning omissions that a theory of responsibility must answer, but I cannot
see why omissions would raise a particular problem for the view that actions are events. For more on
responsibility for omissions see, for instance, Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, chapter 5, and for more on
negative actions see Mele, 2003, pp. 146-154.
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According to a rival theory of events, particular events are identical if and only if they
involve and are constituted by the same substance, the same property and the same
time.88 That view construes events as property instantiations; in particular, every event
is the instantiation of only one property by a substance at a time.
Kim pointed out that we must distinguish between two kinds of properties that
are associated with an event. There is the property that is constitutive of the event, and
there are numerous further properties that are instantiated by the event.89 Consider, for
instance, Sue’s raising her hand. On the property instantiation view, that action is an
event, which involves Sue, the property of being a raising of one’s hand, and a certain
time. The property of being a raising of one’s hand is constitutive of the event. But
that event also instantiates other properties such as being an action that is performed
on planet earth, being an action that involves Sue, and so forth.
So, what if instantiations of the property being a raising of one’s hand and
instantiations of being a rising of a hand constitute distinct events? Even if so, it is
obvious and undeniable that they stand in some intimate and systematic relationship.
That fact that Sue raised her hand entails that the event of her arm’s rising occurred,
and the action, it seems clear, was in some sense constituted or realised by that act-
neutral event.90
Further, it should be noted that it is at least possible that two particulars are not
identical and not entirely distinct. According to Kim, two events may be
distinct—and hence not identical—without being entirely distinct. In an example Kim
compares the event Sebastian’s stroll with Sebastian’s leisurely strolling. Are there
two events happening at the same time, or is there only one event with different
                                                 
88 Compare, for instance, Kim, 1993, essay 3 and Goldman 1970, chapter 1.
89 Kim, 1993, p. 43: ‘the properties an event exemplifies must be sharply distinguished from its
constitutive property (which is exemplified, not by the event, but by the constitutive substance of the
event)’.
90 Alternatively, one may deny that a rising of Sue’s hand occurs when she raises her hand. That is, as
far as I understand it, Goldman’s view. According to Goldman, 1970, actions are instantiations of act-
properties. Sue’s raising her hand is the instantiation of an act-property by Sue at a time. That action, to
be sure, is an event (because it is the instantiation of a property by a substance at a time). But it is the
instantiation of an act-property. And when Sue performs that action, the event of her arm’s rising does
not take place at all. However, I find the idea that Sue’s arm is not rising, when she raises it, very
counterintuitive. In absence of further and independent argument, the view that I suggested in the text
should be preferred, simply because it preserves the intuition that Sue’s arm rises whenever she raises
it. More importantly, though, Goldman’s view is committed to the claim that reason-explanations and
scientific explanations of behaviour explain one and the same thing under the same description—both
explain Sue’s raising her arm. That strikes me as plainly false. Scientific explanations explain events as
event-types—they explain, for instance, bodily movements described as bodily movements (and not
described as actions).
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properties? That depends on whether strolling and strolling leisurely are constitutive
properties. According to Kim, Sebastian’s stroll and Sebastian’s leisurely strolling are
distinct events. But they are not entirely distinct, since the latter event, as Kim thinks,
metaphysically includes the former.91
Pluralism and a Miraculous Coincidence
Causalism and non-causalism disagree on the question of whether the efficacy of
reasons is causal in kind and whether the relationship between reasons for actions and
the causes of bodily movements is in need of explanation. Non-causalists deny that
this relationship is in need of explanation—they endorse what I have called pluralism.
Generally, pluralism is a view concerning the relationships between different
levels of explanation or different domains of discourse.92 The behaviour of human
beings, for instance, can be explained in terms of reasons for action and in terms of
the causes of their bodily movements. Reason-explanations belong to the level of
psychological explanation, which employs mental or intentional vocabulary. Causal
explanations of movements belong to the level of, say, neurology and physiology,
which employ only non-mental vocabulary. Pluralism, as I understand it, says that
different levels of explanations—or difference domains of discourse—are
autonomous in the sense that the relationship between them is not in need of
explanation. In our particular case, to assume a pluralist position is to deny that the
efficacy of reasons is in need of explanation in the sense that we do not need to
explain how the motivational influence of reasons relates to the causal efficacy of the
neurological and physiological antecedents of bodily movements. In particular, it is
the view that the explanatory of force of reason-explanations need not be vindicated
by showing how the efficacy of reason-states relates to the causes of bodily
movements. Rather, the attempt to understand that relationship between the domain of
intentional explanation of action and the domain of causal explanation of bodily
movements is dismissed as a misguided metaphysical project.93
                                                 
91 Kim, 1993, essay 3.
92 I will explain the model of levels of explanation in more detail in chapter 3, pp. 113.
93 For a similar characterisation of pluralism see Cussins, 1992. Few philosophers are self-proclaimed
pluralists in that sense. But there are many positions, which clearly fall under pluralism. Putnam, for
instance, says that he does not reject the ‘[thesis or question of psychophysical correlation], but the
idea that the question makes sense. [The] very picture that is presupposed by the question is wrong,
that is to say, the picture of our psychological characteristics as “internal states” that, qua internal
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Pluralism, however, is a deeply unsatisfactory position. And non-causalism is an
unsatisfactory position insofar as it is committed to pluralism. In the following I will
explain, firstly, why pluralism is unsatisfactory, and then why non-causalism is
committed to the pluralist stance.
In the preceding sections we considered in some detail different ways of
construing the intimate relationship between overt actions and bodily movements (or,
in general, between actions and their intrinsic events). On all the positions considered,
the relationship can be described as intimate and systematic. That is, of course, no
surprise. Sue’s raising her arm is necessarily accompanied by the rising of Sue’s arm.
According to the identity view, every instantiation of the act-type raising one’s arm is
identical with an instantiation of the event-type rising of the arm. On the process
view, every instantiation of the act-type is partly constituted by an instantiation of the
event-type. According to the third position, the act-token includes the event-token, if
they are distinct, but not entirely distinct particulars. And if they are entirely distinct,
the act-token is dependent on and realised by the intrinsic event-token. The important
point is that according to all positions the relationship is systematic in the sense that it
is no coincidence that the instantiation of a certain act-type is accompanied by the
instantiation of a certain non-actional event-type. In other words, the act-token is not
simply accompanied by an event-token of a certain type, but it is identical with,
constituted or realised by the instantiation of a certain event-type. Given, firstly, that
bodily movements of rational agents can be explained in neuro-physiological terms,
secondly, that reasons influence the actions of rational agents, and thirdly, that actions
are identical with, constituted by, or realised by bodily movements, the relationship
between the efficacy of reasons and the causal efficacy of the neuro-physiological
antecedents of movements is systematic and not coincidental—and that is why the
                                                                                                                                            
states, must either be “correlated” or “uncorrelated” with what goes on inside […] our bodies’ (1999, p.
132). Burge, 1993, says that ‘[mentalistic] explanation and mental causation do not need validation
from materialist metaphysics’ (p. 117). Similarly, Baker, 1993, argues that ‘systematic explanatory
success [in scientific and common sense psychology] stands in need of no metaphysical underpinning’
(p. 94). There are close affinities between what I call pluralism and so-called instrumentalism in the
philosophy of mind (Dennett, 1989) and pragmatism in the philosophy of science (Rorty, 1979). As
pointed out in chapter 1, Kant’s doctrine of two worlds—or two standpoints—can plausibly be
interpreted as a version of pluralism. Finally, some positions in the theory of action, which are inspired
by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, can be classified as forms of pluralism; examples are Anscombe,
1957; Melden, 1961; Stoutland, 1976; and von Wright 1974.
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relationship between the domain of intentional explanation of actions and the domain
of non-intentional explanation of bodily movements is in of need explanation.94
Pluralism does not even fail to provide an explanation of the relationship between
the domain of reason-explanation and the domain of non-intentional explanation,
because it denies that the relationship is in need of explanation. That relationship,
however, is systematic in the way explained. Pluralism is unacceptable, because from
the pluralist stance that fact appears as a coincidence. But the systematic
correspondence between the two domains cannot possibly be a coincidence—such a
coincidence would be truly miraculous.95
One may object that the relationship between overt action and bodily movements
is not as tight as it might seem. Every action of raising one’s hand may be realised by
an event-token of the type rising of the arm. But, it seems, many other actions can be
realised in various ways. My response to that is twofold. Firstly, it seems clear that
many non-basic actions, such as giving a signal or travelling to London, are multiply
realisable. However, whether or not basic-actions are multiply realisable is not so
obvious. No instantiation of raising one’s hand, of course, will exactly be like any
other instantiation. But that is not to say that raising one’s hand is multiply realisable.
Rather, that is merely to point out that tokens of that type will, presumably, differ in
some respects. Given that, it is not easy to see how basic actions can be multiply
realised. But, secondly, nothing of importance depends on that issue. We can grant
that all actions—non-basic and basic—can be multiply realised, because certain types
of actions will nevertheless be dependent on certain act-neutral types of events. Let
me explain.
Consider first the mental antecedents of action. We assume that bodily
movements—or act-intrinsic events in general—are caused by neuro-physiological
events, and that they can be causally explained by reference to them. That causal
dependency supports counterfactuals of the following form.
                                                 
94 Different metaphors have been used to express that point. MacDonald, for instance, talks about the
‘harmony’ between mental and physical events—and between the level of mental and physical
explanation (1992, p. 231). Cussins and Smith, for instance, say that mental and non-mental theories
and entities ‘march in step’ (Cussins, 1992, and Smith, 1992).
95 Compare Macdonald, 1992, especially pp. 230-231; Cussins, 1992, pp. 192-200; Smith, 1992, pp.
20-24; Papineau, 1992, pp. 57-58; Stoutland, 1986, p. 46; and Antony, 1991, p. 319.
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(CF1) Given relevantly similar circumstances, had the neuro-physiological
event n of type N not occurred, the bodily movement m of type M would
not have occurred.
Further, if an action has been performed for a reason, that particular performance was
dependent on the agent’s having—or being in—a certain reason-state, and true
reason-explanations support counterfactuals of the following from (independently of
whether they are construed as causal or non-causal explanations).96
(CF2) Given relevantly similar circumstances, had the agent not been in the
reason-state r of type R, she would not have A-ed.
If mental states are multiply realisable and, therefore, not type-identical with neuro-
physiological states, then it will not be true that the agent’s being in r depends on the
agent’s being in n (some other neuro-physiological state may realise being in a state
of type R). But it does not follow that being in a state of type R does not depend on
being in a neuro-physiological states of a certain type. Presumably, every instantiation
of R is partly realised by some rather specific state; namely, by a state that partly
realises R.97 Let us say that the set {N1, N2, N3…} is the set of all realisations of R.
Given that, counterfactuals of the following form hold.
(CF3) Had none of the ni’s occurred, the agent would not have been in a
mental state of type R.
Consider now the actions themselves. If actions are multiply realisable, they are,
presumably, realised by some rather specific physical event or bodily movement;
namely, by a bodily movement that realises the type of action in question. So, let us
say that the set of bodily movements {M1, M2, M3…} is the set of all the realisations
of A-ing. Given that, counterfactuals of the following form hold.
(CF4) Had none of the mi’s occurred, the agent would not have A-ed.
Actions depend counterfactually on reasons at the level of intentional explanation. At
the physical level, bodily movements depend on non-mental antecedents. However,
actions depend as well on bodily movements, and the mental antecedents of
action—that is, reason-states—depend on their physical realisation. The level of
reason-explanation depends, in that sense, on the physical level, even if it is assumed
                                                 
96 See, for instance, Schiffer, 1991; Mele, 1992; and Ruben, 2003, who argue that the support of
counterfactuals is essential to the explanatory force of reason-explanations.
97 The neuro-physiological state realises the mental states only partly, if the mental state supervenes
partly on the agent’s environment—due to environment-dependent content.
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that actions and reason-states are multiply realisable. Further, that dependence is
systematic in the following sense. Assume that an agent’s A-ing can be explained by
reference to r, the agent’s being in the reason-state of type R. Then, typically, m, the
physical realisation of that A-ing, is dependent on n, the physical realisation of r,
because m is caused by n.
The fact that the relationship is systematic—the fact that the levels ‘march in
step’ in the sense outlined—cannot be a coincidence, and it is in need of
explanation.98 The causal theory acknowledges that challenge, and different versions
of causalism either provide an account of the relationship between reasons for actions
and the causes of movements, or they are designed to be in line with some theory—or
theories—of the mind that provide the required account.99 In doing so, the causal
theory provides us with an integrated theory of human agency by showing how the
‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’ are correlated.
Non-causalists stress, firstly, that reason-explanations of actions and causal
explanations of bodily movements are different in kind, and secondly, that they
explain different things. However, both claims are beside the point. Firstly, we saw
that causalism is compatible with the second point as it is compatible with the claim
that reason-explanations explain actions, whereas neuro-physiological explanations
explain bodily movements. Secondly, causalism is compatible with the first claim as
it is compatible with the claim that reason-explanations are rationalising explanations
that are formulated in intentional terms, whereas causal explanations of bodily
movements are not. And thirdly, it became clear that it does not really matter whether
actions are identical with, constituted or realised by events. Rather, what matters is
that the relationship between them is systematic and not coincidental.
It is only natural, I said, to ask how the efficacy of reason relates to the causal
efficacy of the antecedents of bodily movements, given the intimate relationship
between actions and bodily movements. I explained then in more detail what that
                                                 
98 It has been a popular approach to capture that relation of dependence in terms of supervenience (see,
for instance, Davidson, 1980, essay 11 and 1993 Kim, 1993; Lennon, 1990 and Macdonald, 1992).
However, definitions of the relation of supervenience, as it holds between the mental and physical,
merely specify the dependence more precisely. That is to say that supervenience is descriptive, rather
than explanatory. If supervenience holds, then a specification of that relation tells us in what narrower
sense the mental depends on the physical, but it does not explain why it is so dependent. In other
words, supervenience is itself in need of explanation—given that it holds. Compare Horgan, 1993, and
Kim, 2000, especially pp. 9-15.
99 For solutions incorporated into a theory of action see, for instance, Davidson, 1980; Goldman, 1970;
Lennon, 1990; Mele, 1992; and Pietroski, 2000.
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relationship consists in and why it is in need of explanation. To provide an
explanation of that relation is not only required for a solution to the mind-body
problem and the problem of mental causation, but it is also of central importance to
our understanding of rational agency. A comprehensive account of agency must show
how the influence of reasons relates to the causes of bodily movements—a
comprehensive account must be what I called an integrated account. Pluralism does
not provide an explanation of that relationship, simply because it denies that it is in
need of explanation. But that is why it is unacceptable. Further, insofar as non-
causalism is committed to pluralism, non-causalism is unsatisfactory because it fails
to provide an integrated account of agency.100
Pluralism and Non-Causalism
Pluralism is compatible with both non-causalism and causalism about reason-
explanations. Some philosophers think it is undeniable that reason-explanations are
causal explanations and they reject the project of accounting for the correspondence
between the relevant levels of explanation as misguided—they are, in other words,
causalists about reason-explanations and pluralists.101
The kind of causalism that I am defending, however, acknowledges that the
relationship between the relevant levels of explanation is in need of explanation.
Furthermore, I argued that we should reject non-causalism, because it is committed to
pluralism. What remains to be shown is that non-causalism is committed to pluralism.
Reasons, as everyone can agree, influence the actions of rational agents. Non-
causalists deny that their influence is causal in kind. Further, they may argue that it is
misleading to construe their influence as being directed towards actions—or bodily
movements. Rather, reasons influence actions by influencing the judgements and
choices of rational agents. Their influence is rational, and what is influenced is not
the action, but the agent—the thinking agent or person. To focus on the relation
between reasons and action, as non-causalists may insist, obscures that central aspect
of rational agency and leads to a misguided quest for a metaphysical connection
between reasons and actions.
                                                 
100 Apparent alternatives are the traditional views of occasionalism and Leibinz’s theory of pre-
established harmony. Both views refer to a divine being—God—in order to explain the interactions
between the body and the mind. I shall not argue against either view, because I will not engage with the
assumption that there is such a being.
101 See, for instance, Burge, 1993; Baker, 1993; and Putnam, 1999. Compare also Dennett, 1989.
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To say that reasons influence actions by rationally influencing their agents
sounds very plausible, and it is hard to see why anyone would deny that. However, it
is a mistake to think that this observation points, by itself, towards an alternative
account of the efficacy of reasons. Everyone can agree with that characterisation of
rational agency, simply because it is only a characterisation of the agent’s ability to
choose and act in the light of reasons. More importantly, though, shifting the focus
from the efficacy of reasons to the powers of agents merely defers the problem. Given
that an agent’s bodily movements are caused by non-mental states and events, and
given the intimate relationship between actions and movements, the agential power to
act in the light of reasons is itself in need of explanation. In the first chapter we
distinguished between four different positions in the metaphysics of agency, which
provide different accounts of an agent’s power to act for reasons: the reductive
standard-causal model, the non-reductive agent-causal model, volitionism and
pluralism.
I rejected the non-reductive approach and volitionism in the first chapter. The
remaining options are, then, the reductive model and pluralism. At the beginning of
this chapter I pointed out that causalism about reason-explanations goes hand in hand
with the reductive standard-causal approach. Given that, the remaining option for
non-causalism is pluralism. And given, furthermore, that the four named positions
exhaust the viable possibilities, non-causalism is committed to pluralism.
One may object that it has not been shown that non-causalism about reason-
explanation is incompatible with the standard-causal model of agency. One can
envision a view that says that agent-involving mental states and events cause and
causally explain actions, and denies that reason-explanations are causal explanations.
Stoutland’s later position, discussed above, is of that kind.102 I argued, though, that
intentionalists—proponents of that view—in fact have good reason to endorse
causalism about reasons and reason-explanations. Another version of that view can be
envisaged in combination with externalism about reasons (the view that reasons are
facts, rather than mental attitudes or their contents).103 One may hold that agent-
involving mental states and events cause and causally explain actions and deny that
reason-explanations are causal explanations, because mental states and events are not
                                                 
102 See Agreement between Causalists and Non-Causalist?, pp. 89.
103 See Externalism About Reasons, pp. 67.
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reasons for action at all. I argued, though, that externalism about reasons is
compatible with causalism and that there is no reason to deny that explanation in
terms of mental states and events are reason-explanations, given that they stand in
some appropriate relation with the relevant reason-facts. Further, I showed that
explanations in terms of reason-facts are not distinct from explanations in terms of
mental states and events, since the former are merely condensed versions of the latter.
Those considerations do not show conclusively that non-causalism about reason-
explanation and the standard-causal model of agency are incompatible, but they
strongly suggest so. Most non-causalists, however, would not want to combine their
view with the standard-causal model anyway. They commit themselves to the non-
reductive model, to volitionism, or to pluralism. Non-causalism is committed to
pluralism insofar, and only insofar, as reductionism, non-reductionism and
volitionism are dismissed as options for non-causalism, leaving pluralism as the only
option available. I argued, though, that not even pluralism is a viable option as it fails
to provide an integrated account of agency.
Remaining Issues and Problems
Note, first of all, that the case for causalism is not yet complete. Causalism, as I
understand it, acknowledges that the relationship between the level of reason-
explanation and the level of non-intentional explanation is in need of explanation.
What remains to be shown, of course, is that the causal theory can explain the
relationship. In the following chapter, I will suggest an account of that relationship,
which is compatible with non-reductive physicalism and which presupposes
causalism about reason-explanations.
Secondly, there are still important questions to be answered with respect to the
offered causal model of acting for reasons. I pointed out, already in the first chapter,
that reason-states must cause actions in the right way. In particular, it must be
excluded that they cause them by way of so-called deviant or wayward causal chains.
I will return to that issue in chapter 4.104
Thirdly, according to causalism an action can be explained in terms of reason-
states, even if it was not performed for good or normative reasons. The question is,
                                                 
104 Chapter 4, pp. 175.
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though, whether the agent must, somehow, treat or take some consideration as a
reason in order to act for that reason, or whether it is sufficient that the performance
of the action can be rationalised in the light of some of the agent’s attitudes.
Finally, there is one objection to the causal approach closely related to the
previous point, which deserves to be taken seriously. That objection goes, roughly, as
follows. The possibility of deviant causal chains highlights a fundamental problem for
the causal theory. The theory says that reason-states both rationalise and cause
actions, and it requires that those two aspects go hand in hand—it requires that
reason-states cause an action if and only if they rationalise it. But that misses a very
important feature of acting for reason. Namely, that an agent who acts for a reasons is
motivated to perform the action in virtue of having that reason—in virtue of
recognising that there is reason to do it. That means, in terms of the causal theory, that
the reason-states should not merely cause and rationalise the action, but should cause
the action in virtue of rationalising it. Reason-states would need to be rational causes,
rather than states that cause and rationalise.105 I will address that objection together
with the previous question in chapter 4.106
                                                 
105 See, for instance, Antony, 1989, Brewer, 1995 and Wedgwood, forthcoming. Antony argues against
Davidson’s model that it does not explain ‘how reasons cause actions so as to rationalize them
simultaneously. The explanatory force of rationalizations is partly explained by the fact that reasons are
things that have causal efficacy, but we also need to know how it is that reasons can have efficacy in
virtue of their reasonableness’ (p. 168).
106 Concerning causation in virtue of rationalising see chapter 4, pp. 183. Concerning the issue of
treating as a reason see chapter 4, pp. 193 and compare note 59 in this chapter, p. 89,
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Chapter Three: Causalism as Non-reductive
Physicalism
In the previous chapter I argued that a satisfying account of agency must be an
integrated account: it must provide an account of the relation between reasons for
action and the causes of movements. The systematic relationship between actions and
bodily movements—the fact that they ‘march in step’—cannot be coincidental; it is in
need of explanation. Let us call the problem to provide that explanation the
coincidence problem. Pluralism does not solve the coincidence problem, because it
does not acknowledge it as a problem. Rather, it dismisses as misguided the project to
relate the causes of movements with reasons for actions. I argued that we should
reject pluralist positions—hence, non-causalism—precisely because of that. However,
the mere fact that the causalist position does acknowledge the problem, does not give
us reason to prefer it to non-causalism. What is needed is reason to believe that the
coincidence problem can be solved within a causalist framework.
Non-causalists, however, may argue that the project to solve the coincidence
problem is bound to failure. A convincing argument to that conclusion would show
that the project to relate the causes of movements with reasons for actions is indeed
misguided, and it would show that the present issue does not give us any reason to
prefer causalism. A first argument of that kind goes along the following lines.
(1) The relationship between the causes of movement and reasons for action is in
need of explanation.
(2) An explanation of that relationship requires either type-identities between mental
and physical types or a reduction of psychology.
(3) Type-identity theories are untenable.
(4) Reason-explanations are irreducibly formulated in intentional terms. That is,
psychology is not reducible.
(5) Hence, causalism either fails to account for the relationship, or it is committed to
either one of two unfavourable positions; namely, the type-identity theory or
some form of reductionism.
Another argument goes as follows.
(1') Every version of causalism faces the problem of causal exclusion.
(2') Only type-identity and reductive theories can solve that problem satisfyingly.
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(3') Type-identity theories are untenable.
(4') Reason-explanations are irreducible formulated in intentional terms. That is,
psychology is not reducible.
(5') Hence, causalism either does not solve the problem of causal exclusion or it is
committed to either one of two unfavourable positions; namely, the type-identity
theory or some form of reductionism.
In response to the first argument I will argue that an explanation of the relationship
neither presupposes type-identities nor reduction; in other words, I will reject
assumption (2). My response to the second argument will question assumptions (1’)
and (2’). Before that I will say more about the layered model of the world, which is
usually presupposed as a metaphysical framework in debates concerning the present
issues, and I will say more about the third and fourth assumption of the two
arguments.
Causalism comes in different versions. In the following, I will consider the
identity theory, functionalism, and non-reductive physicalism.1 My main aim is to
argue for causalism in general. What needs to be shown in order to complete the
argument of the previous chapter is that causalism can solve the coincidence problem.
The most general distinction with respect to causalism is between reductive and non-
reductive versions—that is, between versions of causalism according to which
intentional psychology is reducible and ones that deny that. If psychology is
reducible, the coincidence problem, as I will show, does not arise. However, if
psychology is not reducible, the problem does arise and it must be shown how non-
reductive theories can solve it. Some causalists argue, or insist, that psychology is
reducible. But that is not the strategy that I shall pursue. Rather, I will argue that, as
far as the coincidence problem is concerned, the tenability of causalism does not
depend on the reducibility of psychology.
My second aim is to contribute to a defence of non-reductive physicalism, which
is my preferred version of causalism. To show that non-reductive theories can solve
the coincidence is the first part of that. In a second part, I argue that the so-called
causal exclusion argument is not decisive against non-reductive physicalism.
                                                 
1 Those theories are, of course, standard theories of the mind; in particular, they are standard accounts
of the relationship between the body and the mind. It should be clear—at least, it should in the
following become clear—why those theories are the relevant versions of causalism.
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Levels of Explanation
We are interested in the relation between the causes of bodily movements and reasons
for actions. In recent philosophy of mind, issues of that kind have been approached by
focusing on the relation between different levels of explanation.2 According to that
‘layered model’, as Kim calls it, the world is ‘stratified’ into different orders, whereby
each layer or level is associated with a certain theory (or the conjunction of theories
of a certain kind), which ranges over certain entities and properties. Each level is a
higher- or a lower-level in relation to other levels.3 The theories, entities and
properties, which are characteristic of a given level, can accordingly be called higher-
or lower-level theories, entities and properties. Further, we can talk about higher- or
lower-level predicates, regularities and explanations, which are characteristic of the
higher- and lower-level theories in question.
In virtue of what is one level higher or lower in relation to another? The criterion
offered by Kim is composition. If the entities described at the level L are entirely
composed by entities described at some other level L’, then L is a higher-level of
explanation in relation to L’, and L’ is a lower-level in relation to L. The entities of
higher-levels are, as Kim says, ‘exhaustively decomposable’ into lower-level entities.4
Sometimes it is pointed out that levels of explanation differ with respect to the
degree or extent of abstraction. Describing an entity and explaining its behaviour at a
higher-level, we abstract from its composition: we abstract from how it is composed
and what it is composed of—in other words, we abstract from what parts it is
composed of and how those parts are related to each other. In relation to the lower-
level theory, which describes the parts and the interactions between them, the higher-
level theory describes and explains the behaviour of the entity as a whole.
Given that model of levels of explanation, the relation between reasons for
actions and the causes of movements can be construed as follows. A reason-
explanation of an action, we assume, cites those mental states of the agent that
rationalise the performance of that action. Mental states are characterised and referred
to by a theory that employs intentional vocabulary, and they are attributed to agents.
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Owens, 1989, and Kim, 2000, pp. 15-19.
3 Here we can ignore the question whether there is, or has to be, a lowest—or highest—level of
explanation. To distinguish levels relationally is sufficient for present purposes.
4 Kim, 2000, p. 15.
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That theory—call it psychology—is about the behaviour of the agent as a whole. It
abstracts from facts about the constitution or composition of the agent, and from facts
about the physical—or neuro-physiological—causes of the agent’s movements. In
relation to a theory that is about the causes of the agent’s bodily movements,
psychology is a higher-level theory that describes and explains higher-level patterns
of behaviour.
Appeal to composition is used to classify different levels of explanations as
higher- and lower-levels. The claim that higher-level entities are entirely
decomposable into lower-level entities does, obviously, tell us something about the
relation between higher- and lower-level entities. But what is more interesting, and
more controversial, is how the relationship between higher- and lower-level
properties and theories should be construed.
On a standard model of scientific explanation, the best account of those relations
is provided by means of scientific reduction.5 On that model, a higher-level theory is
reducible to a lower-level theory only if there are so-called bridge laws that relate the
higher-level properties with lower-level properties such that the higher-level
regularities are deducible from the lower-level regularities (in conjunction with the
bridge laws).6 Some argue that such bridge laws cannot have the form of
biconditionals. The reason is, simply, that a biconditional does not provide an account
of the relation between the levels. A biconditional between mental and physical
properties, for instance, does not explain why a given mental property is instantiated
whenever a certain physical property is instantiated.7 In other words, the biconditional
merely reaffirms what we were assuming all along; namely, that there is some
systematic relationship between the two domains. On the basis of that, one may argue
that bridge laws must have the form of identity statements. Identity between the
higher- and lower-level kinds would not merely claim a systematic relationship
between the two levels, but it would explain why that relation holds. If the higher-
and lower-level kinds are identical, the question why a given higher-level property is
                                                 
5 A standard reference is Ernest Nagel’s The Structure of Science, 1961.
6 Note that the relation between higher- and lower-levels is asymmetric in the following three ways: the
entities of the higher-level are composed by lower-level entities, the higher-level is an abstraction from
lower-levels, and the higher-level regularities can be deduced from the lower-level laws (in
conjunction with the bridge laws). A further asymmetry is that the lower-level theory is explanatory of
the higher-level theory, which is why the reduction of a higher-level theory can be regarded as a
vindication of that theory.
7 Compare, for instance, Kim, 2000, chapter 4.
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instantiated whenever a certain lower-level property is instantiated has a simple
answer: because instantiations of the higher-level property are instantiations of the
lower-level property. It seems, then, that the two most important questions are
whether mental kinds are identical with lower-level kinds, and whether intentional
psychology can be reduced to some non-intentional lower-level theory.
 However, I shall assume, with the opponent, that mental kinds are not identical
with lower-level kinds, and that intentional psychology—and hence, reason-
explanation—is irreducible. Given that, the question we have to ask is whether there
are alternative accounts of the relation between the levels of explanation in question.
To begin with, let us consider what a reduction of psychology would give us.
Firstly, reduction solves the coincidence problem; it would provide an account of
the systematic relation between the two domains and it would, thereby, explain why
they march in step. Secondly, reduction avoids the problem of causal exclusion. If the
higher-level kinds can be reduced to, and if the higher-level laws can be deduced
from the lower-level laws, then there is no reason to think that the higher-level entails
or presupposes irreducible causal powers that compete with the causal powers
described by the lower-level. And thirdly, the reduction of the higher-level theory is
explanatory—it explains why the claims made and entailed by the higher-level theory
hold. To learn that water is H2O and that regularities that describe the properties of
water can be reduced to chemistry is not just to gain another way of talking about
water. Far from it, by identifying water with H2O we gain understanding of why, for
instance, water interacts with other substances in the way it does, or why it shares
some properties with some other substances, but not with others, and so forth.
A reduction of a higher-level theory is worth wanting because it solves—or,
rather, avoids—the coincidence problem and the problem of causal exclusion, and
because it explains and vindicates the higher-level theory. What is needed in defence
of non-reductive physicalism, however, is only the former. The important point here
is that we can distinguish between an explanation of the fact that the levels march in
step and an explanation of the higher-order theory in lower-level terms. Given that,
we can separate the question of whether the coincidence problem can be solved from
the question whether the higher-level theory in question can be reduced. A solution to
the coincidence problem explains why the levels march in step, whereas a successful
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reduction explains—in addition—the higher-level theory in terms of a lower-level
theory.
Now I will briefly turn to reductive theories, their shortcomings, and I will
present the motivations behind non-reductive physicalism. Then I will propose an
alternative solution to the coincidence problem that is committed to neither type-
identities nor reductionism. And in the last section of this chapter I will offer a
response to the causal exclusion argument.
The Type-Identity Theory
According to the type-identity theory, mental kinds (types or properties) are identical
with lower-level kinds (types or properties).8 If identity holds between types, there
will be bridge laws that identify higher-level kinds with lower-level kinds, and the
higher-level mental theory will be reducible to some lower-level theory.9 This would
give us straightforward solutions to both the coincidence problem and to the problem
of mental causation. We can even say that these problems do not arise for the identity
theory in the first place, simply because it says that mental kinds are lower-level
kinds.
According to mainstream opinion, however, the identity theory is untenable.
Arguments from multiple realisation and from considerations concerning the modality
of identity are taken to be decisive against it.10 Only recently there have been attempts
                                                 
8 It is common to assume that it does not make a significant difference whether the claimed identity
holds between states, properties or kinds. Note further that it is not obvious what the appropriate lower-
level theory is supposed to be. Is it physics, chemistry, neuro-physiology? In a recent defence of the
identity theory, Thomas Polger talks at one point about identity between mental and biological kinds
(see Polger, 2004, p. 136). In another passage he talks about identity between mental and physical
states (p. 35). Polger assumes, apparently, type-identity all the way down: from mental to physical
properties via neuro-biological (and other lower-level) properties.
9 Some philosophers think that reducibility stands and falls with type-identity. Others, however, would
reject the claim that mental types are identical with physical types if and only if psychology is
reducible to physics (presumably by way of reducing psychology to neuroscience, and reducing
neuroscience by some further steps to physics) as too strong. They argue that type-identity is not
necessary for reduction, since bridge laws featuring biconditionals, rather than identities, are sufficient.
It seems safe to say, however, that type-identities are a sufficient condition for reduction.
10 The argument from multiple realisation is due to Hilary Putnam, 1967. It says, very roughly, that
mental types cannot be identical with lower-level types, since it is possible that they are realised in
different ways: different individuals (of different species or kinds) may be in a mental state of the same
kind without being in a physical state of the same kind (or without being in any physical state at all).
The argument from the modality of identity is due to Saul Kripke, 1972. It says, very roughly, that the
apparent contingency of the relationship between mental states and brain states is incompatible with
the necessity of identity. For a recent discussion of both arguments see Polger, 2004.
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to revive the identity theory.11 What counts in favour of the theory is that it provides a
very neat solution to the mind-body problem in general, and to the problem of mental
causation in particular. And if one thinks that the type-identity solution is the only
satisfying solution to the problem of mental causation, one has good reason to seek
responses to the arguments from multiple realisation and modality.
However, the identity theory faces another objection. Namely, that it cannot do
justice to the nature of intentional reason-explanations, since it entails the reducibility
of psychological explanations to non-psychological ones. An essential feature of
reason-explanations of action is that the performance of the action is rationalised and
justified by referring to the agent’s reasons under their intentional description. That is
to say that rationalisation and justification of action is essentially provided in
intentional terms; mental states rationalise or justify actions only under their
intentional descriptions. The identity theory does—and cannot—do justice to this fact,
so the objection goes, since it entails that intentional psychology is reducible to non-
intentional theories.
According to the outlined standard account of scientific reduction, a reduction of
psychology to some non-intentional theory entails that the principles and regularities
that support intentional explanations and predictions can be deduced from non-
intentional lower-level regularities (in conjunction with bridge laws). That would
mean that everything that can be explained by psychology could, in principle, be
explained by the lower-level theory. And since the lower-level theory does not
employ intentional vocabulary, it would mean that everything that can be explained in
intentional terms could, in principle, be explained in non-intentional terms, which is
incompatible with the fact that reason-explanations are essentially formulated in
intentional terms.
Further, it would mean that the regularities that ground reason-explanations can
be deduced from non-intentional laws, and that the latter are explanatory of the
former. But reason-explanations rationalise actions, and they are, presumably, based
on normative principles. It is simply very difficult to see how normative principles of
                                                 
11 See for instance Polger, 2004.
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rationality could be deduced from and explained by non-normative lower-level laws
formulated in non-intentional vocabulary.12
The two main points of the objection are the following. Reduction is implausible
firstly because reason-explanations are essentially formulated in intentional terms,
and, secondly, because the norms that ground those explanations are normative
principles that can neither be deduced from nor explained by non-intentional lower-
level theories—the norms of rationality have, as Davidson has put it, no echo in the
physical domain.13
Closely connected to those two points is the following. The reduction of
psychology means not only that psychological regularities can be deduced from and
explained by a non-intentional theory. But it means also that psychological
regularities can, at least in principle, be discovered without doing psychology. And
there is no reason to think that we could discover psychological laws and the norms of
rationality by doing, say, neuro-physiology. The three basic components of reduction
are bridge laws of some sort, deducibility of the higher-level laws, and the
explanatory constraint—the constraint that the lower-level theory must be explanatory
of the reduced higher-level theory. Ned Block, for instance, has pointed out that it is
important to distinguish the deducibility from the explanatory constraint, and that the
former does not entail the latter. Block says that
if one has to do psychology to discover basic laws of physics, the deduction of
[the] laws of psychology from their images in physics won’t be as explanatory
as one might wish.14
What Block is suggesting, it seems, is that the explanatory constraint should
accommodate epistemological issues concerning the discovery of certain regularities.
What is pointed out, in other words, is that reduction concerns not only metaphysical
relations between kinds or properties and logical relations of deducibility. A reduction
                                                 
12 One may appeal to a priori considerations of that sort in order to argue for the stronger claim that a
reduction of psychology is impossible. For the present purposes, however, the weaker claim that
reduction is implausible is strong enough to support the dialectic of my considerations.
13 Davidson, 1980, p. 231.
14 Block, 1997, p. 111. Note that the anti-reductionist point that Block makes is stronger than the one
that I have promoted. Block’s suggestion is not simply that we have to do psychology in order to
discover psychological regularities, but that we have to do psychology in order to discover lower-level
laws. In order to support that claim, one might argue that in order to discover the multiple realisations
of mental properties we have to consult psychological investigation. Or one might argue that scientists
can discover the mechanisms that implement certain mental processes only by investigating the brains
of conscious beings who are able to follow instructions and to interact with their environment
intentionally and rationally.
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is supposed to be explanatory of the higher-level theory, and, according to Block, that
cannot be equated with the deducibility of the higher-order laws. That means that
even if psychological regularities—including the norms of rationality—were
deducible, there would still be further issues concerning the discovery of higher- and
lower-level laws that would give us reason to question the reducibility of psychology.
Functionalism
According to Jackson and Pettit, functionalism is a view about the truth conditions for
the attribution of mental attitudes. It says, roughly, that an agent S is in a mental state
of type M  if and only if S is in some lower-level state that plays the causal role
characteristic of M.15 Functionalism, one might add, is about how mental states are to
be individuated; namely, solely in terms of their functional—that is, causal—roles.16
For further characterisation I will use the common distinction between role
functionalism and realiser functionalism.17 According to role functionalism, mental
kinds are identical with functional—causal role—kinds. On that view, mental
properties are second-order properties, which are multiply realisable by all first-order
properties that satisfy the functional role specified by the second-order property.18
Realizer functionalism is about mental concepts (or predicates), rather than properties
(types or kinds). It says that mental concepts can be analysed or characterised by
specifying their functional roles. On that view, there are no general mental kinds, but
only species- or system-relative mental kinds. What unifies the diverse first-order
realizations is not that they instantiate the same second-order property, but that they
fall under the same functional concept. So, for a given species or type or system,
mental states can be identified with the first-order states that fall under the mental
concept (in individuals of that species or type of system).
                                                 
15 Compare, for instance Jackson and Pettit, 1988, p. 384. Two classic sources are Putnam, 1967, and
Lewis, 1980. For further discussion see, for instance, Block, 1978; David, 1997; Polger, 2004; and
Shoemaker, 1981.
16 To specify the functional or causal role of a mental state is to specify its typical causes and effects. A
typical cause of pain, to use a common example, is tissue damage and a typical effect is groaning or
wincing. Being in pain is then to be in whatever state that satisfies the functional role of pain—in
whatever state that has the causes and effects characteristic of being in pain. In the case of human
beings that state is, presumably, some neurological state (or brain state).
17 Compare Jackson and Pettit, 1988, p. 385.
18 Generally, a second-order property is the property of having a first-order property that satisfies the
functional role that is characteristic of the second-order property. For instance, for human beings to be
in pain is to be in the first-order neurological state that satisfies the functional role that is characteristic
of the second-order property of being in pain. Compare, for instance, Kim, 2000, p. 19.
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Is functionalism a reductive theory? Beginning with role functionalism, we have
to distinguish two claims. Role functionalism is a form of reductionism in the sense
that it identifies mental kinds with functional kinds, and in the sense that it assumes
that psychology is reducible to a functional theory. That is, role functionalism is
committed to the claim that psychological explanations can be reduced to functional
explanations. There is, however, the further question of whether mental—second-
order—properties can be identified with or reduced to the disjunctions of first-order
properties that realise them. Role functionalism is not committed to reductionism in
that sense.
Realizer functionalism is reductive in the sense that it reduces mental concepts
and explanations to functional concepts and explanations, and in the sense that it
identifies mental states with first-order realizations relative to a given species or type
of system.19
According to both kinds of functionalism, mental concepts can be reduced to
functional concepts. Role functionalism goes beyond that by making claims about
mental kinds, rather than just concepts. According to functionalism, then, for each
intentional description of a mental state there is an equivalent functional description
of that state, and intentional explanations can be reduced to explanations in terms of
functional states and roles. Given that, it is clear that functionalism is subject to the
anti-reductionist considerations presented in the previous section. A functionalist
reduction of psychology is implausible, because it is incompatible with the fact that
reason-explanations are essentially intentional explanations, and because it entails that
the normative principles of rationality that ground reason-explanations can be
deduced from and explained by non-intentional—in the present case,
functional—theories (in conjunction with bridge laws).20
In the next section I will turn to non-reductive physicalism. Before that, however,
it will be instructive to see how functionalism solves the coincidence problem. Role
                                                 
19 Note that there are two different notions of reduction employed. The former can be called
ontological, the latter semantic reduction. Role functionalism assumes that there is not only talk about
the mental, but that there are mental kinds. A reductive version of the theory must employ an
ontological conception of reduction that reduces mental to non-mental kinds or properties. Realizer
functionalism, however, restricts itself to mental concepts and does not stipulate the existence of kinds
or properties. For such a theory, reduction is merely a semantic matter. To reduce the mental is to
establish equivalence relations between mental and non-mental concepts, descriptions and sentences.
On the two kinds of reduction see for instance Schiffer, 1987, p. 142.
20 Compare, for instance, Kathleen Lennon, 1990, chapter 6. Lennon argues that a functionalist
reduction is implausible because it entails non-intentional descriptions of essentially intentional facts.
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functionalism identifies mental properties with functional second-order properties
(that is, relational properties concerning the causal relations between first-order
properties). Any system or agent whose first-order properties satisfy—or occupy—the
causal roles specified by the second-order property realises —and thereby has—the
mental property in question. The solution to the coincidence problem is
straightforward. What explains that the two levels of explanation march in step is the
fact that the mental second-order property is realised by the first-order property—in
the outlined functionalist sense of realisation. Since having the right first-order
property is having the mental second-order property, it is no coincidence that reason-
explanations, which are in terms of second-order properties, and causal explanations
of movements, which are in terms of first-order properties, march in step. Similar
considerations apply to realizer functionalism.21
Non-reductive Physicalism
Non-reductive physicalism is the conjunction of the claim that psychology is not
reducible, and physicalism. Physicalism, one may think, says that everything is
physical. It is common to distinguish physicalism from claims such as that there are
only material objects or that everything is composed of matter. Physicalism refers to
physical things, rather than material ones, and it leaves it up to the physical sciences
to specify what counts as a physical entity. Further, the view concerns not only
objects and what they are composed of, but also events and properties. Now, if non-
reductive physicalism is to be a consistent position, then physicalism cannot be
construed as the view that all objects, events and properties are physical. Recall that if
psychology is not reducible, then mental properties cannot be identified with non-
mental properties. Non-reductive theories of the mind say that there are mental
properties that are not identical with physical properties. Hence, they are obviously
                                                 
21 As with respect to the problem of mental causation, it is commonly accepted that realiser
functionalism is not subject to the causal exclusion problem. Since mental states are identified with the
first-order realizations, there is no problem of causal overdetermination. In fact, that is thought to count
in favour of realiser functionalism (as opposed to role functionalism). Role functionalism identifies
mental properties with second-order—that is, higher-level—properties. These properties are thought to
figure in causal explanations, which presupposes that we think of them as being causally relevant. But
each token of a mental property is realized by some first-order property, and it seems plausible to say
that it is the realization that is doing the causal work. One may think, therefore, that role functionalism
has a problem with mental causation: either mental properties are merely explanatory (that is, not
efficacious), or, if we assume that they are causally efficacious, they merely overdetermine effects that
already have a sufficient cause (namely the first-order realizations of the mental states in question).
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incompatible with a view that says that all properties are physical. If it is to be
compatible with non-reductionism, physicalism must be specified accordingly. A
common suggestion goes along the following lines. Physicalism says, firstly, that all
concrete objects are composed of, or constituted by, physical entities, and, secondly,
that all properties and events are dependent on physical properties and physical
events.22 Physicalism says, in other words, that physical particulars and properties are
the basic or fundamental particulars and properties.23
We can, then, characterise non-reductive physicalism as the conjunction of
physicalism and the claim that psychology is not reducible. In particular, non-
reductive physicalism rejects the claim that psychology can be reduced to a functional
theory.24 Functionalism assumes three different levels of explanation: the higher-level
of psychological explanation, the lower-level of physical explanation, and an
intermediate level of functional explanation.25 Functionalism claims that the higher-
level can be reduced to the intermediate functional level.26 Non-reductive physicalism
denies that. It says that psychological explanations are essentially and irreducibly
intentional explanations.
The claim, however, that intentional psychology cannot be reduced to an
intermediate functional theory does not entail there is no non-redundant intermediate
functional theory. In the following I will suggest a solution to the coincidence
                                                 
22 Compare, for instance, Beckermann, 1992, pp. 1-2, and Crane, 1995, pp. 211-212. Compare also
chapter 2, p. 106, note 98.
23 That is the standard account of non-reductive physicalism. An alternative account goes as follows.
Arguably, we can distinguish between two different conceptions of reduction. On the first, reduction is
an ontological issue insofar as it concerns the relation between mental and physical properties. On the
second conception, reduction concerns the relation between theories (their vocabularies and
explanatory powers). Non-reductive physicalism is clearly committed to non-reductionism in the
second sense. It is not clear, though, whether it is also committed to ontological reductionism. If it is
not, then it is not committed to the claim that there are irreducible mental properties. In that case, the
view says only that the psychology is not reducible (that psychological concepts and regularities are
not reducible and that psychological explanations are genuine). I can agree that reduction is, first and
foremost, a relation between theories. The question, however, whether the reduction of a theory
presupposes ontological reduction is beyond the scope of this work. I will assume, throughout, that the
standard construal of non-reductive physicalism is correct.
24 Depending on what conception of reduction is employed, that claim entails either that mental
properties are not reducible to functional properties or that statements involving mental concepts are
not equivalent to (and not reducible to) functional concepts.
25 We can ignore the fact that the lower-level consists itself of different levels.
26 Compare, for instance, Fodor, 1991. Fodor says that according to functionalism, reason-explanations
‘reduce to explanations articulated in terms of functional states [because] beliefs and desires are
functional states. And, for each (true) psychological explanation, there will be a corresponding story, to
be told in hard-core science terms, about how the functional states that it postulates are ‘realized’ in the
system under study’ (p. 29).
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problem for non-reductive physicalism that assumes that there is such a theory, and
that this theory can explain why the higher-level of intentional psychology and the
non-intentional lower-level theory march in step.
The Coincidence Problem
In order to solve the coincidence problem one must provide an account of the
systematic relation between the two levels of explanation (namely, the level of
intentional reason-explanation, and the level that provides explanations of bodily
movements in non-intentional terms)—one must explain why it is no coincidence that
they march in step. Bridge laws that relate mental with physical types or a functional
reduction of mental properties (or concepts) would provide that explanation. But non-
reductive physicalism is incompatible with both type-identities and functionalist
reduction. Is there an alternative way to solve the coincidence problem?
Antony and Levine, for instance, argue that a defence of non-reductive
physicalism must provide a ‘realisation theory’ that shows why a system—or
agent—endowed with the mechanisms described at the lower-level meets the
constraints described at the intentional level, and how the mechanisms mediate the
higher-level causal regularities.27 But how can that be achieved? What is a ‘realisation
theory’?
Adrian Cussins says that in some cases of physical realization we can see—grasp
or perceive—a relation of coherence between what is described at different levels, if
we can see how the structures and mechanisms described at the lower-level realize or
implement the structures described at the higher-level. For illustration Cussins
considers how we can see that the mechanism of the heart realises the function of
circulating blood. In cases like that, one does not need to know any bridge laws in
order to see why it is that an organ with that organisation—why a mechanism of that
sort—realises or implements the function of circulating blood. And one does not need
to know bridge laws in order to see the coherence between what is described at the
functional level and the level of realisation. In such cases, the relation between the
                                                 
27 Compare Antony & Levine, 1997. In a similar vein Botterill & Carruthers say that it must be
rendered ‘unmysterious that a given special-science law obtains, given the ways in which the properties
involved in that law can be realised in physical mechanisms, and given the lower-level laws which
govern that lower level.’ (p. 187) See also Fodor, 1989; Segal & Sober, 1990; and Antony (1995), who
all claim that higher-level laws must be ‘mediated by’ underlying mechanisms. On the related point
that physical realisation can explain supervenience, compare Kim, 2000, especially pp. 19-24.
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levels of explanation is, as Cussins says, intelligible. We can comprehend why the
underlying mechanism realises what is described at the higher level. He says that
[where] there is an intelligible connection between two levels of discourse there
need be no laws governing the relation between the levels, but only this
constraint: that a person who understands both levels of discourse understands
why it is that having the structure given in the lower level is a way of having the
function given in the upper level.28
Cussins, of course, does not think that in the case of the mental we will simply be able
to perceive such an intelligible connection between the levels. The situation is,
obviously, far more complex than it is in the case of an organ’s function and its
anatomical organisation. What Cussins envisages for the case of the mental is a
‘scientific theory’ that mediates between the two levels—a theory, which is about the
relation between the two levels.
In a similar vein, Horgan and Woodward argue that neither bridge laws nor
reduction is necessary in order to vindicate common sense psychology. What needs to
be shown, rather, is that the lower-level mechanisms, which realize mental states and
regularities, ‘preserve the causal architecture’ of intentional psychology.29
Those suggestions are in line with each other. In order to solve the coincidence
problem, we need to understand why and how the lower-level realises the higher-
level. And a theory that shows that the mechanisms described at the lower-level
preserve the causal architecture of the higher-level seems to do that, because the fact
that the lower-level mechanisms preserve the causal architecture of psychology would
explain why they march in step.
It is important to note that those suggestions have some significant features in
common with functionalism. For what functionalism does, amongst other things, is to
show how the lower-level preserves the causal architecture of the higher-level by
showing that the lower-level mechanisms realise the causal structures described by
psychology.30 Further, to abstract from the nature of the entities that actually stand in
the specified causal relations, and to focus on the causal architecture of a system is
precisely the functionalist strategy. It seems that a theory that shows how the lower-
                                                 
28 Cussins, 1992, p. 204.
29 Horgan & Woodward, 1985, especially pp. 219-224.
30 When discussing the example of the heart, Cussins talks about the organs realizing the function of
pumping blood, and he seems to suggest that a theory that explains the relation between different levels
must show ‘why it is that having the structure given in the lower level is a way of having the function
given in the upper level’ (p. 204, my emphasis).
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level mechanisms preserve the causal architecture of the higher-level would be a
functional theory.
But functionalism is a reductive theory—how can it possibly be compatible with
non-reductive physicalism? It is one thing to claim that psychology has a causal
structure or architecture that can be described by a functional theory, which abstracts
from the nature of the states and events that actually stand in the described causal
relations. It is quite another thing, though, to claim that psychology can be reduced to
that theory.
Recall that a successful reduction must be explanatory. To reduce some higher-
order theory is to explain why the higher-order laws hold and how they relate to the
lower-level laws. Non-reductive physicalism denies that psychology is reducible,
mainly because it denies that any non-intentional theory can be explanatory of the
intentional regularities described by psychology. Non-reductive physicalism is,
therefore, incompatible with functionalism. But it does not follow that it is
incompatible with a theory, which describes the causal structure or architecture of
intentional systems in functional terms.31 In fact, there is no obvious reason why non-
reductive physicalists should deny that such a functional theory is possible.
Given all that, we can see that non-reductive physicalism can solve the
coincidence in the same way as functionalism. What is crucial to the functionalist
solution is not that functional properties (or concepts) are explanatory of mental ones,
but that the lower-level mechanisms are shown to be a realisation of the causal
structure described by psychology. And that is all that is needed in order to explain
why the two levels march in step—without presupposing reduction, type-identities or
bridge laws.
The challenge that non-reductive physicalism cannot solve the coincidence
problem stems from the assumption that a solution of that problem requires either
type-identity or reduction. Now we can see why that is mistaken. Functionalism is a
reductive theory. But the solution to the coincidence problem provided by
functionalism does not depend on that. For that reason the functionalist solution is
available to non-reductive theories as well. The mistake is to think that arguments
                                                 
31 Horgan and Woodward talk about the causal architecture of the higher-level theory. Strictly
speaking, it is of course only what is described by that theory that has a causal structure. But we can
talk of the causal structure or architecture of a theory in the sense that the causal relations described by
the theory and the causal explanation provided by it exhibit a certain structure or architecture.
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against functionalist reduction are also arguments against a functional characterisation
of the causal architecture of psychology.
The Causal Exclusion Argument
I will now turn to the so-called causal exclusion argument against non-reductive
physicalism. Many philosophers think that this argument is a serious problem for non-
reductive theories of the mind—some think that it is decisive against them. Firstly, I
will outline the exclusion argument. Then I will distinguish between three versions of
the argument that address three different versions of non-reductive physicalism, and I
will argue that the causal exclusion argument is not decisive against any of the three
versions. According to non-reductive physicalism, mental events are dependent on
physical events. Causal exclusion and overdetermination, however, require distinct
and independent causes. I will argue that the burden of proof lies with the opponents
of non-reductive physicalism, who have to explain how metaphysically dependent
events can possibly overdetermine an effect or exclude each other from being causally
efficacious.
The causal exclusion argument has been formulated in different ways. A first
difference concerns the kinds of entities that are said to exclude each other. On some
formulations the exclusion concerns mental and physical properties, others talk about
mental and physical events, and some formulate the argument simply in terms of
mental and physical causes and effects.32 A second relevant difference concerns the
mode of causal exclusion. Some philosophers insist that what is at stake is the causal
efficacy of mental events or properties. Others, however, say that the efficacy of
physical events excludes the causal relevance of mental events or properties.
What is common and central to all formulations of the argument, though, is the
following intuition concerning causal exclusion and causal overdetermination.
Suppose that c is sufficient to cause the occurrence of e, and that e has another cause
c*, which is distinct from and not part of c. Let us say that an event e1 is a sufficient
cause of the event e2, if e1’s occurrence is, in the circumstances, sufficient for the
occurrence of e2. And e1 is a partial cause of e2, if e1 is a cause of e2 in the sense that
                                                 
32 Formulations in terms of causes and effects can be found, for instance, in Lowe, 2003a, and
Merricks, 2001. For formulations in terms of instantiations of properties compare Kim, 1993 and 2000,
Crane, 1995 and Menzies, 2001. Kim and Yablo, 1992, think that it is of no significance whether the
argument is put in terms of causes, events or property instantiations.
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e1 is itself not sufficient for the occurrence of e2, but it is part of a complex event,
which is sufficient for the occurrence of e2. Now, c*, the additional cause of e, is
either a sufficient or a partial cause of e. If c* is sufficient, then c and c* exclude each
other from being the cause of e, because they overdetermine its occurrence. If c* is a
partial cause of e, then c excludes c* from being causally efficacious, since c i s
already causally sufficient for the occurrence of e. (I will call causes that exclude each
other or overdetermine their effects in that sense, rival causes).
These intuitions concerning exclusion and overdetermination are considerably
strong and straightforward only insofar as they are formulated in terms of causes and
effects. Our intuitions are far less straightforward with respect to causally relevant
properties. It is not obvious whether instantiations of properties can exclude each
other, or overdetermine effects, in the same way as causes. To assume that they can is
a substantial—and controversial—additional assumption. That is why I introduce the
causal exclusion argument purely in extensional terms: formulated in terms of causes
and effects only. The three basic assumptions behind the argument are the following.
(1) Mental Causation: Mental phenomena cause physical phenomena.
(2) Causal Closure of the Physical: Every physical effect has a causally sufficient
physical cause.33
(3) Exclusion of Causal Overdetermination: Causal effects are, usually, not causally
overdetermined.
The causal exclusion argument goes as follows. Every version of physicalism is
committed to the three claims just presented. A non-reductive version of physicalism,
however, is incompatible with the conjunction of them. Given that only events can be
causes, (1) says that some mental events have physical effects. Assume that the
mental event m is a cause of the physical event p; m is either a partial or a sufficient
cause of p. Applying (3), we exclude that m overdetermines the occurrence of p (we
assume that p has only one sufficient cause, if it has a sufficient cause). So, if p has a
sufficient cause, c, then m either is c, or m is not a sufficient cause of p. According to
(2), p has a sufficient physical cause. Hence, c is a sufficient physical cause of p.
Given that, m cannot be a sufficient cause, but it must be a partial cause of p. Partial
                                                 
33 Generally, by causally sufficient I mean sufficient either for the occurrence of the effect or sufficient
to determine its chance. Here, however, I have to restrict my considerations to the deterministic case.
So, in what follows causally sufficient means sufficient for the occurrence of the effect.
128
causes are parts of sufficient causes. Since c is the only sufficient cause of p, m must
be part of c. But since c is a physical—that is, non-mental—cause, m must be a
physical cause of p, contrary to the assumption that m is a mental cause of p. The
argument shows that the assumptions (2) and (3) exclude the causal efficacy of mental
events, contrary to (1).
The exclusion argument is generally considered to be a very powerful argument
that constitutes a serious problem for non-reductive physicalism. It is acknowledged
that there are different versions of non-reductive physicalism that require different
versions of the argument. But it is usually thought that differences with respect to the
details do not diminish the main thrust of the argument. I will distinguish between
three different versions of the argument, and it will emerge that the differences
between them are significant.
But before that let us briefly consider a well-known response on behalf of non-
reductive physicalism. That is a reductio ad absurdum to the conclusion that there
must be something wrong the argument. There is no obvious reason to deny that the
argument applies to the so-called special sciences in general. If the argument can be
generalised, it entails that the efficacy of, for instance, chemical, physiological and
biological events is excluded by the efficacy of physical events—which is absurd.
That makes, as Peter Menzies has put it,
[…] a mockery of the enormous efforts devoted in the special sciences to
formulating experimental and observational methodologies for testing causal
hypothesis. It would follow from this position that all these efforts are
misdirected because they could not, by definition, reveal anything about the
nature of causal processes.34
The lesson to be learned is that something must be wrong with the argument.35 On the
basis of that one may argue that our intuitions concerning the metaphysics of
causation are not reliable. If we want to settle the question whether the mental makes
a causal difference, we should, therefore, not engage in further metaphysical
speculation. Rather, we should consider whether it can be established that mental
events have a status comparable to the status of, say, chemical, physiological, or
biological events. Instead of wasting our time with the metaphysical riddle of mental
causation, we should ask whether or not psychology is a special science on a par with
                                                 
34 Menzies, 2001, p. 5.
35 See, for instance, Fodor, 1989, and Menzies, 2001.
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chemistry, physiology or biology. And if it is not, we should ask whether the causal
relevance of mental events can be grounded in the generalisations of common sense
psychology or by virtue of the fact that they support the right counterfactuals.
Needless to say, proponents of the exclusion argument dismiss such
considerations as evasive and unsatisfactory. The problem of mental causation, they
insist, is a metaphysical problem that lies at the very heart of the mind-body
problem—and they insist that it requires a metaphysical solution. To dismiss the
problem and the attempts to solve it as metaphysical speculation, they will respond, is
to brush the philosophical problem under the carpet.36
I agree, on the one hand, that the reductio shows that something is wrong with
the exclusion argument. But, on the other hand, I think that the metaphysical issues
cannot be dismissed so quickly. Non-reductive physicalists should at least try to spell
out what goes wrong.
Events and Property Instantiations
I assumed that the relevant mental phenomena are mental events. Philosophers of
mind, though, often talk about mental states and properties. It is common to use the
term mental events in a broad sense that includes mental states.37 We would, then,
obtain two versions of the argument; one in terms of mental events, and the other one
in terms of the instantiations of mental properties (for no one should expect the
properties themselves to have a causal role). Little significance has been given to this
distinction. It has been assumed that the argument is equally compelling in both
versions. Let us first consider the version in terms of mental events.
The causal exclusion problem would dissolve under the assumption that mental
kinds are identical with physical kinds. But this solution is obviously not an option for
non-reductive physicalism, which is committed to the rejection of type-identities.
Another possibility, though, is identity between mental and physical event-tokens.
There are two ways to distinguish events as mental events. An event is a mental
event just in case it has a mental description, or, alternatively, just in case it has a
                                                 
36 Compare, for instance, Kim, 2000, and Crane, 1995.
37 Compare for instance Horgan and Tye, 1988, who say that they are following a ‘frequent recent
practice’ by using ‘event’ in a sense that includes ‘states, process, and the like’ (p. 427).
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mental property.38 I shall assume that the two definitions are equivalent. Given that, it
is certainly possible that mental events are identical with physical events, even though
mental properties cannot be identified with physical properties. For it is possible that
one and the same event has both a mental and a physical description (or property).39
Further, it is possible that the physical properties of such an event include those
properties that realise and determine the event’s mental properties. That is, it is
possible that it is one and the same event that has both the mental properties and the
physical properties on which they depend. Suppose that this is generally the case.
Then the non-reductive physicalist can say that the mental and physical events are not
rival causes, because they are one and the same event—being token identical, they
share causal powers.
If we consider property instantiations instead of events, that move—the appeal to
token-identity—is not available. For what goes hand and hand with that alternative
version is a particular view on the nature and individuation of events, according to
which events are property instantiations. On that view, events are properties
instantiated by a substance at a time. That rules token-identity out, since the
instantiation of a mental property and the instantiation of the underlying physical
property constitute distinct event-tokens.
It seems that we have identified a significant difference between the two versions
of the exclusion argument. But it merely seems so, the opponents insist. According to
Davidson’s theory, which is the token-identity theory, the events in question
instantiate a causal law only under their physical description. We are warranted in
regarding them as cause and effect only insofar as they are covered by physical law.
But that means that they are causally efficacious only in virtue of their physical
properties; they cause what they cause not in virtue of being mental events. Therefore,
                                                 
38 One may wonder how events can possibly have mental properties. It seems clear that events have or
instantiate properties. The rising of Sue’s arm, for example, has the property that it takes place on
planet earth, that it involves Sue, and so forth. But can events have mental properties? Only agents, it
seems, can have desires, beliefs, feelings, and so forth. Many philosophers simply assume that it is
possible that events can or cannot be causally efficacious in virtue of their mental properties. I think,
though, that the talk about mental properties of events is best construed as being elliptical. No matter
what theory of events is employed, the theory in question must accommodate the fact that the events
which we are concerned with are agent-involving events. Strictly speaking, then, a mental property of
an event is a property which is instantiated by a substance involved in that event. For the sake of
simplicity, though, we will talk about the properties that are had or instantiated by the event (compare
Braun, 1995, p. 449, who makes a similar suggestion).
39 Davidson has famously argued that this not only possible, but actually the case: every event that has
a mental description has a physical description. See Davidson 1980, essays 11 and 12.
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appeal to token-identity does not help, and the difference between the two versions is
of no significance. Consider, for instance, how Stephen Yablo has put that point.
To reply with the majority that mental events just are certain physical events,
whose causal powers they therefore share, only relocates the problem from the
particulars to their universal features […]. Mental events are effective, maybe,
but not by way of their mental properties; any causal role that the latter might
have hoped to play is occupied already by their physical rivals.40
A few things, however, have been overlooked in this diagnosis. In my alternative
analysis I will distinguish between three versions of the argument, whereby each
version results from a combination of non-reductive physicalism with a particular
view on the individuation of events.
Version One
The first version of the argument is directed at the already mentioned token-identity
theory. On that view, the mental events and the underlying physical events, which
realise and determine the mental events, are token-identical. The charge against this
view is that such events cause their effects only in virtue of their physical properties –
the events in question have physical effects, but not in virtue of being mental events.
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that events cause their effects in
virtue of some of their properties.41 Why do the events in question have their effects
not in virtue of their mental properties? How can the opponent justify the claim that
they are efficacious only in virtue of their physical properties? We can distinguish
between two arguments for that claim.
The first argument appeals to a connection between the causal role of properties
and causal laws. It is assumed, firstly, that an event c causes the occurrence of the
event e in virtue of having the property P if and only if P figures in the causal law that
covers e and c (more precisely, if and only if there is a causal law according to which
an event’s being P is nomologically sufficient or relevant for the occurrence of e).
Further, if c causes e in virtue of having P, P is said to be a causally relevant property
                                                 
40 Yablo, 1992, pp. 248-249.
41 Davidson’s own response is that, given his view on causation and the individuation of events, it
simply does not make any sense to say that a cause is efficacious in virtue of some of its properties.
Causation is an extensional relation between events. Certainly, in order to obtain a causal explanation
we have to refer to the events using the right descriptions. But it does not follow that they are
efficacious in virtue of some property (Compare Davidson, 1993, especially pp. 12-13). Opponents will
either insist on the principle that causes are efficacious in virtue of some of their properties, or they will
try to show that Davidson’s response merely relocates the problem in a way that does not help to save
the view. My task, however, is not to decide on the tenability of Davidson’s response.
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with respect to e’s causing c. And it is assumed, secondly, that there are no
psychological laws or regularities that ground causal claims about mental events; it is
assumed, in other words, that psychological anomalism is true. From that it follows
that no event causes an effect in virtue of having a mental property.
That first argument, however, is not decisive for the following reasons. Firstly,
the second assumption—psychological anomalism—is rather controversial. It is in
need of independent justification and cannot just be assumed. The problem is that
most philosophers who deploy the exclusion argument against non-reductive
physicalism also argue for some form of reductive physicalism.42 But it is hard to see
what independent reasons a reductive physicalist might have to hold the second
assumption. In fact, reductive physicalism seems to be committed to the claim that
there are psychological laws or regularities. Secondly, the argument shifts the focus of
the debate in a way that is problematic for the opponent of non-reductive physicalism.
Typically, opponents of non-reductive physicalism argue that the problem of mental
causation requires a metaphysical solution, and that all proposals that establish merely
the explanatory relevance of mental events or properties are inadequate or beside the
point. The problem, they insist, concerns causal efficacy, not causal explanatory
relevance. The argument, though, shifts the focus from the causal efficacy of mental
events to the question whether mental properties figure in causal laws and the
question whether there are psychological laws; questions which concern the
explanatory relevance of the mental, rather than their causal efficacy.43
According to a second line of argument, it becomes obvious that the events in
question have their effects only in virtue of their physical properties once the
principle of the causal closure of the physical is understood in the right way.
According to Kim, the basic idea behind that principle is that, for every physical
event, one will never ‘leave the physical domain’, if one traces out its complete causal
history.44 The causal history of any physical event consists only of other physical
events. Events are physical events in virtue of having physical properties. So, the
causal history of any physical event can be given in terms of other events and their
                                                 
42 The most prominent proponent of that strategy is Kim, 1997 and 2000.
43 Further below, p. 134, I will say more about causal efficacy and causally relevant properties.
Compare also note 45 below.
44 Compare Kim, 2000, p. 40: ‘One way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this: If you
pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside
the physical domain.’
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physical properties only. And that means, it seems obvious, that all the causal
relations that constitute that history hold only in virtue of physical properties; there is
no room left for mental properties to do any additional causal work.
The closure principle, however, is a purely metaphysical and extensional
principle; it talks about causes and effects only. Assume, once more, that events and
only events can be causes and effects. Consider a physical event e that is caused by c,
and assume that e is both a physical event in virtue of having the physical property P
and a mental event in virtue of having the mental property M. What licences the claim
that c causes e only in virtue of having P?
I fail to see why and how the closure principle, by itself, rules out the possibility
that c causes e in virtue of having M. Note, firstly, that in order to hold that c causes e
in virtue of having M  one does not have to ‘leave’ the physical domain.
Metaphysically speaking, we cannot leave the physical domain, since each mental
event is, by assumption, identical with a physical event. Secondly, the thought behind
the argument cannot be that the causal relevance of mental properties is excluded by
the causal relevance of physical properties. Without the introduction and justification
of further metaphysical principles, the notion of exclusion—just like the notion of
overdetermination—applies only to causes (that is, events).45 The closure principle
does not entail anything with respect to the causal relevance of properties. It does not
exclude the relevance of mental properties, since it does not say that physical
properties are sufficient—whatever that might mean. It says that every physical event
has a sufficient physical cause. But it is an event that is sufficient, not an event’s
having a certain property rather than another.46
                                                 
45 Stephen Yablo says that although ‘causes and effects are events, properties as well as events can be
causally relevant or sufficient’ (Yablo, 1992, p. 247, note 5). It is correct that we can talk about
causally relevant events as well as causally relevant properties. But is not obvious that the sense of
causal relevance is the same in both cases. An event can be causally relevant in the extensional sense
of being a partial cause. In that sense, events are causally relevant as causes. If one denies, as Yablo
does, that properties can themselves be causes, it remains to be explained in what sense properties can
be causally relevant. And whatever that sense is, it is different from the one in which events are
relevant, and it is, therefore, not clear at all that the exclusion argument can be restated simply by
substituting property for event, as Yablo suggests.
46 Some may construe the closure principle as saying that the occurrence of any physical event can be
explained in physical terms only (only in terms of events and their physical properties). But by reading
the argument in that way, the opponent is again shifting the focus from causation to causal explanation.
The closure principle is a metaphysical principle. It is about causes, not about causal explanations. It
does not say that physical causes have their effects only in virtue of their physical properties, nor does
it say that everything can be causally explained in terms of physical properties.
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In conclusion we can say the causal exclusion argument is not decisive against the
token-identity version of non-reductive physicalism. Opponents, however, will object
that even if the response is correct, it shows only that it is possible that some events
have their effects in virtue of their mental properties—it shows only that mental
properties can be causally relevant. What needs to be shown, though, is that the
mental is causally efficacious.
What kinds of things can be causally efficacious? Causes, I suggest, and only
causes are causally efficacious. And as the standard view has it, events and only
events are causes. Instantiations of properties, on the other hand, can have two
different causal roles. Firstly, as being the property of an event—as being instantiated
by an event—a property can be causally relevant in the sense that the event causes the
effect in virtue of having the property. Secondly, as being an event the instantiation of
a property—by a substance, at a time—can be causally efficacious.
On the present version of the argument, mental event tokens are physical event
tokens. That is, the instantiation of the mental property and the instantiation of the
physical property do not constitute two distinct events, since they are instantiated in
one and the same event. Given the distinctions just made, it follows that instantiations
of mental properties can at best be causally relevant—they are not and cannot be
causes . And that means that they cannot be causally efficacious. Further,
instantiations of physical and mental properties cannot be causal rivals, since causal
exclusion or overdetermination presupposes distinct causes. Now, what does not
follow from all that is that mental events are not, or cannot be, causally efficacious.
Version Two
On the first version, mental and physical properties are properties of one and the same
event. If we construe events as property instantiations, we obtain two further versions
of the argument. Recall that that we can distinguish between properties that
constitutive of events from properties that merely modify events. The former are
instantiated by a substance at a time and the latter are instantiated by an event.47 Now,
in some cases it will be controversial whether a given property is constitutive of an
event or not. Consider again Kim’s example of Sebastian’s stroll and Sebastian’s
leisurely strolling. Are there two events happening at the same time, or is there only
                                                 
47 Compare Kim, 1993, p. 43, and see also chapter 2, pp. 101.
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one event has that more than one true description? According to what is known as the
Anscombe-Davidson view on the individuation of events, there is only one event that
can correctly be described as a stroll and as a leisurely stroll. According to the view
that events are property instantiations, however, whether there is only one event
depends on whether strolling leisurely is a constitutive property or whether it merely
modifies the event. Recall further that we can distinguish between two ways in which
the events might be related, because two events, as Kim says, can be distinct without
being entirely distinct.48 Sebastian’s stroll and Sebastian’s leisurely strolling are,
according to Kim, distinct events. But they are not entirely distinct, since the latter
event metaphysically includes the former.
Given that, we can now formulate the second version of non-reductive
physicalism, according to which the instantiations of mental and physical properties
constitute events that are distinct, but not entirely. Rather, physical events include
mental events.
Kim did not try to spell out how the relation of inclusion between distinct events
has to be understood; he says that the notion is intuitively plausible enough.49 Stephen
Yablo, though, has suggested the following. According to Yablo, the relation between
mental and physical events is best understood as one between determinables and
determinates, which, in turn, is best understood as an event’s essence subsuming the
other event’s essence. What does that mean? Consider the determinate being red of
the determinable being coloured. Being red is a specific—or determinate—way of
being coloured. Similarly, Sebastian’s leisurely strolling is a determinate of
Sebastian’s stroll, and the former subsumes the latter. The important thing to note is
that the relation of subsumption—of one event’s subsuming another event—is
precisely the relation of inclusion. I will not go into any further detail of Yablo’s
account.50 Rather, let us see how it can be applied to the problem of mental causation.
The lesson to be learned, according to Yablo, is that mental and physical events
cannot causally exclude each other, if they stand in the suggested metaphysical
                                                 
48 The distinction between distinct and entirely distinct events is supposed to block a counterintuitive
proliferation of events. Compare ibid., pp. 42-46.
49 Ibid., p. 45.
50 As indicated, Yablo suggests to construe the relation of inclusion as a relation between the event’s
essences: an event e is said to subsume or include another event e*, if the essence of e* is a ‘subset’ of
the essence of e (see Yablo, 1992, section 5, especially pp. 261-262).
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relation of inclusion.51 For we know , as Yablo says, that determinates and
determinables are not causal rivals. True, by citing an object’s being red we may be
able to causally explain an event, or an event’s having a certain property, which
cannot be explained by referring to that object’s being coloured. But it cannot
plausibly be suggested that these properties are rival causes, simply because the
particular instance of being red just is the particular instance of being coloured. If we
apply this lesson to the problem of mental causation, we can then say with Yablo that
‘any credible reconstruction of the [problem] must respect the truism that
determinates do not contend with their determinables for causal influence.’52
It does not matter whether or not Yablo was successful in analysing the relation
of metaphysical inclusion correctly. For, on any account of that relation, if the
physical event determines the mental event by including it, the two events cannot
plausibly be causal rivals. To say they cannot be causal rivals is to say that they can
neither exclude each other, nor overdetermine an effect, and we can conclude that the
causal exclusion argument does not apply to the second version of non-reductive
physicalism.
Version Three
On the third version of the argument, instantiations of the mental and the physical
properties constitute entirely distinct events. None of the responses that have been
given so far apply. The mental and physical properties in question are constitutive of
metaphysically distinct events. Instantiations of them can therefore be efficacious as
causes. Furthermore, it seems that they can be causal rivals, since they constitute
entirely distinct events.53
                                                 
51 One may wonder how a physical event can include a mental event. The best way to think about it is
in terms of multiple realisation. Assume that systems of type S and type T can be in mental states of
type M, and that systems of the two types realise M in different ways. Then the states that realise M in
systems of type S and T must be alike in certain respects, because they both realise M. But given that M
is multiply realisable, we can assume that those states also differ in some respects; they realise M in
different ways. Given that, we can say that the way in which the two systems realise M are specific or
determinate ways of being in M.
52 Ibid., p. 259.
53 One may think that this way of construing the relation between mental and physical events is not
compatible with non-reductive physicalism. According to non-reductive physicalism, mental events
depend on physical events. This dependence, one may think, is incompatible with the claim that the
events are entirely distinct. But is it impossible that two events are entirely distinct and dependent?
Consider the following. Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him with a knife. At one point, Kim suggests
that Brutus’ killing Caesar and Brutus’ stabbing Caesar are entirely distinct events, whereas Brutus’
stabbing Caesar with a knife merely modifies Brutus’ stabbing Caesar (compare Kim, 1993, p. 44).
137
Yablo argued that, if two events are not entirely distinct, in the sense that one
includes the other, then they cannot be causal rivals. It does not follow that two events
can be causal rivals, if they are entirely distinct. Nor is it obvious that all causes that
are entirely distinct causes of one and the same effect are, or can be, rival causes. In
order decide whether they are or can be rival causes, we need to have a closer look at
some of the issues involved.
Intuitively, for causal rivalry, exclusion or overdetermination to occur, there have
to be two or more independent causes of one and the same effect. If that is not the
case, if the causes in question are not independent in the relevant sense, the exclusion
argument does not apply, because the notions of causal rivalry, exclusion and
overdetermination do not apply. In other words, whatever is necessary for causal
rivalry, exclusion, and overdetermination, is necessary for an application of the
argument.
In the following I will suggest a characterisation of causal overdetermination and
of the involved notion of independence. I will argue that mental and physical events,
construed as entirely distinct events, cannot overdetermine their effects, because they
are not independent in the required sense. Given that, it is then the opponent’s burden
to clarify why and how the exclusion argument applies to non-reductive physicalism
and to the problem of mental causation in general. Let me begin with two
observations.
Let us consider a clear case of causal exclusion; a case in which two causes
overdetermine an effect. An example that is often used to illustrate causal
overdetermination is the case in which two sharpshooters kill their victim, which
happens to be one and the same person, at exactly the same time. Each shot is
sufficient to cause the victim’s death, which is overdetermined by two distinct
sufficient and independent causes.
The first observation is that the events in the case of mental causation are not
distinct in the same way as the relevant events in the sharpshooter case. In the
sharpshooter case, the events are not only distinct with respect to the instantiation of
                                                                                                                                            
Intuitively, though, the particular killing of Caesar depends on Brutus’ stabbing him. To decide
whether the third version is consistent would require a detailed discussion of the involved notions of
metaphysical distinctness and dependence, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, I will
assume, for the sake of the argument, that it is consistent. If it is not consistent, so much the worse for
the proponents of the exclusion argument—for then the third version collapses into either the first or
the second version.
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properties, but they are distinct in the further sense that the properties are instantiated
by distinct substances. This, of course, is not the case for mental causation; the mental
and the physical property are instantiated by one and the same substance. That does
not show, of course, that being instantiated by distinct substances is necessary or
sufficient for causal rivalry. But it suggests that the events’ being entirely distinct is
not sufficient. What is required, in addition, is that they are independent, in some
sense.
This brings us to the second observation. What we are assuming, and what the
opponents of non-reductive physicalism usually assume as well, is that the two
purported causes—the mental and the physical event—stand in some intimate
relationship. All versions of non-reductive physicalism assume that mental events
supervene, in some sense, on physical events, and that mental events are realised by
them. It is assumed, in other words, that mental events (or properties) are, in some
sense, dependent on physical events (or properties). By hypothesis, that is, the mental
and their underlying physical events (or properties) are not independent.
This independence, however, concerns the existence of mental events and
properties. Whenever there is a mental event, there is some physical event that
realises it. It is possible that there are physical events and no mental events, but it is
impossible that there are mental events and no physical events. The mental depends
on the physical and is realised by it, but not vice versa.
What we are interested in, however, is independence of causes as a criterion for
the application of the causal exclusion argument. Recall that the third assumption of
the causal exclusion argument concerns causal overdetermination. The argument
applies only if the notion of causal overdetermination applies. That is, for the
argument to apply, there must be causes that can overdetermine an effect.
I suggest having a closer look at the notion of causal overdetermination in order
to get a better grasp of the relevant notion of independence. Let us begin with a
characterisation of overdetermination, which is adopted from Trenton Merrick’s
Objects and Persons.54
Some effect e is causally overdetermined if and only if:
(a) e is caused by c,
                                                 
54 Compare Merricks, 2001, p. 58, who thinks that a definition along such lines is ‘the most literal,
straightforward and natural’ definition of causal overdetermination.
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(b) c is causally irrelevant as to whether some other numerically distinct cause,
c*, is a cause of e, and
(c) e is caused by c*, and c* is numerically distinct from c.
Where c is causally irrelevant as to whether c* is a cause of e if and only if:55
(d) c is not a cause of c* (that is, c is neither a sufficient nor a partial cause of
c*, and c is not an intermediate in a causal chain that runs from a cause of c*
to c*), and
(e) c does not cause c* to cause e (nor does it cause any members of c* to cause
e, if c* consists of more than one cause jointly causing e).
One can agree with Merricks that this extensional construal of overdetermination is
straightforward. But, unfortunately, it does not help us any further for two reasons.
Firstly, Merricks talks about objects as being causes. For overdetermination to occur,
two distinct causes have to cause the effect, and distinct causes are, on that view,
distinct objects. That means that rival causes—causes that can overdetermine an
effect—are numerically distinct substances. That reflects my intuition that we get a
clear sense of the phenomenon of overdetermination, if the causes are associated with
distinct substances. But since it does not cover the case in which two distinct events
occurring in one and the same substance, it is of no help.
Secondly, the definition recognises only causal relations between the two
potentially rival causes; what matters, according to clause (b), is whether one cause is
causally relevant or irrelevant as to whether the other cause brings about the effect.
What we are looking for is a characterisation of the way in which the two causes of
the effect, c and c*, can said to be dependent or independent causes. The presented
definition captures the dependence between them in terms of causal relevance; that is,
the dependence is construed as causal dependence.
Some philosophers have tried to understand the relation between mental states
and their physical realisations in causal terms. Most philosophers, however, think that
the dependence between the mental and the physical is of a different kind. The notion
of supervenience, as many think, provides merely a minimal constraint for that
relation, which is itself in need of explanation (given that it holds). A popular solution
is to say that supervenience holds, because the physical states realise the mental
states.56 What is needed, then, are dependence-conditions that can be applied to
different relations between the physical and the mental, such as causation,
                                                 
55 Compare ibid., p. 57.
56 Compare Kim, 2000, pp. 23-24.
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supervenience, determination and realisation. An obvious candidate for that is
counterfactual dependence.
It is commonly assumed that there is a close connection between causal
dependence and counterfactual dependence. Causal relations are said to entail or
support relations of counterfactual dependence. On Merricks’ definition, c and c* do
not overdetermine e, if c is causally relevant as to whether c* causes e. If c is causally
relevant in that way, then whether c* causes e depends causally on c. This causal
dependence entails or supports counterfactuals of the following form:
(CF) Given relevantly similar circumstances, had c not occurred, c* would not
have caused e.
My suggestion is to replace the causal dependence employed in Merrick’s definition
by counterfactual dependence. For what is crucial, it seems, is not the causal
connection itself, but the entailed counterfactual. Consider again the case of the two
sharpshooters. It is a case of overdetermination, because there are two sufficient and
independent causes of the same effect. Specified in causal terms, the independence
consists in the absence of causal connections between the two causes. Why is that
relevant to the question whether the effect is overdetermined? If one shooting depends
causally on the other shooting, as one might say, then the two shootings are not
independent causes of the victim’s death. But that is plainly circular, given that we
want know in virtue of what causes are independent causes. A better answer is the
following. If the two shootings are causally dependent, then one of the two
sharpshooters would not have killed the victim, had the other one not done so.
The case of the two sharpshooters is a case in which it is a coincidence that two
events cause the same effect. A causal connection would render the two shootings
non-coincidental. But so would a counterfactual connection. That is why I suggest
replacing the causal condition on overdetermination by a counterfactual one.
Accordingly, the two causes, c and c*, do not overdetermine the effect e, if c*’s
causing e is counterfactually dependent on c; that is, if CF holds.
We found Merrick’s definition of causal overdetermination to be too narrow, since it
covers only cases in which two potentially rival causes are causally independent. To
construe the kind of independence that is necessary for causal rivalry and
overdetermination in terms of counterfactual independence has the advantage that it
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covers relationships of different kinds that might hold between events. In order to see
whether the counterfactual approach will get us any further with our problem, let us
see whether the relation of realisation—as it is usually employed by non-reductive
theories—supports counterfactuals of the right sort.
Suppose that p is the physical realisation of the mental event m, and that both p
causes e and m causes e. Is it true that had p not occurred, m would not have caused
e? Let us assume that m is multiply realisable.57 We have then to distinguish between
two cases. In the first case we assume that each system or agent falls under a certain
type or species such that for all mental event-tokens m of type M: for any agent of a
certain type, tokens of M are realised by physical event-tokens p of type P. In that
case, we can limit our considerations to agents of certain types, and restricted
counterfactuals of following form will hold.
(CF’) For all agents s of type S: had the s-involving event p not occurred, the s-
involving event m  would not have caused e , given relevantly similar
circumstances.
That counterfactual holds, because the occurrence of m depends counterfactually on
p. If the antecedent holds, then the mental event m does not occur—and if m does not
occur, then, trivially, m does not cause e.
In the second case, we do not assume that mental events of a certain type are
realised by all agents of a certain type in the same way—realised by physical events
of the same type. In that case we have to consider the set {P1, P2, P3…} of all possible
realisations of the mental state type—across all individuals of all agent-types. In that
case, counterfactuals of the following form will hold.
(CF’’) For any agent s: had none of the s-involving events pi (of type P i)
occurred, the s-involving event m would not have caused e, given relevantly
similar circumstances.
Again, that counterfactual holds, because the occurrence of m  depends
counterfactually on pi. If the antecedent holds, then the mental event m does not
occur—and if m does not occur, then, trivially, m does not cause e. What we get, in
both cases, is a counterfactual dependence between p, m, and m’s causing e.
                                                 
57 Note that non-reductive physicalism is typically motivated by the possibility of multiple realisation
of mental states. It is therefore safe to make that assumption. (Moreover, if relevant counterfactuals
hold in case mental states are multiply realisable, they certainly hold in case they are not.)
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Given all that, we can conclude that mental events and their physical realisations
do not overdetermine their effects since they are not independent causes. The mental
event is not an independent cause, because its occurrence and its causing the effect
depends counterfactually on its physical realisation. No dependency of that sort holds
for standard examples of causal overdetermination. The two shootings do not depend
on each other—neither causally nor counterfactually. What makes the sharpshooter
case a case of causal overdetermination is precisely the fact that had one sharpshooter
not killed the victim, the other one would have. They kill their victim independently
of each other—and that they do so at the same time, with the same success, is a mere
coincidence.
I argued that the causal exclusion argument is not decisive against non-reductive
physicalism, no matter whether the mental and physical events in question are
construed as token-identical, distinct or entirely distinct. What is important to note is
that the response to the last version applies to all three versions, since it relies on the
claim that mental events are dependent on physical events—a claim that all versions
of non-reductive physicalism are committed to.
What causal exclusion and rivalry amount to is fairly straightforward in case
there are distinct and independent causes. But the case of mental causation is not of
that sort. It is not clear at all what causal exclusion and rivalry amount to, given that
the mental depends on the physical. There would have to be a kind of causal
exclusion that is either not tied to the outlined notion of overdetermination, or one
that is not tied to any notion of overdetermination at all. In any case, it remains to be
shown what sort of causal exclusion that is and how it has to be understood. We can
conclude that the opponents of non-reductive physicalism have yet to show how the
causal exclusion argument applies to mental causation, even if it is assumed that
mental events and their physical realisations are entirely distinct.
A First Objection
Now I will turn to two general and fundamental objections, which address the way in
which the problem of mental causation and non-reductive physicalism have been
presented, rather than the response to the causal exclusion argument. According to
non-reductive physicalism, mental states and events depend on physical states and
events, and that is why considerations of causal overdetermination do not apply. In
his Mind in a Physical World Kim addresses that response, and he acknowledges that
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the way in which non-reductive physicalism construes the relationship between
mental and physical causes does not constitute a paradigmatic case of causal
overdetermination. But it is not clear, Kim argues, why that removes the problem.
The exclusion problem doesn’t go away when we recognise the two purported
causes as in some way related to each other, perhaps one being dependent on
the other.58
That is because the exclusion problem, as Kim suggests, is ‘not exactly that of causal
overdetermination’. The problem is, rather, to show what further or additional causal
work is left for a mental event, given that its physical realisation is, by itself, causally
sufficient for the effect.
[There] is a real problem, the exclusion problem, in recognising [mental]
properties as causally efficacious in addition to their realizers.59
That is to say that the fact that the mental depends on the physical cannot be part of
the solution to the problem. Far to the contrary, that dependence is the root of the
problem.
It is important to see that the [exclusion problem] arises because the two
putative causes are not independent events.60
The thought is, it seems, that because mental events are not independent causes, they
are not, and cannot be, causally efficacious in addition to their physical realisations.
Hence, to point out that mental and physical events are not independent causes does
not count in favour, but against non-reductive physicalism.
My first response is that Kim is simply begging the question. What I have offered in
response to the causal exclusion argument are responses to an argument, which is
based on assumptions that every version of non-reductive physicalism is supposed to
be committed to. In that argument, considerations concerning causal
overdetermination play a central role. What Kim says, however, is that the problem of
causal exclusion is ‘not exactly that of causal overdetermination’. But what he
describes as the ‘real’ exclusion problem is based on an additional—and
hidden—assumption; namely, the assumption that mental events have to be causally
efficacious independently of and in addition to physical events. The problem with that
                                                 
58 Kim, 2000, p. 53.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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assumption is that non-reductive physical is not committed to it. Non-reductive
physicalism says, among other things, that mental states and events, which are
realised by physical states and events, make a causal difference, and that psychology
is not reducible. Presumably, the view is committed to the claim that mental states
and events are causally efficacious. But, as far as I can see, it is not committed to the
stronger claim that they are causally efficacious independently of and in addition to
physical states and events.61
The reason why the causal exclusion argument appears to be a strong argument
against non-reductive physicalism is that it is based on assumptions that everyone
shares. What Kim is offering, however, is an assumption that would rule out non-
reductive physicalism without further argument. In other words, Kim is not offering
an argument at all.
But maybe I have misinterpreted Kim’s objection. What Kim suggests, one may
argue, is not that non-reductive physicalism in particular is committed to the
assumption that mental events are causally efficacious independently of and in
addition to physical event. Rather, any satisfying account of mental causation must
show how mental events can be causally efficacious independently of and in addition
to physical events. (The thought behind that would be that only independent causes
are really causally efficacious—events make a real difference, only if their causal
contribution is independent from other events that cause the same effect.)
But that cannot be correct either. Kim is one of many philosophers who
acknowledge that the type-identity theory of the mind would provide a
straightforward solution to the problem of mental causation. On that theory, mental
events are causally efficacious, because they are physical events. But since they are
identical with physical events they are, by definition, not efficacious independently of
and in addition to physical events. Given that the identity theory provides a solution
to the problem of mental causation, it cannot be a necessary condition that mental
events must be causally efficacious independently of and in addition to physical
events.
                                                 
61 Non-reductive physicalism is also not committed to the claim that mental events are causes in some
special way. It need not abandon what Tim Crane has called the homogeneity of causation. Compare
Crane, 1995, p. 218 and pp. 231-233.
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One can, of course, deny that the identity theory solves the problem of mental
causation, precisely because it does not show how mental events can be causally
efficacious independently of and in addition to physical events. But that response is
not open to Kim. For, as we will see, Kim’s own solution does not establish that
mental events are efficacious independently of and in addition to physical events.
Further, it will emerge that the two cornerstones of Kim’s reductive solution to the
problem of mental causation are in fact compatible with non-reductive physicalism.
The first cornerstone of Kim’s solution to the problem of mental causation is
what he calls physical realizationism. On Kim’s view, both realisation and reduction
are construed as restricted to species or types of systems. In other words, whether or
not something is realised by or reducible to something else is relative to different
species or types of systems.
When P is said to “realize” M in system s, P must specify a microstructural
property of s that provides a causal mechanism for the implementation of M in
s; […].62
Further,
[…] the idea that mental properties are realized by physical properties […]
warrants reductive talk like “Having M, for appropriate systems, consists in, or
just is, having P.”63
The second cornerstone of Kim’s view is the principle of causal inheritance:
If M is instantiated on a given occasion by being realised by P, then the causal
powers of this instance of M are identical with (perhaps, a subset of) the causal
powers of P.64
I will not go into any further details of Kim’s position. But I think it is not difficult to
see why Kim thinks that the causal inheritance principle holds, given the outlined
view of physical realisation. If that principle holds, Kim argues, there is no problem
of causal exclusion for mental causation, because if the causal efficacy of mental
events just is the efficacy of their physical realisers, they are, obviously, not rival
causes.
That solution has a lot in common with the type-identity theory solution. It solves
the problem simply by showing that there is no problem. Since the causal efficacy of
                                                 
62 Kim, 1993, p. 343, pp. 363-364, and Kim, 2000, pp. 19-23.
63 Kim, 2000, p. 24.
64 Kim, 1993, p. 355. Compare also Kim, 2000, p. 54.
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any mental event just is the efficacy of its physical realisation, there is no problem of
exclusion or overdetermination, and it follows, trivially, that mental events are
causally efficacious. But just as the type-identity solution, Kim’s proposal does not
show that mental events are causally efficacious independently of and in addition to
physical events.
Kim’s theory is a reductive one. It is not obvious, though, whether that is
essential to its solution of the problem of mental causation. What is essential, so much
seems clear, is the proposed physical realizationism in conjunction with the causal
inheritance principle. It may be true that the former warrants reductive talk, as Kim
says. But it is not obvious that it presupposes or entails that psychology is reducible.
Consider what Kim says about the physical states and events that realise mental states
and events.
These underlying microstates will form an explanatory basis for the higher
properties and the nomic relations among them; but the realization relation itself
must be distinguished from the explanatory relation [which] should not be
regarded as constitutive of [the realization relation].65
Reduction concerns, first and foremost, theories and explanations. It can be
distinguished from metaphysical issues concerning the relationship between mental
and physical properties, and it can be distinguished from the issue of physical
realisation. The question, however, is whether the issue of reduction cannot only
distinguished from the issue of realisation, but whether it is independent of it. Is it
possible that the mental properties of some system are realised by some of its physical
properties and that psychology is not reducible?
I am not aware of any argument that shows that this is impossible. It certainly
seems possible that mental events are realised by physical events even though
psychology is irreducible. In the section on the coincidence problem I argued that
non-reductive physicalism is compatible with a functional theory that shows how
mental states are realised by physical states without reducing the former to the latter. I
pointed out that in order to establish irreducibility it is sufficient to establish that the
lower-level theory is not explanatory of the higher-level theory (in our case,
psychology). The position that I proposed says that psychology is not reducible, and it
seems clear that it is compatible with both physical realizationism and with the causal
                                                 
65 Kim, 1993, p. 344.
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inheritance principle—which is just to say that non-reductive physicalism is
compatible with Kim’s solution to the problem of mental causation.
A Second Objection
However, the response just presented gives rise to another objection. The proposed
version of non-reductive physicalism says that psychology is irreducible, that there
are mental properties, and that the causal efficacy of the instantiation of a mental
property just is the causal efficacy of their physical realisation. This position, the
objection goes, is unstable—if not incoherent—for the following reason. A higher-
level theory and the causal explanations it provides are irreducible only if the theory
captures causal powers that cannot be captured by any lower-level theory. Events
have their effects, as we assume, in virtue of having or instantiating certain properties.
So, in order to be irreducible, the higher-level theory must capture causally relevant
properties that are not and cannot be captured by any lower-level theory. In other
words, if a higher-level theory does not range over irreducible properties, it is, in
principle, reducible, because it does not capture irreducible causal powers.66
On the suggested version of non-reductive physicalism, mental events inherit
their causal powers from the physical events that realise them. But that just means
that mental events do not have irreducible causal powers. And it means that
psychology does not capture irreducible mental properties. But, given that, there is no
reason to think that the proposed view is a non-reductive theory. In order to avoid
incoherence, either the causal inheritance principle or the claim that psychology is
irreducible must be abandoned. Given that, though, non-reductive physicalism faces a
dilemma: either it loses the solution to the problem of mental causation by
abandoning the causal inheritance principle, or it concedes defeat by giving up the
claim that psychology is not reducible.
However, that objection too is based on additional and partly hidden assumptions
and principles. The problem, as I will show, is again that non-reductive physicalism is
not committed to them. And again, the assumptions and principles in question rule out
                                                 
66 Kim, again, is a prominent advocate of that view. In ‘The Nonreductivist’s Trouble with Mental
Causation’ Kim asks what it is for a mental property to be ‘real’. In virtue of what is it a real property?
The proposed answer is inspired by what Kim calls ‘Alexander’s dictum’: To be real is to have causal
powers (compare, Kim, 1993, p. 348). On the basis of that he arrives at the view that mental events are
irreducible only if they have irreducible causal powers (compare p. 350).
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non-reductive physicalism directly, which means that the opponent is again begging
the question.
The opponent insists that any irreducible higher-order theory must range over
irreducible causal powers and properties. Given the way in which that assumption is
used against non-reductive physicalism the opponent must mean the following: an
irreducible mental theory must range over mental properties in virtue of which mental
events are causally efficacious independently of and in addition to physical events.
That must be what the opponent means, because the opponent’s aim is to show that
the non-reductive position is subject to the causal exclusion argument. (And in order
to do so the opponent must establish that mental and physical causes are distinct and
independent causes of one and the same effect.)
Given that, and given what has been said in the previous section, it is clear that
the opponent is mistaken. Non-reductive physicalism is not committed to the claim
that mental events are causally efficacious independently of and in addition to
physical events, because it says, by definition, that mental events are dependent on
physical events.
Presumably, the opponent will not be satisfied with that response. Psychological
explanations, it is assumed, are causal explanations. Why are they irreducible, if they
do not capture irreducible causal powers or irreducible and causally relevant
properties? Let us have a closer look at some of the issues involved.
Note firstly that non-reductive physicalists and their opponents employ different
criteria for reduction. Non-reductive physicalists stress that reduction concerns
theories and explanatory power. Their opponents, however, talk about irreducible
properties and causal powers. Non-reductive physicalists think that in order to show
that a higher-order theory is not reducible to a lower-level theory, it is sufficient to
show that the lower-level theory is not explanatory of it. The opponents insist that
more is required; in addition, it has to be shown that the higher-level theory ranges
over irreducible properties that confer irreducible causal powers onto the entities that
have or instantiate those properties.
Given that, one might think that the disagreement boils down to a disagreement
about the conditions for reduction. One might even think that there is no real
disagreement about whether psychology is reducible or not, because the two sides
deploy different conceptions of reduction. One side talks about theories and
149
explanations, the other side about properties and causal powers. One may think, in
other words, that the opponents are talking past each other.
But I do not think that this is a correct diagnosis of the situation. What the
opponents of non-reductive physicalism insist on is an additional criterion for a
theory’s being irreducible. There is some agreement about what reduction is and what
the criteria for reducibility and irreducibility are. What both sides can agree on is that
the criteria deployed by non-reductive physicalism are necessary for reduction. And
what is contentious, it seems, is the following principle concerning irreducibility.
(R1) A higher-level theory T is irreducible only if T ranges over properties that
are causally relevant and irreducible.
However, further below I will argue that R1 is not necessarily incompatible with non-
reductive physicalism. If that is correct, R1 cannot account for the disagreement.
Rather, what is responsible for the conflict must be R1 in conjunction with a principle
that says something like the following.
(R2) A causally relevant property P  is irreducible only if it confers an
irreducible causal power onto the entities that have or instantiate that property
(only if the entities in question have irreducible causal powers in virtue of
having or instantiating P).
So, why can non-reductive physicalists accept R1, and what can they say against R2?
Against R2, non-reductive physicalists may appeal to the status of the so-called
special sciences in general. Suppose that T is a well-established empirical theory that
is not reducible to physics, and that T ranges over entities that are physically realised.
By application of R1 we can say that T ranges over causally relevant and irreducible
properties, and by application of R2 we can say that the entities which have those
properties have irreducible causal powers.
But what does it actually mean to have irreducible causal powers? In the present
context, I can make sense of that claim only in the following way. To say that entities,
which are physically realised, have irreducible causal powers is to say they are
causally efficacious independently of and in addition to the physical entities that
realise them.67 If that is correct, then T is subject to the causal exclusion argument.
And since T has been selected randomly, we can generalise and conclude that all
                                                 
67 Note that the entities in question are mental events, and that to attribute causal powers to events is
somewhat inappropriate. To have a certain causal power, I take it, is to have a certain dispositional
property. And it seems that only objects or substances can possess dispositional properties. Therefore, I
shall interpret talk about the causal powers of events as talk about their causal efficacy.
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theories of the special sciences are subject to the causal exclusion argument—which
is absurd.
There are the following three obvious ways to avoid that conclusion. One may
deny R1, one may deny R2, or, thirdly, one may deny that there are irreducible
special sciences. I maintained—and below I will argue—that non-reductive
physicalists can accept R1. Given that, there is, in the absence of further argument, no
reason to reject R1. The choice, then, is between the second and the third option. The
choice, in other words, is between a contentious metaphysical principle and the claim
that there are no irreducible special sciences. I think there is good reason to reject the
metaphysical principle R2. There is considerable agreement that the special sciences
are autonomous, and that they are, therefore, not reducible.68 The opponent may
object that we might be wrong about that. Maybe we are not yet in a position to see
why and how all sciences are reducible to physics. But would that count in favour of
the third option? Would that count in favour of R2? I cannot see why. The fact that it
might turn out to be true that all special sciences are reducible does not give us reason
to believe in a metaphysical principle that leads, a priori, to the conclusion that all
special sciences are reducible. The reason why we should reject R2 is, then, the
following. We should reject R2, because we should reject a metaphysical principle
that entails that all special sciences are reducible. There is reason to believe that the
special sciences are not reducible, and the question of whether the special sciences are
reducible or not is, at least to a great extent, an empirical question, and not a
metaphysical one.
What is missing is an explanation of why non-reductive physicalism is not
necessarily incompatible with R1. According to R1, any irreducible theory must range
over irreducible properties that are causally relevant. What we need to know is in
virtue of what a causally relevant property is irreducible. R2 provides an answer to
that by appeal to irreducible causal powers. Having rejected R2, we need an
alternative account. The obvious alternative is to appeal to irreducible causal
regularities or laws. On such an approach, a property P is irreducible just in case the
formulation of an irreducible higher-order theory (including the formulation of the
                                                 
68 Compare for instance Dupré, 1993; Fodor, 1974; Owens, 1989; Antony & Levine 1997 and Polger
2004.
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relevant higher-level laws) must mention P.69 According to that, the irreducibility of
properties stems from explanatory power, rather than causal power.
However, one might still be puzzled by the suggestion that a higher-order theory,
which provides causal explanations, is irreducible due to its explanatory power, even
though it does not range over irreducible causal powers. I have suggested that the
opponent’s talk of irreducible causal powers is best understood as being about higher-
level events that are causally efficacious independently of and in addition to the
lower-level events that realise them. What is crucial at that point is to recall the
distinction between the extensional relation of causation and the intensional relation
of causal explanation. Given that distinction, it is certainly possible that there are
properties, which are causally relevant and irreducible in virtue of the explanatory
insight provided by theories that range over them, rather than in virtue of conferring
irreducible causal powers onto the entities that have or instantiate them. Consider the
following.70
Assume that there are two mental events m and m* such that we can explain the
occurrence of m* and m*’s having the higher-level property A by reference to m’s
occurrence and m’s having the higher-level property R. Assume further that m  is
realised by the physical events p1,…, pj; that m* is realised by the physical events
p1*,…, pk*; and assume that the causal process between m and m* consist of nothing
but causal chains leading from the pi’s to the pi*’s.
Given that, one is citing the causes of the pi*’s, if one is citing all the pi’s, and
one is thereby citing the causes of the physical events that realise m. From that it does
not follow that the particular instantiation of A—that is, the occurrence of m*’s being
A—can be causally explained by reference to the pi’s (or by reference to the complex
physical event that is constituted by the pi’s). That shows that it is possible that m’s
being R can causally explain something, namely an instantiation of A, that cannot be
explained by reference to m’s physical realisation.
                                                 
69 Compare for instance Antony and Levine, 1997. They say that a property is ‘real (or autonomous)
just in case it is essentially invoked in the characterisation of a regularity’ (p. 91). And they argue that
it does not follow that ‘real’ properties have ‘distinct causal powers’ (compare p. 92).
70 The following is inspired by David Owens, 1989. Owens argues that higher-level properties and
regularities cross-classify lower-level entities. The complex lower-level physical events that realize the
higher-level events are not explanatory, because from the perspective of the physicist they are like
‘shapeless fusions of physical events’ (p. 67).
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The opponent, I suppose, will object that the mental events and properties in that
scenario appear to be merely explanatory. All the real causal work, it seems, is done
by the physical events, and the mental events do not really make a difference.
However, it is a mistake to think that the mental events are merely causally
explanatory. Partly responsible for the underlying confusion, I think, is a
misconstruction of the model of levels of explanation. The levels of explanation, of
course, must be understood as different levels of description and abstraction, rather
than, literally, as different layers of the world. Let us have a look at the kind of figure
that is typically used to illustrate the problem of mental causation, which reflects that
misconstruction. In the following figure, p and p* are physical events and m and m*
are the mental events that are realised by them. The vertical lines stand for the relation
of realisation and the arrow stands for causation.
The mental events belong to the higher-level of mental explanation LM, and unless we
add another arrow from either m to p* or from m to m*, the mental event m appears to
be causally impotent. However, the account that I have presented looks rather
different. Consider the following figure that represents the scenario discussed above.
In that figure the circles capture the physical events, which realise the mental events
and the instantiations of mental properties. The levels of explanation are not pulled
apart, and the mental event m does not appear as causally impotent. The particular
occurrence of m and m’s being R is realised by the particular pi’s, and the causal
efficacy that is exercised by the pi’s is, ipso facto, exercised by m. The most important
thing to note is that the cause is the whole complex event on the left hand side, and
that the effect is the whole complex event on the right hand side. The cause is the pi’s
realising m’s being R. It would be a mistake to say that m is merely explanatory, or
that the pi’s alone do the causal work. Again, the cause is the pi’s realising m’s being
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R; hence, m’s being R causally explains and causes m*’s being A.71 But even though
the effect too is the whole complex event, it is possible that certain features of the
effect can only be explained by referring to certain features of the cause. It is,
therefore, possible that the explanatory insight gained by reference to the cause as a
mental event is not reducible; it is possible that m’s being R can causally explain
something—an instantiation of A—that cannot be explained by reference to m’s
physical realisation.72
Conclusion
My aim was neither to present a fully developed and detailed account of causalism,
nor to provide a full defence of causalism construed as non-reductive physicalism.
Rather, my aim was to contribute to a defence of causalism by showing that two main
obstacles—the coincidence problem and the causal exclusion argument—can be
overcome, no matter whether psychology is reducible or not. Both the suggested
solution to the coincidence problem and the response to the exclusion argument raise
further questions that are beyond the scope of this work. What has been shown,
though, is that with respect to both problems good suggestions and responses are
available to non-reductive physicalism.
What is important to note is that the presented considerations are not only in
defence of non-reductive physicalism, but that they are part of the overall argument
for causalism. I argued that the main advantages of causalism are, firstly, that it
provides an answer to the question how reasons influence or affect actions. And,
secondly, it gives an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the
relationship between reasons for actions and the causes of bodily movements. The
                                                 
71 According to non-reductive physicalism, the mental depends on and is determined by the physical.
The relation between the mental and the physical is usually specified more precisely in terms of
supervenience (compare chapter 2, p. 106, note 98). A plausible definition of supervenience should
capture that any agent, whose having a certain mental property is realised by having certain physical
properties, has that mental property necessarily; where the modality in question is metaphysical
necessity. Given that, it is not possible that the pi’s cause the pi*’s without realising m’s being R and
m*’s being A, respectively. For more on that see, for instance, Noordhof, 1999.
72 I should mention an alternative strategy available to non-reductive physicalists. I argued that non-
reductive physicalism is compatible with R1 (the claim that irreducibility of a theory requires that it
ranges over irreducible properties). Alternatively, non-reductive physicalists might reject metaphysical
speculation concerning the causal relevance and reducibility of properties altogether. In connection
with that, they might also deny that there are mental properties. Rather, the irreducibility of the mental
concerns only theories and their vocabulary. What is irreducible are not mental properties, but mental
concepts, predicates and, generally, sentences featuring intentional vocabulary.
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important point is that the suggested solution to the coincidence problem is not just
compatible with causalism, but it presupposes causalism. The central idea was that a
solution to the coincidence problem must show how the mechanisms described by the
lower-level theory preserve the causal architecture of the higher-level theory. That, of
course, presupposes that the higher-level theory describes a causal architecture. It
presupposes, in other words, that reason-explanations are causal explanations. Given
the absence of an alternative account of the relationship between reason-explanations
of actions and causal explanations of movements, we have not only defended
causalism, but we have provided reason to endorse it.
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Chapter Four: The Standard-Causal Model and
its Limits
In the first chapter I defended the reductive standard-causal account of agency against
non-reductive alternatives. Proponents of the non-reductive approach think that the
standard-causal theory cannot account for certain important aspects of human
agency—namely, that we can choose to act in the light of reasons, that we can do so
with free will, and that we are morally responsible for some of our actions. Against
that I argued that a non-reductive theory does not do better in accounting for any of
those abilities or aspects. The non-reductive theory, I argued, not only fails to account
for the required kind of control, but it fails to account for an agent’s exercise of
control altogether. In this chapter I will return to the notion of agential control and I
will respond to the more fundamental challenge that the reductive model cannot
account for agency at all. I will acknowledge the challenge, but I will deny that it
constitutes a genuine problem for the standard-causal theory. Provided that the theory
can account for an agent’s exercising control, as I will suggest, there is no reason to
think that the theory cannot capture the phenomenon of agency.
After that, I will address further issues and problems concerning the standard-
causal model, such as the problem of deviant causal chains, the question whether all
actions that are done for reasons are based on deliberation, and the question whether
the standard-causal model can account for all aspects of human agency. We will see
that the standard-causal model cannot account for the ability to act with libertarian
free will. I will argue, though, that we should nevertheless endorse the standard-
causal model of agency, and abandon instead the belief in our having free will.
The Challenge of Disappearing Agency
Some philosophers think that the reductive standard-causal approach fails to capture
the phenomenon of agency altogether. In his Free Action, A. I. Melden considers two
versions of the view that actions have causal antecedents. On the first version, actions
are bodily movements that have, as Melden says, a ‘complete causal explanation […]
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in terms of brain states, stimuli, muscle movements’, and so forth.1 Melden assumes
that causal explanations are grounded in strict causal laws, and that causes
necessitate—or causally determine—their effects. On the basis of that he argues that a
causal theory of action would not only render free and morally responsible action
impossible, since it entails that one could never have done otherwise. But, more
fundamentally, such a view would leave, as Melden says,
[…] no room for personal agency, [for] there is nothing in this account that is
‘my doing’ – I am a helpless victim of the conditions in my body and its
immediate physical environment.2
Then he turns to the view that the causal antecedents of actions are mental states and
events. According Melden, the fact that an action is caused by mental antecedents,
such as ‘volitions, desires, interests etc.’, does not help to render the causal theory of
action any more plausible. For even on that version of the causal theory, the agent is
no more than a victim of causal forces.
[What] I willed [was] not something I really willed and did, but something that
was made happen by my antecedent conditions, my mental condition, my
inclinations, my desires, motives, and so on. If these are the causal factors and if
these are subject to causal explanation in terms of antecedent psychological
factors, then whatever happens is none of my doing […].3
What Melden expresses here, it seems, is an intuition that we encountered in the first
chapter; namely, the intuition that actions are done or performed by the agent himself,
rather than being caused by agent-involving states or events. Melden says that the
‘self’ in any instance of self-governance cannot be identified with, or reduced to, any
arrangements of the agent’s mental states and events: ‘I am not any one of these
[psychological antecedent] factors, nor all of them’, and whatever is caused by them
is ‘not strictly speaking my doing’, because the behaviour they cause ‘can be
explained not by reference to my self, but to various events in the psychological
mechanism’.4
Melden’s challenge goes beyond the objections that were considered in the first
chapter insofar as it addresses agency as such, rather than aspects of agency—such as
acting for reasons and acting with free will. Further, Melden emphasises the point that
                                                 
1 Melden, 1961, p. 7.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
4 Ibid., pp. 8.
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both bodily movements and their mental antecedents, which are supposed to
constitute actions, are mere happenings. They are mere events that happen to or in the
agent, rather than things that are being done by the agent. If the causal theory is
correct, as Melden thinks, then
[…] each of us, myself included, as I survey the natural history of our [actions],
is a victim, witting or not, of these goings-on that make all the difference to
what, in our common and confused or downright mistaken way, we describe as
the things that people do.5
According to Melden, the very fact that the standard-causal model construes agency
in terms of events—and event-causal processes—renders it inadequate. An agent’s
performing an action is essentially a doing. It cannot be identified with, reduced to, or
explained by happenings—that is, events—or causal relations between them. Melden
does not deny that actions can appear as happenings. They can be described as
events, if we observe their ‘natural history’. But even if actions are—or appear
as—events from a certain perspective, in order to understand their nature as actions
we must assume a stance that recognises them as doings.
Thomas Nagel’s critique of the standard-causal model focuses on that last point.
Nagel thinks that actions disappear if we view them from the same standpoint that we
take towards phenomena of the ‘natural world’.
Something peculiar happens when we view action from an objective or external
standpoint. […] Actions seem no longer assignable to the individual agents as
sources, but become instead components of the flux of events in the world of
which the agent is a part. […] The essential source of the problem is a view of
persons and their actions as part of the order of nature, causally determined or
not. That conception, if pressed, leads to the feeling that we are not agents at all,
that we are helpless and not responsible for what we do.6
Nagel makes clear that the problem is not causal necessitation—or causal
determination. Rather, the problem is that the standard-causal theory assumes an
objective and external standpoint, which construes action as being part of the natural
order. Let us call that standpoint, which seeks to explain all concrete phenomena in
event-causal terms, naturalism.7
                                                 
5 Ibid.
6 Nagel, 1986, p. 110.
7 Arguably, that is only a minimal condition for what is otherwise known as naturalism. Naturalism,
typically, makes stronger claims in addition to that (compare, for instance, MacDonald, 1992, and
Pettit, 1992). However, in the context of action theory it is common to characterise naturalism in that
minimal way. Compare Velleman, 2000, p. 130 and Bratman, 2001, p. 312.
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Just like Melden, Nagel thinks that it does not matter whether the causal
antecedents of action are mental or, say, neuro-physiological in kind, because the
problem is that actions are construed as events, caused by other events.
[…] my doing of an act […] seems to disappear when we think of the world
objectively. There seems no room for agency in a world of neural impulses,
chemical reactions, and bone and muscle movements. Even if we add
sensations, perceptions, and feelings we don’t get action, or doing—there is
only what happens.8
The challenge presented by Melden and Nagel amounts to the following. The
naturalistic standpoint recognises only events and things that are associated with
event-causation and event-causal explanations.9 That standpoint does not and cannot
capture agency—actions, doings or activity. Understanding itself as being part of
naturalism, the standard-causal theory assumes that standpoint. Therefore, it cannot
capture the phenomenon of agency.10 Let us call that the challenge of disappearing
agency.11
Is there a Problem of Disappearing Agency?
The first question that we have to ask is whether that challenge constitutes a genuine
problem for the standard-causal theory. At the heart of Melden’s and Nagel’s
challenge is the claim that naturalistic theories cannot capture the phenomenon of
action or agency, because they recognise only happenings—that is, events. As far as
that general point is concerned, Melden and Nagel do not offer any argument. The
force of the challenge is merely intuitive, and from that alone it is not obvious that
they have identified a genuine problem for the standard-causal model of agency.
Proponents of the standard-causal approach may dismiss the challenge as
question-begging—or, simply, as beside the point. The standard-causal theory offers
an account of agency in the sense that it provides necessary and sufficient conditions
                                                 
8 Nagel, 1986, p. 111.
9 Things such as states or standing conditions, dispositions and the objects that possess them, facts and
states of affairs.
10 Compare also with what Bishop, 1989, calls the problem of natural agency: ‘the problem of natural
agency is an ontological problem—a problem about whether the existence of actions can be admitted
within a natural scientific ontology’ (p.40).
11 Mele, 2003, pp. 215 and Lowe, 2003b, section 1, talk about ‘the problem of disappearing agents’.
Lowe refers to Gideon Yaffe, 2000, who calls it the ‘Where’s the Agent Problem.’ The challenges of
disappearing agents and disappearing agency are very closely related, since agents are beings who
exercise agency. I will turn to a related challenge, which I will call the challenge of disappearing
agents, further below.
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for action—for an exercise of agency—to take place. If these conditions referred to
actions, doings or related agential phenomena such as an agent’s exercising control,
the account would be circular. Melden and Nagel dismiss the approach because it
mentions only events, causal relations and causal explanations, but no doings. But, of
course, necessary and sufficient conditions for action must not mention doings or any
other agential phenomena. What Melden and Nagel overlook is that the naturalistic
approach does not claim to provide an analysis of our concept of agency in standard-
causal terms, but conditions for the realisation of agency by event-causal processes.12
The challenge is therefore off target, and certainly it does not constitute a problem for
the standard-causal theory.
However, I shall not draw upon that response, since it is based on a rather
uncharitable reading of Melden’s and Nagel’s point. That reading makes a mockery
of the challenge of disappearing agency by reducing it to the claim that no event—or
event-causal processes—can constitute an action, because happenings are not doings.
Instead, I suggest a more charitable interpretation of the challenge in terms of control.
Whenever an action is performed, the agent exercises some kind of control.
According to Melden and Nagel, the naturalistic stance does not recognise agency.
From that perspective, agents appear as a mere locus where states and events take
place; they appear as beings that are subject to happenings, rather than as subjects of
control. On that reading, the challenge for the naturalistic approach is to show how an
agent’s exercise of control can be accounted for in standard-causal terms. The
challenge is, in other words, to explain why and how a particular causal
process—consisting of agent-involving states and events—constitutes agential
control. Note that this is merely a challenge, but not a problem for the naturalistic
approach. Melden and Nagel have not presented an argument to the conclusion that a
standard-causal account of control is untenable or incoherent. Rather, they have
presented intuitions, which show that it is difficult to see why and how a standard-
causal process can constitute control.
The appropriate response to the challenge, I propose, is to show that the standard-
causal model has resources to distinguish between causal processes that constitute
control and ones that do not. If that distinction can be drawn in standard-causal terms
                                                 
12 Bishop, 1989, makes that point in his defence of the event-causal theory of action; compare
especially pp. 177-180.
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only, then the standard-causal theory can, in effect, account for control. Opponents
might complain that this response is unsatisfactory, because it will refer only to
happenings. By making that point, though, they would commit themselves to the
uncharitable—and question-begging—reading of the challenge, which they should
dismiss rather than endorse. Let us turn, then, to the standard-causal account of
agential control.
Agential Control
It seems obvious that an agent who acts for reasons exercises agential control.
According to the standard-causal model of agency, acting for reasons requires that the
action is caused and rationalised by some of the agent’s mental states and events—it
requires, in other words, that the action is caused by reason-states. However,
rationalisation and mere causation is not sufficient. Reason-states must cause actions
in the right way, which is highlighted by examples involving so-called deviant—or
wayward—causal chains. The possibility of deviant causal chains constitutes a
serious and difficult problem for the standard-causal theory of action. In the next
section I will argue that this problem can be solved. The solution to that problem
completes the standard-causal account of acting for reasons, and it provides, thereby,
a standard-causal account of agential control. However, the solution that I shall
propose will not only complete the account of acting for reasons, but it will also help
us to see why that account provides us with an account of control in event-causal
terms. It will therefore be useful to anticipate some aspects of the problem and its
solution.
Typically, an argument from deviant causal chains against the standard-causal
approach is presented in forms of examples in which all the standard-causal
conditions are satisfied, but in which it seems obvious that the agent does not perform
an action at all (or in which it seems obvious that the agent does not perform the
action intentionally). Such examples are therefore presented as counterexamples to
the standard-causal model of action (or intentional action). Consider, for instance,
Davidson’s much-discussed climber example, which introduces the most basic—and
most troublesome—type of causal deviance.
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the
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rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might
so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold […].13
The climber’s belief and desire cause and rationalise his loosening the hold on the
rope. But, obviously, the climber does not perform an action at all, let alone the action
of loosening his hold on the rope intentionally or for reasons. Hence, causation and
rationalisation by reason-states is not sufficient for agency.
It is generally agreed that the standard-causal theory must exclude such cases—it
must require that reason-states cause movements in the right or non-deviant way.14 In
the example, the reason-states cause the bodily movement, but not directly. Rather,
there is a causal chain from the reason-states to the movement that runs through a
state of nervousness, which renders it false that the agent performs an action. It is that
causal intermediary—that state of nervousness, which links the reason-states and the
movement—that renders the causal pathway deviant. The agent, it seems, fails to
perform an action, because the agent’s reason-states cause the movement via that
intermediary state.
According to the solution that I endorse, cases of causal deviance can be
excluded by requiring that the bodily movement is guided by and responsive to the
relevant reason-states—rather than being merely caused by them. I will show, firstly,
that the notions of guidance and responsiveness are compatible with the reductive
standard-causal approach, and secondly, that requiring guidance and reason-
responsiveness solves the problem of causal deviance. In cases like the climber
example, for instance, the bodily movement is not a response to the climber’s reason-
states, but to his nervousness. By requiring reason-responsiveness the standard-causal
model can accommodate examples of that type.
What emerges is a plausible and informative account of agential control in terms
of non-deviant causation by agent-involving reason-states.15 There are two things to
                                                 
13 Davidson, 1980, p. 79.
14 Goldman, 1970, argued that the problem of characterising non-deviant causal pathways is an
empirical problem. It is, though, now agreed among virtually all proponents of the standard-causal
model that the problem of deviant causal chain is a philosophical problem (Goldman acknowledged
that it is a problem—he merely denied that it is one for philosophy). Proponents of the standard-causal
model who acknowledge the philosophical problem include Bishop, 1989, chapters 4 and 5; Davidson,
1980, pp. 232-233; Mele, 2003, 51-63; Brand, 1984, chapter 1; Enç, 2003, chapter 4; Peacocke, 1979;
Searle 1983, chapters 3 and 4; Thalberg 1984.
15 It is the agent himself who is in control insofar as the movements issue from his own reason-
states—insofar they issue from what the agent himself desires, believes, values, intends, and so forth.
There may be problems with mental attitudes that the agent has not acquired in a normal or appropriate
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note. Firstly, given the outlined model of acting for reasons, we get a clear sense as to
why that provides an account of control. According to the standard-causal model, an
action is done for reasons only if it is caused, guided by and responsive to some of the
agent’s reason-states. We can understand why an agent whose action is guided by and
responsive to what she desires, believes and intends exercises agential control by
performing that action. Secondly, it seems plausible to say that states such as
nervousness and agitation render causal pathways deviant, because they undermine
the agent’s control. The climber, for instance, is not performing an action, because his
loosening the hold on the rope is triggered by something—his nervousness—over
which the agent has no or only insufficient control, and the causal pathway is deviant,
because it runs through that control-undermining state. A solution to the problem of
causal deviance excludes such cases, and it thereby excludes control-undermining
states. Given the suggested solution, then, guidance by and responsiveness to reason-
states excludes control-undermining states.
Given all that, we can conclude that the standard-causal model has the resources
to distinguish between an agent’s having control and an agent’s lacking control, and
that it can, therefore, account for an agent’s exercise of control. The standard-causal
model can explain what control consists in and how it is realised by event-causal
processes only.16 That shows, then, that agency does not disappear from the
naturalistic stance of the standard-causal model, since agential control does not
disappear from that stance.
Acting, and Acting for Good Reasons
Opponents may find objectionable that the offered account of control is restricted to
acting for reasons. Why should one think that an agent is exercising control only
when he is acting for reasons? The offered account is implausible, because it is overly
                                                                                                                                            
way (but through brainwashing, for instance). It may be that additional conditions on ownership
(conditions that specify in virtue of what a given attitude is the agent’s own attitude) are necessary for
moral responsibility and autonomous action. But for an exercise of a basic kind of control it seems
sufficient that the mental states are the agent’s own in the plain sense that the agent is the subject of
those attitudes—or that the agent instantiates them.
16 The proposed response to the challenge of disappearing agency bears similarities to a well-known
compatibilist strategy. Incompatibilists about free will hold that the existence of free will stands and
falls with the truth of causal determinism: if causal determinism is true, we do not have free will, and if
we have free will, causal determinism is false. A standard compatibilist strategy is to point out that
their opponents ignore important distinctions that can be made with respect to different kinds of causal
connections. In particular, we can distinguish between deterministic causal processes that undermine
freedom (processes that constitute coercion or compulsion, for instance), and ones that do not.
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rationalistic. We are capable of performing actions voluntarily and spontaneously for
no reason whatsoever. Examples are actions such as scratching the back of one’s
head, drumming with one’s fingers or crossing one’s legs.17 Acting spontaneously,
agents exercise a kind of control that cannot be construed as guidance by and
responsiveness to reasons. Even if the proposal provides a correct account of acting
for reasons, it captures only rational agency, but not agency understood as the
capacity to act spontaneously.
In response to this objection I will offer a list of clarifications concerning the
standard-causal model of action. In the first chapter I characterised action as activity
that is intentional and rational in the sense that it is subject to rationalising
explanations. It is intentional in the sense that rationalising explanations describe it as
purposeful and goal-directed; they show that the agent intended to achieve some goal
or satisfy some desire by performing the act.18 It is rational in the sense that it appears
as intelligible in the light of some of the agent’s mental attitudes, which the
rationalising explanation appeals to. I called mental states and events that help to
rationalise the performance of some action reason-states, and I assumed that activity,
which is subject to true rationalising explanation, is action that is done for reasons.
Further, I pointed out that this characterisation goes hand in hand with the definition
of action in terms of its causal history, according to which an agent-involving event is
an action if and only if it is caused in the right way by agent-involving reason-states.
As it stands, then, the standard-causal model identifies action and agential control
with intentional action and intentional action with action that is done for reasons.
A first clarification concerns the notion of reasons for action and the
corresponding notion of acting for reasons. I pointed out that the employed notions of
                                                 
17 Compare for instance Ginet, 1990: ‘Many a time, for example, I have voluntarily crossed my legs for
no particular reason. No antecedent motive, no desire or purpose I expected thereby to serve, prompted
me to do it’ (p. 3).
18 To say that acting is intentional activity is, of course, not to say that all actions are intended or done
intentionally. By raising her arm, say, Sue scares away a fly. Sue may or may not have the intention to
scare away the fly. If not, it may still be true that Sue scares away the fly intentionally—say, in virtue
of expecting it as a side-effect. But it seems uncontroversial that scaring away the fly is something that
Sue does. Assume, then, that this action is neither intended nor done intentionally. That can be
accommodated in two ways. Assuming a coarse-grained theory of events, the action is intended and
done intentionally only under the description of being a raising of an arm. But scaring away the fly is
caused by her intention to raise her arm as the two acts are token-identical. Assuming a fine-grained
theory, Sue’s scaring away the fly is an action as it is generated by the raising of the arm, but it is not
intended and not done intentionally as it is not represented—as goal or as expected side-effect—in the
content of the intention that causes the arm’s movement. Compare Mele, 1997, pp. 233-234. For more
on intentional action see, for instance, Bratman, 1987, Mele and Moser, 1997 and Enç, 2003.
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reason and rationality are subjective or internal. What appears as rational in the light
of some of the agent’s attitudes may not be something that we would normally call
rational; an action that appears as rational in that internal and agent-relative sense
may well be irrational or unintelligible in an objective and agent-neutral sense.
Further, an action that appears as intelligible in the light of some of the agent’s
reason-states may be irrational in the light of all of the agent’s reason-states, as in
cases of weak-willed action. The same holds for the corresponding notion of reasons
for action, because acting for reasons is construed as action that is caused by reason-
states in a non-deviant way. That is, an agent may act for reasons in that internal and
agent-neutral sense even though there was no reason to perform the action (in the
circumstances) in an objective and agent-neutral sense of what there is reason to do.
Consider, for instance, Bernard Williams’s gin and tonic example.19 Sam wants a
gin and tonic and he believes that the glass in front of him contains some. In fact,
though, it’s not a gin and tonic, but a glass of petrol. Williams asks whether Sam has
reason to drink the stuff, and he notes that ‘there are two ways here’ to answer that
question. On the one hand, it is clear that Sam does not have reason to drink
it—clearly, he does not have reason to drink petrol. On the other hand, if he drinks it,
we can explain his action in terms of his desire and belief, and that explanation seems
to be a reason-explanation of his drinking the petrol. Now, I do not want to claim that
Sam has normative reason, nor do I want to deny that. All I am saying is that if Sam
drinks the stuff in the glass in front of him, then he acted for a reason in the agent-
relative sense, even though it may be wrong that he had normative reason to drink
it—reason in the objective or agent-neutral sense.
According to the standard-causal model, then, acting for reasons is not
necessarily acting for good or normative reasons. Some philosophers will protest
against that claim. They will insists that all reasons for action are good reasons for
action, because something is a reason only if counts in favour of something—only if
it points towards something that is good about something.20 I think, though, that this
attack is beside the point. As the gin and tonic example shows, some actions can be
rationalised even though there was no reason to perform that action. To say that such
actions are done for reasons is a plausible terminological stipulation, rather than a
                                                 
19 Compare, Williams, 1981, p. 102.
20 For instance, Dancy, 2000.
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substantial claim about normative reasons. Given that, it is entirely unproblematic to
distinguish between acting for reasons and acting for good or normative reasons.
The point of the first clarification is, then, that the claim that all acting is acting
for reasons does not entail that all acting is acting for good or normative reasons. It
means, rather, that all actions are caused in the right way by reason-states. Similarly,
to construe agential control in terms of acting for reasons is not to construe it in terms
of acting for good reasons.
The second clarification concerns reason-states—mental states and event that are
appealed to in rationalising explanations of actions. Proponents of the standard-causal
theory do not agree fully on which mental states and events are the ones that cause
and rationalise actions. The popular candidates are desires, beliefs, intentions, and
events of desire-, belief-, and intention-formation. The currently prevailing view is
that the proximate causal antecedent of every action is the formation of an intention.21
Often the formation of an intention is itself caused by other reason-states, such as
desires, beliefs or other intentions.22 In some cases the formation of an intention to act
may issue from a desire alone. Those are typically cases in which the agent has an
intrinsic desire to do something—that is, roughly, a desire to do something just for
sake of doing it or just because one feels like doing it. And in some cases, the
formation of an intention may not be caused by another reason-state at all, but may
issue directly from other mental events, such as perceptions. The sight of a chocolate
cake, as Mele suggests, may directly issue in the formation of an intention to buy one,
without any specific desire to do so and without any belief that buying a chocolate
cake serves some further purpose.23
                                                 
21 Compare Mele and Moser, 1997. David Velleman, for instance, describes ‘the standard story of
human action’ as follows: ‘[the agent’s] desire for an end, and his belief in the action as a means,
justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the
corresponding movements of the agent’s body’ (Velleman, 2000, p. 122). For detailed accounts and
versions of the view see Brand, 1984; Bratman, 1987; Mele 1992 and 2003; and Enç, 2003.
22 The claim that every action is caused by an intention seems to lead to a regress, if the acquisition of
an intention is itself an action—namely, the mental act of making a decision. For then the act of
forming an intention must as well be caused by the formation of another intention, which is, again, a
mental act. However, Mele, 2003, argues that we can distinguish between intentions that are acquired
passively and ones that are acquired actively by making a decision. Further, the claim is not that all
actions of, for instance, type A are caused by an intention to A. It says, rather, that all actions are caused
by some intention—it does not need to be an intention to A. Given that, proponents of the standard-
causal model can propose that every active formation of an intention—every decision—is partly caused
by a passively acquired intention to settle the practical question what to do (pp. 202-205).
23 Compare Mele 2003, p. 201.
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Given all that, it is clear that states and events of all three types—desires, beliefs,
and intention—can be reason-states. It is very controversial whether beliefs alone can
cause and rationalise action. But some desires and some intentions, it seems, can by
themselves rationalise actions. In particular, the performance of some actions may be
rationalised by referring to intrinsic desires or intrinsic intentions only. That
highlights another respect in which the employed notions of reasons and rationality
are minimal and agent-relative. Consider Sue’s drumming a rhythm with her fingers.
Given that this is motivated by an intrinsic desire to drum a rhythm, the action can be
rationalised by reference to that desire and it is done for that reason. The performance
of the action makes sense in the light of the desire, and it is done for that reason given
that it is by motivated it. Reason-explanations of actions of that kind seem banal,
superfluous, or ridiculous. But that, of course, is irrelevant to the question whether or
not such actions admit of reason-explanations. Explanations of such actions strike us
as banal or ridiculous, because they rationalise utterly insignificant movements, which
we virtually never have to explain or justify in everyday discourse. Nevertheless, it
may well be true that I scratched my head or crossed my legs, because I wanted to
relieve a minor discomfort and because I believed that performing those actions are
adequate means to that end.
Finally, the standard-causal model does not require that the agent attends to
performing the action for a reason. It does not require that the agent consciously or
reflectively deliberates about the action and the reasons in favour of it. The reason-
states may not be at the forefront of the agent’s mind, as it were, or they may even be
operative at a sub-conscious level. And it does not require that agents act for obvious
or transparent reasons—the reasons the agent acted for need not be transparent to the
agent himself, nor to others.
The point of the second clarification is, then, that spontaneous actions such as
scratching the back of one’s head, drumming with one’s fingers or crossing one’s legs
may well be done for reasons in the sense outlined. They may not be done for good or
normative reasons and they may not be done for any further reasons, in the sense that
they do not serve any further purpose. But that does not show that they are not done
for reasons in the subjective and agent-relative sense of being caused by reason-states.
It is, therefore, far from obvious that instances of spontaneous and merely voluntary
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actions exhibit a kind of control that cannot be captured as non-deviant
causation—guidance by and responsiveness to—reason-states.
Furthermore, even if there were voluntary and spontaneous actions, which are not
done for reasons in the sense explained and which involve a different kind of control,
it would not follow that the standard-causal model cannot capture the phenomenon of
agency, because it would not follow that it cannot capture agential control. Acting for
reasons is a kind of agency and agents who act for reasons exercise agential control.
Given that the standard-causal model can capture acting for reason, it can capture, at
the very least, a kind of agency and a kind of agential control. We can conclude, then,
that is has not been shown that there is a problem of disappearing agency for the
standard-causal theory, and that the challenge of disappearing agency can be met by
the standard-causal account of agential control construed as acting for reasons.
Agency As Such
The opponent may object to that last point that the challenge of disappearing agency
concerns the phenomenon of agency as such. If one interprets the challenge in terms
of agential control, then the offered notion of control must capture the phenomenon
agency as such, rather than some particular kind of agency.
My response to that is that there is no plausible interpretation of what agency as
such is. Agency, rather, is best understood as a family of different kinds of
agency—such as rational, deliberative or autonomous agency. In order to see that let
us consider whether we can make sense of the notion of agency as such.
Assume that we can reasonably well distinguish between human agency and
other animal behaviour. Agency as such could then be understood either as human
action in general, or as including animal behaviour in general—including human
action. The latter construal can be ruled out for two reasons. Firstly, most
philosophers, including Melden and Nagel, are primarily concerned with human
agency; usually they formulate their points using first- or third-person
statements—referring to themselves, their readers or to human agents in general.
More importantly, though, if we construe agency in that broad sense, the challenge
becomes very implausible. For then the proponents of the challenge are committed to
the claim that the behaviour of other animals—cats, flies, spiders or whatever you
like—cannot be captured in naturalistic terms, which is absurd. The first construal
also faces problems. If we construe agency as such as human agency in general, we
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are restricting the phenomenon to one kind of agency, which contradicts the spirit of
the objection. Far more importantly, though, we do not have a characterisation of
human agency as such. All attempts to distinguish between human and other animal
behaviour refer to some kind or aspect of agency, which is deemed distinctively
human—such proposals aim to identify a specific capacity or ability that distinguishes
us from other animals.
Agency, I suggest, is best broken down into kinds or aspects of agency.
Accordingly, questions and problems concerning agency are best broken down into
questions and problems concerning certain kinds of agency—such as purposive
behaviour, acting for reasons, deliberative action, reflective and self-controlled action,
autonomous and free action. This list of different kinds of agency, however, is more
than just a list; it is a hierarchy of kinds of agency. It begins with a very basic form of
agency—namely, purposive behaviour—and continues with more and more
sophisticated forms—rational action, deliberative action, and so on. It is a hierarchy
in the sense that an agent’s having—or being capable of—each of the subsequent
forms of agency presupposes that the agent is capable of the preceding, more
fundamental, forms of agency. For instance, being capable of acting for reasons
presupposes that one is capable of purposive behaviour, but not vice versa; being
capable of autonomous action presupposes that one is capable of deliberative action,
but not vice versa; and so forth. Most of those kinds of agency are distinctive of
human agency, including acting for reasons. But none of them can be identified with
human agency as such.
Is there a Problem of Disappearing Agents?
Michael Bratman and David Velleman are two contemporary proponents of the
standard-causal model of agency, who have addressed a problem for the theory that
is, apparently, related to the challenge of disappearing agency. In fact, some of their
statements suggest that they acknowledge that there is a problem of disappearing
agency. After introducing the central claims of the standard-causal theory in his paper
‘On What Happens When Someone Acts’, David Velleman identifies an apparently
serious flaw of the model. It fails, as Velleman says,
[…] to include an agent—or, more precisely, [it] fails to cast the agent in his
proper role. [According to the standard-causal model,] reasons cause an
intention, and an intention causes bodily movements, but nobody—that is, no
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person—does anything. Psychological and physiological events take place
inside a person, but the person serves merely as the arena for these events: he
takes no active part.24
Velleman, apparently, accepts the full force of the challenge of disappearing agency,
and he acknowledges that it constitutes a problem, which the standard-causal theory
must address and solve. In a fairly recent article, Michael Bratman addresses two
interrelated and open problems for the standard-causal theory. One problem is what
he calls the metaphysical problem of ‘agential authority’. Introducing the problem,
Bratman says that
[…] when a person acts because of what she desires, or intends, or the like, we
sometimes do not want to say simply that the pro-attitude leads to the action. In
some cases we suppose, further, that the agent is the source of, determines,
directs, governs the action and is not merely the locus of a series of happenings,
of causal pushes and pulls.25
In order to solve the problem of agential authority, Bratman suggests, the standard-
causal theory must show that the phenomenon of ‘agent- or self-determination’ can be
identified with or reduced to a complex ‘causal structure involving events, states, and
processes of a sort we might appeal to within a broadly naturalistic psychology.’26
Both Velleman and Bratman see themselves committed to the naturalistic
approach. In other passages both make clear that they do not accept the full force of
the challenge of disappearing agency. In fact, that is implicit in the quoted passage
from Bratman, where he says that the problem arises only sometimes. Sometimes, he
says, we want to say that the agent is the source of her actions, rather than just a locus
of events and causal pushes and pulls. In other passages he acknowledges that the
standard-causal model can capture what he calls ‘merely motivated behaviour’, which
is, after all, a kind of agency. The problem of agential authority, then, does not arise
with respect to all kinds of agency, but only with respect to what Bratman calls ‘full-
blown agency’, in which the agent determines the action.27
That is very similar to Velleman’s view. After saying that ‘nobody does
anything’ on the standard-causal account, Velleman introduces the notion of ‘human
action par excellence’.28 Velleman says he is interested in what distinguishes our
                                                 
24 Velleman, 2000, p.123.
25 Bratman, 2001, p. 311.
26 Ibid., p. 312.
27 Ibid.
28 Velleman, 2000, p. 124.
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conception of human action from our conception of other animal behaviour, and that
what he is trying to show is that the standard-causal theory
[…] describes an action from which the distinctively human feature is missing,
and that it therefore tells us, not what happens when someone acts, but what
happens when someone acts halfheartedly, or unwittingly, or in some equally
defective way.29
Taken literally, this passage is self-contradictory. Velleman says that the standard-
causal theory describes an action, yet it fails to provide an account of what happens
when someone acts. I take it that an agent who acts defectively still performs an
action. What Velleman must mean is that the standard-causal account is successful
only in describing some actions—namely, somehow defective or sub-excellent
ones—, but it fails to capture human action par excellence.
Velleman and Bratman think that they have identified a genuine metaphysical
problem for the standard-causal model. The rhetoric used in some passages suggests
that Velleman and Bratman acknowledge and address the problem of disappearing
agency.30 However, closer inspection shows that their primary aim is to reconcile the
naturalistic standard-causal approach with a special and distinctively human kind of
agency. The alleged problem is that the role that agents play in full-blown agency or
action par excellence is not captured by the standard-causal model—we might call
that the problem of disappearing agents.
Is there a problem of disappearing agents? What exactly is the problem? I will
argue that there is no such problem. The alleged problem has something to do with
the agent’s role in the performance of ‘full-blown’ agency. In order to make progress,
we first need to know what ‘full-blown’ agency—or ‘human action p a r
excellence’—consists in.
Identification and Autonomous Agency
Both Bratman and Velleman are interested in a higher and refined aspect of human
agency, which they characterise, partly, by opposing it to lower, defective, or
otherwise sub-excellent aspects of human agency. Both are influenced by the
philosophy of Harry Frankfurt and Frankfurt-style examples, which feature, typically,
                                                 
29 Ibid., my emphasis.
30 Berent Enç is a proponent of the standard-causal model who explicitly acknowledges that there is a
problem of disappearing agency; see Enç, 2003, especially pp. 133-137. I will discuss some aspects of
Enç’s proposal in the next section.
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the performance of an action that the agent does not want to do despite being
motivated to do it. The best-known example of that kind is the ‘unwilling addict’ who
is motivated to take a drug, even though he does not want to take it.31 In Frankfurt’s
terminology, such an agent has a first-order desire to take the drug and a second-order
desire that this first-order desire be not effective—by leading to action.
Generally, first-order desires are directed towards actions, objects or states of
affairs, and second-order desires are directed towards first-order desires and their
motivational efficacy. An agent S has a second-order desire either if S has a desire to
have—or cease to have—a certain first-order desire (to do or attain something), or if S
has a desire that a certain first-order desire be motivationally stronger or weaker than
it actually is. In case the agent has a second-order desire not to be motivated by a
certain first-order desire, as in the case of the unwilling addict, Frankfurt says that the
agent cannot identify himself with the first-order desire; in other passages Frankfurt
says the agent dissociates himself from having the desire or being motivated by it,
and that the agent is alienated from it.32
Bratman and Velleman agree with Frankfurt that examples of that kind highlight
an aspect of human agency that a comprehensive theory of action has to account for,
and they agree that the notion of identification is appropriate to capture that aspect.
But they also think that Frankfurt’s own reconstruction of the phenomenon in terms
of first- and second-order desires is seriously flawed and, ultimately, untenable. If that
is correct, then the problem is to provide an account of the notion of identification in
standard-causal terms—one that avoids the problems of Frankfurt’s construal in terms
of higher-order desires.
The problem with Frankfurt’s proposal is the following. The model introduces
second-order desires in order explain what it is for agent to identify himself with—or
dissociate himself from—the desires that motivate his actions. It says, roughly, that to
identify oneself with a first-order desire is to have the second-order desire that one be
motivated by that first-order desire.33 The problem is that it is possible to dissociate
oneself—to fail to identify oneself—with the second-order desire in question, for
                                                 
31 See Frankfurt, 1971, reprinted in Frankfurt, 1988, as essay 2.
32 See Frankfurt, 1988, essays 2, 5 and 12.
33 In fact, that is only one possible interpretation of Frankfurt’s early position, which he denied
explicitly later. But since that is the reading that both Velleman and Bratman take as the starting point
for their expositions, I shall assume it as well.
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second-order desires are themselves merely desires. To account for the fact that one
can identify oneself with the second-order desire, would require that there is a third-
order desire to have the second-order desire, and so forth.34
Given that, full-blown agency or action par excellence is action that issues from
desires with which the agent can identify herself, in the sense outlined. And the
problem is to account for the notion of identification in a way that is compatible with
the reductive standard-causal model. What is important to note, though, is that
Frankfurt’s primary aim was not to provide an account of identification. Rather, what
Frankfurt was interested in was to provide an account of autonomous and free action
and of the concept of a person. The account of identification was only instrumental
with respect to those to objectives. According to Frankfurt’s original position,
whether an agent acts freely and autonomously depends on whether the agent can
identify himself with the desires that motivate the action. And whether an agent is a
person or not depends on whether the agent has or is disposed to have second-order
attitudes towards her first-order desires—whether the agent, as Frankfurt says, cares
about by which desires her actions are motivated.
Given that, it is a mistake to think the problem to account for full-blown agency
or human agency par excellence constitutes a new and genuine metaphysical problem
for the standard-causal theory. The problem to provide an account of identification is
instrumental to solving traditional and well-known philosophical problems; namely,
to specify the conditions for autonomous agency and personhood. Velleman and
Bratman, we can conclude, neither address the fundamental worry expressed by
Melden and Nagel, nor have they identified a novel problem in the metaphysics of
agency.
Self-determination
The terms ‘full-blown agency’ and ‘action par excellence’ are not commonly used. It
is not entirely clear to me whether Bratman and Velleman think that full-blown
agency—or action par excellence—differs from autonomy in significant ways. The
fact that they introduce those terms suggests so. What seems clear, though, is that
full-blown agency has something to do with autonomy or self-determination.
                                                 
34 That was first pointed out by Watson, 1972. Compare also Bratman, 2001, p. 313 and Velleman,
2000, 132-135.
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Velleman claims that the problem, which he is trying to solve, is the fundamental
problem ‘of finding a place for agents in the explanatory order of the world.’35 When
a human agent performs a human action par excellence, then the behaviour, as
Velleman says, can be ‘traced back to the agent himself rather than occurrences
within him’.36 Similarly, Bratman says that sometimes we want to say that the agent
determines the action, rather than agent-involving states or events. Bratman aims to
specify the structure of psychological mental states and events—or the ‘psychological
functioning’, as he says—that is equivalent to a person’s being the ‘full-blown agent’
of an action.37 I think it does not matter whether full-blown agency—or action par
excellence—differs from autonomy. Because, no matter what kind of agency is under
consideration, it is misleading and unhelpful to characterise it in the way suggested by
Velleman and Bratman; namely by referring to the agent is its source. Let me explain.
I argued that there is no such thing as agency as such. Agency is best understood
as a family of certain kinds of agency that can be ordered as a hierarchy. Something
similar, I think, holds with respect to agents. Velleman and Bratman think that some
actions can be ‘traced back’ to the agent, and they seek to specify the agent’s role in
the production of such actions. But just as it is unhelpful to look for the phenomenon
of agency as such, it is unhelpful to look for the agent—him- or herself—or the
agent’s role or functioning in the performance of action. Consider again the offered
hierarchy of kinds of agency: purposive behaviour, acting for reasons, deliberative
action, reflective and self-controlled action, free and autonomous action. Clearly, in a
sense, each instance of behaviour, which falls under any one of those categories, has
an agent—a being that performs the behaviour. In that sense, each instance of
behaviour can be ‘traced back’ to an agent, and in each case we can specify the
agent’s role or participation. But that means that we cannot discriminate between
different kinds of agency by asking whether the behaviour in question can be traced
back to an agent. Maybe we can delineate human agency by asking whether a given
action can be traced back to a human agent? But that cannot be right either, because
most of the listed forms of agency are specifically human forms of agency—and they
can, therefore, be traced back to a human agent. What we usually do in order to
                                                 
35 Velleman, 2000, p. 127.
36 Ibid., p. 130.
37 Compare Bratman, 2001, p. 312.
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distinguish human forms of agency from other animal behaviour is to point out, or
refer to, some of the properties or abilities of human agents by virtue of which they
are capable of higher forms of agency—we do not refer to the fact that human actions
can be traced back to an agent. To ask whether the action can be traced back to an
agent or whether the agent plays a role in its performance strikes me as vacuous and
inadequate. (Obviously, it would be uninformative and circular to say that full-blown
actions or actions par excellence are actions that can be traced back to full-blown or
excellent agents.)
One may object that Velleman and Bratman do not literally refer to the agent
construed as a substance. Both Velleman and Bratman reject reference agent- or
substance-causation, and they see themselves committed to the reductive approach of
the standard-causal theory. Rather, when they talk about the agent, they mean some
structure of psychological states and events that occupies the role of the agent.38
That observation is correct. However, it does not affect my criticism. Both
Velleman’s and Bratman’s view can be understood as a continuation of Frankfurt’s
endeavour to account for free and autonomous action in terms—or partly in terms—
of identification. The aim of that project is to identify a structure of psychological
states and events, which constitutes an agent’s identifying himself with his operative
motives. If that reading of Velleman and Bratman is correct, then the problem they
are dealing with is to provide conditions for free and autonomous action. To introduce
the terms ‘full-blown agency’ and ‘agency par excellence’ is confusing and
unnecessary.
Far more important, though, is the following point. Take any structure, M, of
mental attitudes and relations between them, such that an agent’s being in M
constitutes or realises the agent’s identifying himself with an operative motive (or,
more generally, the exercise of a particular kind of agency).39 To identify parts of M,
or M as a whole, with the agent or the agent’s role in the production of action, it
seems to me, is a category mistake. If M constitutes or realises the agent’s identifying
himself with an operative motive, then it is the agent’s having—or being in—M that
constitutes or realises the phenomenon of identification (or the exercise of the kind of
                                                 
38 Compare Bratman, 2001, p. 312 and Velleman 2000, p. 137.
39 Consider, for illustration, Frankfurt’s original view, according to which an agent S identifies himself
with a motive m if and only if S has a higher-order attitude that favours m’s presence and motivational
efficacy.
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agency in question). Given that, it is a mistake to construe the question whether the
agent can identify himself with a motive as the question whether the agent stands in
the relation of identification with some of his motives. We can say of the agent that
he identifies himself with the motive, but we should not look for an agent within the
agent who does that—we should not look for an entity that stands in the relation of
identification with some of his attitudes.40 In other words, it would be a mistake to ask
whether identification can be ‘traced back’ to the agent, since identification is
constituted or realised by the agent’s being in the relevant structure of psychological
states and events. Similarly, it would be a mistake to characterise full-blown
agency—or action par excellence—by saying that it can be traced back to an agent,
since autonomous agency issues from the agent’s being in a psychological structure of
a certain kind—and neither a part nor the whole of that structure is identical with the
agent.
Deviant Causal Chains and Reason-Responsiveness
Most proponents of the standard-causal approach acknowledge that the possibility of
deviant causal chains constitutes a serious problem and that the plausibility and
success of the view depends on whether that problem can be resolved convincingly.41
In this section I will first say more about the connection between the problem of
causal deviance, acting for reasons, and agential control. Then I will introduce and
discuss different forms of causal deviance, and, finally, I will propose a solution,
which is based on guidance by and responsiveness to the contents of reason-states.
In the previous section we saw that the standard-causal theory can provide a
viable account of an agent’s exercise of control in terms of the agent’s being guided
by and responsive to reasons. It emerged that the problem of causal deviance is
related to the issue of providing an account of acting for reasons and agential control.
Examples such as Davidson’s climber show that the fact that an agent’s mental states
and events cause and rationalise a bodily movement does not guarantee that the agent
acts for reasons. Hence, the causal and rationalising relation is not sufficient for
                                                 
40 This mistake is particularly salient in Velleman’s position. Velleman says that the problem with
Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of agency forces us to ‘look for mental events and states that are
functionally identical to the agent’ (Velleman, 2000, p. 137).
41 Compare for instance Brand, 1984; Bishop, 1989; Davidson, 1980; Enç, 2003; Mele, 2003; Searle,
1983; Thalberg, 1984.
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acting for reasons. The same holds for action and agential control, because the
standard-causal model construes action and control in terms of acting for reasons.
Examples of basic deviance show that the fact that a movement is caused and
rationalised by reason-states is sufficient neither for action, nor for an agent’s
exercising control. What is missing, as I suggested, is that the movement is guided by
and responsive to the agent’s reason-states. According to that suggestion, to amend
the account of acting for reasons and agential control in the way outlined is to provide
a solution to the problem of basic deviance. That means that causation in the
right—that is, non-deviant—way is causation that meets the conditions of guidance
and reason-responsiveness.
Causal Deviance
It is common to distinguish between three different types of deviant causal chains in
the theory of action. Davidson’s climber example, which has been introduced above,
is a case of basic deviance, which is the most troublesome kind of causal deviance.
Besides that we can distinguish between consequential deviance and second-agent
deviance.42 The former is a second main category of causal deviance—along with
basic deviance—, whereas second-agent deviance can be treated as a special case of
basic deviance. In order to distinguish these two further kinds, I need to say more
about basic deviance.43
In all cases of deviance, some control-undermining state or event occurs between
the agent’s reason-states and an event produced by that agent. What distinguishes
cases of basic deviance is that the control-undermining event occurs between the
reason-states and an agent-involving event that would constitute a basic action.44
Davidson’s climber example is a case of basic deviance. The climber rids himself of
the weight and danger by loosening his hold on the rope. If the climber performed an
action, the movement of loosening his hold on the rope would be a basic act. The state
                                                 
42 I borrow the term ‘basic deviance’ from Bishop, 1989, p. 132, and the term ‘consequential deviance’
is taken from Brand, 1984, p. 23.
43 I may not do justice to all the subtleties of the phenomenon of deviance in action theory. It may be
possible to introduce some further sub-categories that require modified responses. The exposition,
though, covers the standard cases of deviance, and with basic deviance it covers the most important
and most troublesome kind of causal deviance. I take this to be sufficient to show that the problem of
causal deviance can be resolved convincingly.
44 For the notion of basic action see chapter 1, pp. 18.
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of nervousness that undermines the agent’s control occurs between the climber’s
reason-states and that movement, which would be a basic action.
In the case of consequential deviance, the control-undermining states or events
occur somewhere between a basic action and some action—or outcome—that the
agent intended or wanted to perform—or bring about—by performing the basic act.
Consider the following standard example. A sniper has the intention to kill an enemy
by shooting him. He carries out the intention, but misses. By producing the noise of
the shot, though, he stampedes a herd of wild pigs, which trample the poor enemy to
death.45 In such cases the agent performs a basic action intentionally, for reasons, and
the agent is in control as far as that basic action is concerned. The deviance occurs
later and it affects an action or outcome that the agent wanted to bring about by
performing the basic action. These cases are thought to constitute counterexamples,
because the agent’s end is not to perform the basic action. The sniper’s end is to kill
the enemy; he intends to do so, and the intention causes the enemy’s death. According
to a simple standard-causal theory, the sniper does not only perform the action of
firing the shot intentionally and for reasons, but he also kills the enemy intentionally
and for reasons. The former is true, but the latter, it seems, is clearly false. Hence, the
standard-causal theory has got it wrong.
Cases of second-agent deviance are special cases of basic deviance, as control is
undermined by interference between the agent’s reason-states and the movement that
would be a basic act. Second-agent deviance occurs when control is undermined not
by states or events, but by another agent. Harry Frankfurt has presented a much-
discussed example, which fits exactly this description, in order to make a point about
moral responsibility.46 The agent, Jones, is about to decide whether to vote for one of
the two presidential candidates. Unbeknownst to Jones a gifted neuroscientist, called
Black, has implanted a device in Jones’ brain by virtue of which he can detect what
Jones is going to decide and influence his actions, if he wishes to do so. Jones, it
seems, it not fully in control, no matter whether Black intervenes or not. And it seems
that the causal pathway is deviant—at least in those cases in which Black intervenes.
                                                 
45 Compare Bishop, 1989, p. 126, who has taken this example from Daniel Bennett. For another much
discussed example of that kind see Chisholm, 1966.
46 Frankfurt, 1969, reprinted in Frankfurt, 1988, essay 1.
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Let us consider first a standard way of dealing with consequential deviance. What
goes wrong in cases of consequential deviance is that the intended action or outcome
is not brought about according to plan. The sniper intends to kill the enemy in a
certain way; namely, by shooting him, not by having him trampled to death. The
standard-causal model can accommodate cases like that by requiring that actions are
guided by the contents of the relevant reason-states. In cases of consequential
deviance, the agent has a certain action-plan that is incorporated in the contents of the
relevant reason-states. In the example, the action-plan consists in the intention to kill
the enemy by shooting him. To say that the performance of the action must be guided
by the intention is to say, simply, that the way in which the intended end is brought
about must be in accord with the agent’s action-plan, which is incorporated in the
content of the intention.47 The notion of guidance can be accounted for in causal
terms, if it is granted that the intentional contents of reason-states and events can be
causally relevant. Guidance by reason-states can then be construed as causation by
reason-states in virtue of their contents. A bodily movement, for instance, is in that
way guided by reason-states, because the reason-state’s content is causally relevant as
to whether that particular movement occurs, rather than another one or no movement
at all.48 Requiring guidance by reason-states, the standard-causal model can exclude
cases of consequential deviance.49
                                                 
47 For a summary account of the role of action-plans in intentional action see, for instance, Mele and
Moser, 1997.
48 Consider, for instance, guidance by an intention—by an agent’s having or acquiring an intention.
The simplest form of an action-plan, which is part of the content of an intention, consists of a
representation of the intended action; a representation of which type of action is to be performed. In
most cases, though, the action plan specifies by what means—by the performance of which type of
act—the intended or desired end should be attained. An act-token is then guided by an intention if,
firstly, it either instantiates the intended act-type or if it instantiates an act-type that is specified as a
means to the intended end, and, secondly, if it is caused by the intention in virtue of its content—which
incorporates the action-plan.
49 Many have argued that the causal connection between reason-states and the action must be sustained
or continuous—at least in some cases where the agent’s exercise of control is a process that takes as
long as the performance of the action itself. Compare for instance Bishop, 1989; Mele, 2003; Thalberg,
1984; Searle 1983. The standard way of accommodating such cases is to say that the guidance function
of intentions—or reason-states in general—can be sustained or continuous. That requires that the agent
is having the intention as long as the execution of the action takes—which seems unproblematic. The
causal relation between such an intention and the action might be construed as sustained or continuous
causation. But it can, more plausibly, also be construed as a series of feedback loops between
behaviour and intention. That means, very roughly, that the causal pathway would incorporate a
mechanism that adjusts, at certain time-intervals, the execution of the action in accordance with the
content of the intention. Compare for instance Bishop, 1989, pp. 170-171 and Mele 2003, pp. 56-58.
Further, cases in which the agent must improvise cause complications—either because the plan is not
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Basic Deviance and Reason-Responsiveness
To refer to the guiding role of the contents of reason-states helps only when the agent
has an action plan that covers the event that would have been an action, had the
pathway not been deviant. That is why it helps only in cases of consequential
deviance. Consider again Davidson’s climber. He wants to rid himself of the weight
and danger and believes that loosening his hold on the rope is a way of doing so. He
does not have a further belief how to loosen his hold; he does not have a belief
concerning what means are necessary, appropriate or best for loosening his hold,
because loosening the hold is a basic act. We do not need to plan basic actions,
because we do not have to know how or by what means to bring them about. We just
do them; that is why they are basic. And that is why reference to guidance by reason-
states does not help with basic deviance.50
It has been pointed out that an action that is done for a reason is a response to
that reason; action that is motivated by reasons is responsive or sensitive to reasons.51
In the previous section I have outlined how the requirement of reason-responsiveness
can help to handle examples of basic deviance. I will argue now, firstly, that the
problem of basic deviance can in fact be solved by requiring reason-responsiveness,
and, secondly, that the notion of reason-responsiveness is compatible with the
standard-causal model.
The reason why the causal pathway in the climber example is deviant seems to be
that the movement is merely caused by the reason-states—the movement is not a
response to the reasons qua reasons. The relevant events in that example are
following: the agent’s having the reason-state (say, the intention to rid himself of the
weight and danger), the agent’s being nervous, and the agent’s movement of
loosening the hold on the rope; call these events r, n and m. In the actual scenario r
causes n, and n causes m. What will be relevant to an explanation of why the causal
pathway is deviant are the following three facts. Firstly, m is caused by an event, n,
which undermines the agent’s control. Secondly, n does not rationalise m, but is
caused by an event that rationalises m. And thirdly, the fact that m is caused and
rationalised by an appropriate reason-state, r, is a coincidence—because it is a
                                                                                                                                            
specific enough or because things are not going according to plan. Brand, 1984, and Bishop, 1989,
show that the guidance condition can be refined as to accommodate such cases.
50 Compare Bishop, 1989, pp. 132-134.
51 Compare, for instance, Audi, 1997; Bishop, 1989; Peacocke, 1979; Stoutland, 1998b.
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coincidence that n causes the type of movement that is rationalised by m. Basic
deviance is possible because coincidences of that kind are possible.
Proximate Causation
A first strategy to solve the problem of basic deviance is to require proximate
causation. It says that intentions are the proximate or immediate causal antecedents of
all actions, and it excludes control-undermining states by excluding all causal
intermediaries between reason-states and actions.52 (Note that it would be problematic
to exclude only control-undermining states and events, because we must explain
agential control in terms of non-deviant causation.)
Bishop has dismissed that strategy for the following reason. Intentions, Bishop
claims, ‘as realised in central neural states will never be causally proximate to the
bodily movement that matches them’.53 There will be a causal chain of physiological
events that results in the movement, and the most the proximity strategy can require is
that the intention initiates that chain. But that, of course, does not solve the problem,
because that causal chain may run through a state or event that undermines control.
That objection, however, is flawed as it confuses levels of explanation. The
requirement that intentions must be proximate causes of action is a requirement at the
level of psychological description and explanation. It may well be—and it is almost
certainly the case—that a causal relation between two intentional events is realised at
the neuro-physiological or physical level by a far more complex chain or pattern that
involves a multitude of events. But that does not show that the intention cannot be the
proximate mental antecedent of action.54
The proximity strategy, however, is unsatisfying in one important respect. I said
that the problem in the climber case is that the bodily movement is merely caused by
the reason-state, rather than being a response to it. The proximity solution ensures that
bodily movements, for instance, are caused and rationalised in a way that constitutes
agential control. But it does not show that the bodily movement is a response to the
reason-state qua reason-state; it does not show that the reason-state causes the bodily
movement because it is a reason-state. The reason-state causes and rationalises the
action, but the reason-state’s rationalising the action seems to be irrelevant to its
                                                 
52 Compare, for instance, Brand 1984, Mele and Moser, 1997.
53 Bishop, 1989, p. 139.
54 Compare Wedgwood, forthcoming, section 3.
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causing it. The proximity strategy establishes agential control by excluding all causal
intermediaries—which excludes, trivially, all control-undermining intermediaries. But
it does not establish control as reason-responsiveness.55
The Counterfactual Strategy
A second strategy for solving the problem of basic deviance attempts to capture the
notion of reason-responsiveness in counterfactual terms. Let us consider again the
climber example and assume that in the actual scenario the climber has the intention
of ridding himself of the weight and danger by loosening his hold on the rope
now—at time t. And consider a possible scenario in which the climber intends to rid
himself of the weight and danger by loosening his hold on the rope not now, but
shortly—at t’. Other things being equal, that intention would unnerve the climber just
as in the actual scenario, and we can assume that the climber’s nervousness would
cause the loosening of the hold on the rope now—just as in the actual scenario. We
can see, then, that the agent’s movement in the actual scenario is not reason-
responsive, in the sense that the climber would not have performed a different action,
had he had a slightly different reason-state—an intention that calls for a performance
of the loosening of the rope at t’ rather than at t. Given that, it seems that an
appropriate counterfactual condition can solve the problem of basic deviance.
Consider as a first and rough approximation the following condition, taken from
Berent Enç’s recent treatment of the problem of causal deviance.
(CC) If the content of the intention had been different, the action would have
been different correspondingly.56
The required correspondence between the intention’s content and the action consists
in a match between the type of the basic act performed by the agent and the type of
basic act specified in the content of the intention. So, had the agent intended to B,
rather than A, then the intention would have caused a bodily movement that is, or
constitutes, an action of type B (and had the agent intended to bring about the end E
by performing the basic act B, rather than by performing A, the agent’s intention
                                                 
55 Another worry is that the proximity strategy is ad hoc, as it simply excludes what is responsible for
the problem. But there is independent plausibility to the claim that all actions are preceded and
accompanied by the agent’s having or forming an intention. Searle, for instance, argues on
phenomenological grounds that every overt action consists of a bodily movement and what he calls an
‘intention-in-action’ that causes the movement (1983, chapter 3).
56 Compare Enç, 2003, p. 103, who adapts the condition from Bishop, 1989, p. 150.
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would have caused a bodily movement that is, or constitutes, an instance of B, rather
than A). Had the climber intended to rid himself of the weight and danger shortly, the
nervousness would nevertheless have caused his loosening the hold now. That is, his
action would not have been different correspondingly. The counterfactual condition is
not satisfied, and the climber case fails, therefore, to constitute a counterexample.57
Note that the counterfactual strategy captures the notion of reason-responsiveness
satisfactorily. Reason-states are rationalising states; they are states in the light of
which the performance of some action appears as intelligible. In particular, the
performance appears as intelligible in the light of the contents of reason-states. If Sue
intends to A, then her B-ing appears as intelligible in the light of the fact that Sue
believes that B-ing is conducive to A-ing—Sue’s B-ing appears as intelligible in the
light of the content of that belief. CC requires that actions co-vary with the contents of
intentions, and that captures the intuition that actions, which are done for reasons, are
responsive to reason-states qua reason-states.58
The problem with that approach is that it is conceivable that an agent is reason-
responsive only in the actual scenario. Consider an agent, S, whose arm is replaced by
a prosthetic device that is suitably connected to nerve endings of S’s nervous system.
The only movement that the device can perform—at the time t—is a movement of
type M. Assume that M-ing is intrinsic to A-ing and that S A-s at t because S intends to
attain E by A-ing at t. Had, for instance, S intended to attain E by B-ing, then the
action would not have been different correspondingly, under the assumption that B-
ing requires a different movement of the prosthetic device. That example does not
satify CC, but S’s attaining E by A-ing at t may nevertheless be reason-responsive:
whether or not the action in the actual scenario is reason-responsive is independent of
                                                 
57 Reason-responsiveness certainly does not require that CC holds for all possible worlds. The climber
example suggests that the relevant worlds are close worlds in which the motivational component of the
climber’s intention and part of its content are being held constant (compare Bishop, 1989, pp. 148-
150). Further we held constant the circumstances and the climber’s disposition to get nervous in the
circumstances. Compare Haji, 1998, who specifies which features must be held constant in those
alternative scenarios that are relevant to agential control (see pp. 80-82).
58 Bishop, 1989, and Enç, 2003, think that the counterfactual strategy is subject to counterexamples in
which another agent undermines the agent’s control in the relevant alternative scenarios. An example
of that kind is the above-mentioned Frankfurt example (Frankfurt, 1988, essay 1). However, the
counterfactual strategy can avoid such counterexamples by holding constant the causal mechanism that
is operative in the actual scenario and by changing the condition as follows: had the content of the
intention been different and had the actual mechanism been operative, the action would have been
different correspondingly (compare with the discussion of Frankfurt-style examples in Fischer and
Ravizza, 1998). The remaining difficulty, which is not insurmountable, is to specify in virtue of what a
mechanism is the same or a different mechanism.
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whether the operative causal mechanism responds to reason-states in alternative
scenarios.
Causation in Virtue of Content
The third strategy is a response to the original objection. In the climber example the
reasons merely cause and rationalise the performance of the bodily movement. What
renders the pathway deviant is the state of nervousness, which undermines the agent’s
control and renders it a coincidence that the reason-states cause and rationalise the
bodily movement. What has been overlooked, though, is that the standard-causal
model not only requires that mental states rationalise and cause actions, but also that
they causally explain them. In the example, the reason-states explain the movement in
some sense—but not in the sense required. The reason-states cause the nervousness,
and the nervousness causes the movement. In the circumstances, had the agent not
had the reason-states, the bodily movement would not have been performed. In that
sense, the reason-states are causally explanatory of the movement. However, the
theory requires that reason-states cause and causally explain actions in virtue of their
intentional content. That requirement is clearly violated in the climber example. The
statement of the problem presupposes that the relation of causation is transitive. The
reason-states cause the movement, because they cause the nervousness, which causes
the movement. But the reason-states do not cause the movement in virtue of their
content, because the nervousness, trivially, does not cause the movement in virtue of
content. In that case, the question of whether the relation of causation in virtue of
content is transitive does not even arise, because the nervousness does not cause the
effect in virtue of content. Accordingly, the reason-states do not explain the
occurrence of the particular movement in virtue of their content—why that particular
type of movement occurred, rather than another, cannot be explained by reference to
the contents of the reason-states. Subsequently, the question of whether the relation of
being explanatory in virtue of content is transitive does not arise, because the
nervousness is not explanatory in virtue of content. In other words, if we consider the
pathway from the reason-states to the movement, the relation of causation holds and it
is transitive, but both the relation of causation in virtue of content and the relation of
being explanatory in virtue of content break down.
That solves the problem of basic deviance and it captures the notion of reason-
responsiveness. Being caused and causally explained in virtue of content, the action is
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not merely a response to a cause, but it is a response to a reason-state qua reason-
state; it is a response to the content of the mental state in the light of which its
performance appears as intelligible.
Conclusion
I outlined a solution to the problem of consequential deviance and I presented three
different solutions to the problem of basic deviance—which are three solutions to
second-agent deviance, as I assumed that second-agent deviance is a special case of
basic deviance. I expressed reservations with respect to the first and the second
proposal. It is important to note, though, that the three proposals are not exclusive;
they are not incompatible and they are not rival proposals. In particular, a standard-
causal theory may require that reason-states proximately cause and causally explain
actions in virtue of their content. That solves the problem of basic deviance and it
captures the notion of reason-responsiveness.
Acting for Reasons and Deliberative Action
As it stands, the standard-causal theory says that non-deviant causation by reason-
states is necessary and sufficient for acting for reasons. Some philosophers think,
though, that acting for reasons requires that the action is based on—or that it results
from— practical deliberation. They think, in other words, that all acting for reasons
is, necessarily, deliberative acting for reasons. In this section I will discuss and reject
Berent Enç’s arguments for that position.
Enç is a proponent of the standard-causal approach. According to his theory,
every action is based on an intention, and every intention is based on a practical
deliberation in which the agent considers alternative courses of action and assesses
the reasons for and against them. The functioning and realisation of that process, as
Enç shows, can be construed in standard-causal terms only.59
Now, it is certainly not obvious that acting for reasons presupposes deliberation.
Quite to the contrary, one may argue on intuitive or phenomenological grounds that
Enç’s reconstruction of what acting for reasons consists in is obviously false.
Experience tells us that on many occasions when we act for reasons, we do not
engage in deliberation. We can certainly distinguish between actions that are merely
                                                 
59 Enç, 2003, especially chapter 5.
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done for reasons and ones that are preceded by an evaluative process in which one
assesses or weighs the reasons for and against certain courses of action. Often it is
obvious what one should do, often we do it out of habit, and sometimes there is
simply not the time to assess the pros and cons. In all such cases our actions are not
based on deliberation, but we may nevertheless act for reasons. Such considerations
are not decisive. But they show that the proponents of the deliberative model must
motivate their view, as it lacks intuitive appeal.
Purposive Behaviour and Acting for Reasons
What motivates Enç to defend a deliberative model of acting for reasons?
Interestingly, Enç thinks that the theory provides a response to what I have called the
challenge of disappearing agency. He says that a hard ‘problem for a causal theorist
of action is to persuade the sceptic that a coherent concept of agency or control can be
located in mere event causation.’60 According to Enç, that problem can be formulated,
or expressed, in two ways. The first formulation is basically the one that we have
encountered discussing Melden and Nagel:
If an agent’s action is the causal consequence of a series of events, then what
sense can one give to the notion of that the action’s being under the agent’s
control?61
The second formulation uses a comparison between acting for reasons and a less
sophisticated form of behaviour. Enç considers the dive performed by a moth in order
to escape a predator. The behaviour, we assume, is caused by the reception of an
input, which indicates the advance of a predator, in conjunction with the moth’s
disposition to perform a dive in the circumstances. Comparing the two kinds of
behaviour, Enç says the following:
Certainly, the moth does not have the proper kind of choice or control over its
dives. So the causal theorist ought to be able to say what it is that separates
rational agents from the moth. And apart from pointing to the complexity of the
mechanism in rational agents, which is just a quantitative difference, not a
qualitative one, the causal theorist cannot in principle have any resources with
which to do this.62
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 133.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 136.
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The behaviour of the moth, as Enç points out, is purposive. The moth performs the
dive in order to escape predation. But the moth, of course, does not dive for that
reason. Enç thinks that this difference is a qualitative one, and he aims to account for
it in standard-causal terms only.
Without going into much detail, I will in the following outline some of the central
features of Enç’s causal theory of deliberation. Then I will argue that Enç’s aim and
motive to account for control and for the qualitative difference between purposive
behaviour and acting for reasons does not support the claim that all acting for reasons
is based on deliberation. (In the following one must bear in mind that according to
Enç an account of the kind of control exercised by rational agents and an account of
the qualitative difference between purposive behaviour and acting for reasons is one
and the same thing.)
Enç’s Causal Theory of Deliberative Action
According to Enç, the crucial difference between acting for reasons and purposive
behaviour is that an agent who acts for reasons has beliefs of a particular kind, which
play a distinctive causal role in the process that leads to action. The beliefs in question
have a conditional content of the form ‘if under certain circumstances a certain type
of action is performed, it is likely that a certain type of result will obtain’. What plays
the mentioned distinctive causal role are the consequents of such conditional beliefs;
for an agent to act for reasons, the consequents must, as Enç says, enter in into the
causal mechanism as separate units.63
This sub-theory concerning the detachability and efficacy of the consequents of
conditional beliefs is at the heart of Enç’s causal theory of deliberative action. What
motivates that sub-theory? Enç’s aim is to account for control and for the qualitative
difference between purposive and rational behaviour. If that aim requires the outlined
theory of deliberative action (including the sub-theory), then there is good reason to
endorse it. Furthermore, if an account of control and acting for reasons requires the
outlined theory of deliberative action, then we have reason to endorse the view that
all acting for reasons is based on deliberation.
Let us first see why Enç thinks that a causal theory of deliberative action requires
the outlined sub-theory. Enç presents a sophisticated causal model of deliberative
                                                 
63 Compare ibid., p. 145.
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acting for reasons that accounts for both deliberation about alternative means to an
end and for deliberation about alternative ends (or courses of action). A central
element of that model is what Enç calls the ‘What-If generator’.64 An agent who
deliberates asks himself practical questions such as “What should I do in such and
such circumstances?” or “How should I bring such and such about?” Asking practical
questions, the agent will, according to Enç, run a series of what-if scenarios. That is,
the agent will ask himself “What will happen if I A in the circumstances—what if I B
instead?” and so forth. In order to come to a practical conclusion, the agent has to
assess the value of the expected consequences and the costs of the pursuit of the
required means. A-ing, for instance, may have better consequences than B-ing, but A-
ing may be very costly or risky.
An evaluative process of that kind requires information—a background that
allows the agent to compare and assess the alternatives. This information is provided
by beliefs concerning actions and their consequences, and the content of such beliefs
will say that ‘if under certain circumstances a certain type of action is performed, it is
likely that a certain type of result will obtain.’ Deliberation, then, requires the kind of
conditional beliefs introduced by the sub-theory. Further, the process of going
through the What-If scenarios requires that the agent is able to compare the expected
consequences of alternative courses of action. And in order to do that, the agent must
be able to detach the consequent of the conditional belief. Given all that, we can see
that a reconstruction of the whole deliberative process in standard-causal terms may
require that detached consequents (of conditional beliefs) enter in into the causal
mechanism as separate units.
So, if Enç’s reconstruction of deliberative action for reasons is correct, then there
is reason to endorse the sub-theory. But on that ground there is, obviously, no reason
to think that acting for reasons and exercise of control is necessarily preceded by
deliberation about alternative means and courses of action.
Enç, it seems, thinks that the aim of accounting for control gives us reason
endorse the claim that all acting for reasons is based on deliberation, because the
detachability and efficacy of a conditional belief’s consequence is a feature that
establishes a qualitative difference between acting for reason and merely purposive
behaviour. But that alone, if true, does not support the claim that all acting for reasons
                                                 
64 See ibid., p. 157-159.
188
is deliberative. What one would have to show, in addition, is that only the proposed
deliberative model can account for the qualitative difference in standard-causal terms.
But I think it is easy to show that there are other differences between acting for
reasons and purposive behaviour that count as qualitative differences.
Note, first of all, that Enç does not properly justify the claim that an account of
the difference between purposive behaviour and acting for reasons must identify a
qualitative rather than just a quantitative difference. Further, he does not explain what
a qualitative difference—as opposed to merely quantitative difference—actually
amounts to. But let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that we must identify a
qualitative difference, and let us rely on an intuitive grasp of what a qualitative
difference is.
Very plausibly, Enç’s theory does identify a qualitative difference. Nothing in the
causal history of the moth’s behaviour plays a causal role similar to the one of
detached consequents (of conditional beliefs). It identifies a kind of causal role or
mechanism, which is operative in rational agents, but not in agents who are capable
merely of purposive behaviour. But is that the only qualitative difference we can
identify?
To begin with, a moth does not have propositional attitudes such as beliefs,
desires or intentions. That is, it seem obvious to me, a qualitative difference between
the two kinds of agents. And it is a difference that has significant implications with
respect to what kinds of agency they are capable of. The fact that the moth does not
have propositional attitudes entails, trivially, that its behaviour is not caused by
reason-states, and that it cannot appear as reasonable or intelligible in the light of
such states. Further, it entails trivially that the moth’s behaviour is not guided by
reason-states (that it is not caused in virtue of their contents). And the fact that the
moth does not have beliefs entails, trivially, that nothing in the causal history of the
moth’s behaviour plays a causal role similar to the one of conditional beliefs.
Now, I cannot see why only that last difference should count as a qualitative
difference. As far as I can see, all the differences stated in the previous paragraph are
qualitative differences between merely purposive behaviour and action that is done
for reasons. Given that, the aim of accounting for that qualitative difference does not
lend any support to the claim that all actions that are done for reasons are based on
deliberation. Since we do not need to appeal to deliberation and the causal role of
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conditional beliefs in order to identify a qualitative difference, there is no need to
assume that acting for reasons is necessarily deliberative.
Is Acting for Reasons Necessarily Based On Deliberation?
In the passage quoted above Enç says that ‘the moth does not have the proper kind of
choice or control over its’ behaviour. Taken literally, Enç assumes that having control
over something is the same thing as having a choice about it. If we assume further
that making a choice is the same as deliberately deciding and acting for reasons, then
Enç would simply be begging the question. Because then it is assumed that an
account of control is an account of deliberative action done for reasons.
There is, however, an intuition that gives independent support to the assumption
that acting for reasons requires some kind of deliberation. When we act for reasons,
the reasons do not lead to action in an unmediated or straightforward way. Strictly
speaking, it is not the reason-states (or the agent’s having the reason-states) that result
in actions, but the agent acts on them—in the light of them. Whenever an agent acts
for reasons, the agent considers the reasons and, then, acts on them. Acting for
reasons involves this minimal reflective element: the agent stands back and considers
the action and its consequences. This minimal reflective process is often performed or
executed in an instant, without hesitation, critical evaluation or reflection. Acting for
reasons, the agent must consider at least two alternative courses of action and their
consequences. But sometimes that will involve simply considering doing one thing
and the consequences thereof, and considering the consequences of not doing it.65
That intuition has some plausibility. Probably there is a good case to be made for
the claim that we engage in deliberation far more often than one might
think—especially if one construes deliberation as a process that is often carried out
swiftly without hesitation and without much reflection or evaluation. However, I do
not think that the outlined intuition gives us decisive reason to think that all acting for
reason is necessarily based on deliberation. As pointed out, there is the intuition to the
contrary that there are reasonable or rational actions—actions done for reasons—that
are not preceded by any deliberation or reasoning concerning alternative
possibilities—not even by a minimal or very brief process of deliberation. Alfred
                                                 
65 Compare, for instance, Schueler, 2003, who argues on intuitive and conceptual grounds that acting
for reasons is necessarily deliberative acting for reasons. Compare also Enç, 2003, pp. 153-157.
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Mele, for instance, argues that some intentions are acquired passively in the sense that
they are not actively formed as the result of a deliberative process. Habitual actions
provide good examples. ‘When I intentionally unlocked my office door this morning’,
Mele says, ‘I intended to unlock it. But since I am in the habit of unlocking my door
in the morning, and conditions this morning were normal, nothing called for a
decision to unlock it.’66
Mele argues further that some intentions ‘nonactionally arise out of desires’.
Consider Al who is on the way back to this office. Suddenly, Al acquires the desire to
include a short detour—he just feels like taking a short detour. Mele suggests that it is
plausible to say that such a desire straightforwardly results in the intention to take a
short detour (which straightforwardly results in Al’s taking a short detour) provided
that Al has no relevant competing desires and no reservations concerning the desired
action. Accordingly, the standard-causal theory might require that an agent acts for
reasons by passively acquiring an intention and performing an action ‘out of a desire’
only if there are no competing desires and only if the agent has no reservations (in the
form of beliefs that the desired course of action is imprudent, unethical, too risky, or
the like).
Alternatively, proponents of the standard-causal theory may require that an action
that is motivated by a desire is done for reasons only if the desire is integrated in the
agent’s motivational system, in the sense that it is responsive to opposing reasons.
Robert Audi has formulated such a condition on acting for reasons.67 When an agent
acts for reasons, opposing reason will at least diminish the agent’s tendency to
perform the action in question. And it will be true that had the agent had opposing
reasons, they would have reduced that tendency. For instance, if an agent S has a
tendency to A because S desires A-ing, and if S has no competing desires, then the
desire to A is integrated into S’s motivational system in case it is true that if S
believes or judges that A-ing is in some sense inappropriate, wrong or undesirable,
then that belief or judgement will diminish S’s tendency to A.
At this point a remark concerning the role of desires seems in place. One thought
or intuition that stands behind many of the objections and worries we encountered is
that being caused to do something by a desire is indistinguishable from being driven
                                                 
66 Mele, 2003, p. 200.
67 Compare Audi, 1986, especially pp. 93-95.
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or pushed by a desire. The first thing to say is that desires are not per se irresistible or
overwhelming. We can distinguish between being caused to do something by a
generic desire and being caused to do something by an irresistible or overwhelming
desire. The important point is that what renders a desire irresistible or overwhelming
is not the fact that it causes an action.
Enç and proponents of Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of agency would certainly
agree with that. But they offer an additional criterion for acting on ordinary—that is,
resistible or non-compulsive—desires. On the hierarchical approach, the agent must
identify himself with the desire by virtue of having higher-order pro attitudes towards
it. Enç, on the other hand, requires, firstly, that the agent has at least one other current
desire favouring an alternative course of action and, secondly, that the agent considers
acting on either desire in a process of deliberation.68
I do not deny that those proposals characterise interesting and important aspects
of human agency. What I question, however, is that deliberation (or identification) is
necessary for acting for reason (and the associated kind of control). I showed that we
can make the relevant distinctions within the standard-causal framework without
referring to either deliberation or identification. As with respect to desires, we want to
distinguish between acting on a desire and being driven or pushed by a desire. We do
not need to refer to either deliberation or identification, since we can account for that
difference by referring to relations between desires and other first-order attitudes of
the agent, such as competing desires or beliefs about what is appropriate, good or
desirable. On that suggestion, a desire is irresistible or overwhelming if it is not in
accord with and not responsive to opposing reason-states. Action that issues from
such unresponsive desires does not constitute action for reason, and a causal pathway
that leads from unresponsive desires to action does not constitute an exercise of
control, even if the desire rationalises and causes a movement in a non-deviant way.
What these suggestions show is that the standard-causal theory has the resources
to make all the relevant distinctions. It can distinguish between purposive behaviour
and acting for reasons, and it can distinguish between behaviour that results from
irresistible or overwhelming desires and action that is based on desires. What emerges
is a plausible account of acting for reasons, which does not require that acting for
reasons is based on deliberation.
                                                 
68 Enç, 2003, p. 160.
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Habitual Action and Control
Finally, let us consider Enç’s account of habitual action. Enç is well aware of the fact
that habitual action poses a challenge to any view that claims that all acting for
reasons is deliberative. Enç considers an agent who ‘always removes the key from the
ignition before he opens the door of his car’, and he acknowledges that in cases like
that ‘no weighing of pros and cons takes place before the habit kicks in’.69 Enç does
not claim, as one might expect, that in the case of habitual action we are not aware of,
or do not attend to, the deliberative process (because the deliberation is processed in
an instant or because it is sub-conscious). Rather, Enç suggests that a habitual action
is done for reasons if the habit, which is enacted in the performance of the action, has
been acquired through a process of deliberation.
[…] in so far as the circumstances are perceived to conform to those in which
the habitual action was adopted through deliberation as the best means of
reaching some goal, and the goal is still a relevant concern, enacting the habit is
a piece of rational behaviour.70
So, in fact Enç does not require that every action that is done for reasons is the direct
or immediate result of a deliberative process. Rather, he requires that every rational
action is grounded in—and can be traced back to—a deliberative process in the sense
just outlined.
But that approach to habitual action gives rise to a serious problem. Recall that
Enç aims to meet the challenge of disappearing agency—the problem of ‘agent-
control’, as he calls it—by providing an account of acting for reasons in standard-
causal terms. Acting for reasons, he thinks, presupposes deliberation, which means, in
effect, that exercise of control presupposes deliberation. In conjunction with the
suggested view on habitual action we obtain the following problem.
According to the view, whenever an agent performs a rational action habitually at
the time t’, then the agent performed a deliberative action for reasons at some earlier
time t, which resulted in the formation of the habit in question. It is not implausible to
think that the rationality of the habitual action is grounded in—and can be traced back
to—the deliberative action at t. What is rather implausible, though, is that the exercise
of control at t’ can be traced back to the deliberative action at t. Control, it seems
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obvious, is exercised at the time the action is performed. Since control is construed as
deliberative action for reason, we must conclude for the case of habitual action that
the agent exercises control only at t when then habit is acquired, but not at t’ when the
habit is enacted. And that is, I think, a counterintuitive and very unfavourable
consequence of Enç’s theory.
In conclusion we can say that Enç has failed to motivate the claim that
deliberation is necessary for acting for reasons. Hence, he failed to give us reason to
think that deliberation is necessary for an agent’s exercise of control. Enç argues, in
effect, that acting for reasons and deliberative action collapse into one category.
However, if my arguments are correct, the distinction between acting for reasons and
deliberative action does not collapse; the distinction is significant and real. It may
well be that many—or even most—instances of actions that are done for reasons are
based on deliberation. But the question is not whether some or most instances of
rational action are based on deliberation, but whether rational action is necessarily
deliberative. It is conceivable that we act for reasons without engaging in any
deliberation, and intuition tells us that occasionally we do perform such non-
deliberative rational actions. I argued that we do not need to abandon that intuition.71
Practical Reasoning and Treating as a Reason
Given that deliberation is not necessary for acting for reason, it does, of course, not
follow that non-deviant causation by reason-states is sufficient. One may think, as
already mentioned, that acting for reasons involves a minimal reflective element of
treating a certain consideration as a reason for action. One may endorse that intuition
and deny that treating as a reason requires deliberation about alternatives courses of
action. There are two further interpretations of that intuition that would support the
claim that non-deviant causation by reason-states is not sufficient.
According to the first, treating as reasons involves practical reasoning about the
means to a given end. I distinguished between acting for reasons and acting for
                                                 
71 The task of settling the question whether acting for reasons is necessarily deliberative action strikes
me as difficult and elusive. Our intuitions concerning the concept of acting for reasons are neither
straightforward nor conclusive. Further, a proponent of the view that acting for reasons is necessarily
deliberative can always avoid counterexamples by claiming that the agent need not explicitly or
actively engage in a deliberative process or that this process takes place at a sub-conscious level. I
think the suggested approach to ask whether we need to refer to deliberation in order to obtain all the
relevant distinctions and in order to obtain a plausible characterisation of acting for reasons is the best
way to approach the issue.
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normative reasons. The former is action that can be rationalised in the light of the
agent’s reason-states, the latter is action that is done for good reason. I pointed out
that non-deviant causation by reason-states is supposed to capture the former rather
than the latter. However, the notion of acting for reasons is ambiguous in a further
sense. Setting aside the question of whether the agent in fact had good reasons, we
can ask whether the agent took herself to have good reason or whether her action can
merely be rationalised in the light of some of her reason-states. If we take that
distinction into consideration we can see that the first interpretation is either too weak
or too strong. The fact that an agent engages in practical reasoning about means to an
end does not show that the agent takes herself to have reason in any significant sense,
because the agent reasons only about the means to a given end. The agent considers
only how to achieve the end, rather than the reasons for and against pursuing that end.
In that sense the first interpretation is too weak. It is too strong, however, if acting for
reasons is associated with action that can be rationalised in the light of some of the
agent’s mental states and events. Actions that are done for their own sake do not
require any kind of practical reasoning, because they are not done by doing something
else. In that sense requiring means-end reasoning is too strong.
According to a second interpretation, an agent who acts for a reason necessarily
treats or endorses some consideration as a reason. There are, prima facie, two ways in
which an agent’s treating as a reason can be construed. Firstly, treating as reason may
consist in the agent’s having and acting on higher-order beliefs concerning which
considerations are—or count as—reasons for actions. Secondly, it may be construed
as a genuine and irreducible psychological event or process. Both views, I think, face
difficult problems.72 But I will restrict myself to the point that there is no reason to
pursue that proposal in the first place. Consider again Al who goes for a short walk,
because he feels like it. There is no reason to assume that Al has a second-order belief
concerning which considerations would give him a reason to go for walk, or that Al,
in the circumstances, treats or endorses a certain consideration as a reason for going
for a walk. Nevertheless, according to the standard-causal model, Al acts for a reason,
given that the action is caused in the right way by a reason-state—which is, in that
                                                 
72 Compare Wedgwood, forthcoming, who argues that reference to higher-order beliefs leads to an
infinite regress of ever more higher-order beliefs. Concerning the notion of treating as a reason as
irreducible compare chapter 2, p. 89, note 59.
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case, an intrinsic desire. Note, again, that I do not deny that treating or endorsing
certain considerations as reasons may play an important role in the performance of
some actions. Rather, I deny that acting for reasons necessarily involves treating or
endorsing something as a reason.
Free Will and the Limits of the Standard-Causal Model
In previous sections we have been concerned first and foremost with the most basic or
fundamental aspects of human agency. Agency, as I suggested, should be construed
as a hierarchy of kinds of agency, and we might identify the lower boundary of the
domain of distinctively human agency with the boundary between purposive
behaviour and acting for reasons. In this final section I shall say more about the
higher, more refined and sophisticated kinds of agency and about the upper boundary
of the domain of human agency.
Consider again the proposed hierarchy of kinds of agency: purposive behaviour,
acting for reasons, deliberative action, self-controlled action, free and autonomous
action. Besides that, moral responsibility is of importance for two reasons. Firstly,
many philosophers think that being morally responsible presupposes a certain kind of
agency. Secondly, moral responsibility is, of course, itself an important feature of
human agency.73 I am confident that all those kinds and aspects of human agency can
be accounted for in standard-causal terms. I cannot argue for this claim in detail, nor
do I have the room for detailed accounts of all the mentioned kinds and aspects of
agency. But I will show how those tasks can be carried out. All the higher kinds of
agency are built on top of—or on the basis of—lower kinds of agency. That means
than an account of the higher kinds of human agency can be given by adding further
conditions to the account of acting for reasons. What needs to be shown, then, is that
those further conditions are compatible with the standard-causal approach.
Higher Kinds of Human Agency
Let us first turn to deliberative action. Discussing Berent Enç’s position, we saw that
it is possible to provide an account of deliberative action in standard-causal terms.
Deliberation concerns, typically, different means to some end, different ends or
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acting for reasons—namely, acting for moral reasons.
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courses of action, and the consequences thereof. Enç shows that the process of
comparing and evaluating different means, ends and consequences can be
implemented by standard-causal mechanisms, provided that the mental states and
events, which constitute the deliberative process, are causally efficacious in virtue of
their contents. That shows that acting on the basis practical reasoning or deliberation
is compatible with the standard-causal approach.
Consider next self-controlled action. I suggested that a plausible condition for
acting for reasons is that the relevant mental states must be integrated in the agent’s
motivational system, in the sense that they are responsive to other reason-states of the
agent. A standard-causal account of self-controlled action can take that as a starting
point and formulate further and stronger conditions concerning integration and
responsiveness. Note first that self-control can be predicated of actions as well as
agents. First and foremost, though, it is a feature of agents—a character trait of
persons. An agent lacks self-control if her actions are frequently weak-willed (akratic
or incontinent). And an agent is weak-willed with respect to a certain action, if it is
performed intentionally against better judgment; that is, the agent intentionally
performs the action even though she judges that it would be best or better not to do it
(or to do something else).
The standard-causal theory can account for these features by expanding and
strengthening the conditions on accordance and responsiveness between desires,
beliefs, judgements and intentions. For instance, it may require that in order for an
agent S to be self-controlled, the tendency of S  to act on given desires must
usually—or frequently—be diminished by opposing judgements and beliefs to a
degree sufficient to ensure that the agent acts in accordance with the judgements and
beliefs rather than the desires.74 It may require, in other words, action-guiding
responsiveness to judgements and beliefs.
Let us turn then to free and autonomous action. Like self-control, freedom and
autonomy can be attributed to both actions and agents. A minimal and uncontroversial
requirement for free action is that the agent is free from constraints like obstruction,
interference, coercion, compulsion, and so forth. Accordingly, an agent S is free if S is
                                                 
74 That is compatible with the view that judgements and beliefs can motivate action, but it is not
committed to it. One may require that the agent has desires that are in accordance with the judgements
and beliefs and that motivate the actions in questions.
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frequently—or in some relevant cases, at least—free from constraint. Note, firstly,
that the use of the term free in that context is entirely unproblematic, since it means
nothing more than the absence of constraint. And secondly, there is no reason to think
that this kind of freedom is incompatible with the standard-causal model of agency. In
order to obtain an account of free and autonomous agency on top of all the kinds of
agency discussed so far, the standard-causal theory can incorporate either one, or
both, of the following two suggestions. Firstly, the theory can incorporate an account
of identification in terms of higher-order attitudes.75 Secondly, the theory can
formulate conditions concerning the acquisition and history of the agent’s mental
attitudes.76 The latter approach will require that the agent’s mental attitudes have been
acquired in a normal and unconstrained manner. One may try to give a positive
account of what the normal acquisition of mental attitudes consists in by appeal to
perception, learning, socialisation, and so forth. Alternatively, or in addition, one may
require that the agent’s mental attitudes have not been induced—through
brainwashing—or implanted—by evil scientists—or otherwise been acquired in a
way that bypasses the agent’s exercise of her own cognitive and practical skills.
Accordingly, an agent S is autonomous if, firstly, S is capable of deliberative and
rational agency; secondly, S is a free and self-controlled agent; thirdly, S can identify
herself with the attitudes that motivate her actions; and, fourthly, if S has acquired her
mental attitudes in a normal and unconstrained way.
Finally, let us briefly turn to the issue of moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s
counterfactual intervener example, which has been introduced in the previous
section,77 strongly suggests that moral responsibility does not presuppose that the
agent could have done otherwise (in the categorical or unconditional sense).78 I shall
assume that the counterexample is decisive. Given that, there is no reason to think that
                                                 
75 Compare, for instance, Dworkin, 1988.
76 Compare, for instance, Mele, 1995, especially chapter 9.
77 See pp. 177.
78 The argument based on that example is, roughly, the following. Arguably, the scenario supports the
following two claims. Firstly, Jones performs an action in the actual scenario, but due to the presence
of the counterfactual intervener, he could not have done otherwise. Secondly, Jones is morally
responsible for that action. Therefore, alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral
responsibility. The counterexample and that argument has been challenged in various ways. For
discussion see, for instance, Fischer, 1994 and Ekstrom, 2002. The crucial question, it seems to me, is
the following. What matters in cases in which we are not sure whether the agent is responsible:
whether the agent had alternative possibilities or whether the agent’s act was deliberate or intentional?
I think the Frankfurt example strongly suggests that what matters is the latter: what matters are
properties of the actual action, rather than open possibilities.
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the feature of being morally responsible—and the kind of agency that it
presupposes—is incompatible with the standard-causal account of agency.79
In my response to the challenge of disappearing agency I provided an account of
acting for reasons and the associated exercise of control in standard-causal terms.
Now we can see how and why the higher kinds of human agency can be constructed
on the basis of that, and that the accounts of those kinds of agency are compatible
with the standard-causal approach. The remaining question is whether the presented
hierarchy of kinds of agency is complete. If it is complete, we can say that the
accounts of the various kinds of human agency taken together are tantamount to an
account of human agency. If it is not complete, we are left with an account of most
aspects of human agency. Are there higher, more refined and possibly more valuable
aspects of human agency? What springs to mind as a missing kind of agency is, of
course, acting with free will.
Plural Control and Indeterminism
Free will, I assume, is the ability to choose and to do otherwise. In the first chapter I
distinguished between the following two necessary conditions.
(AP) Open or Alternative Possibilities. It is open to the agent to decide and do
otherwise than she actually does. In the circumstances, the agent could have
decided and done otherwise.
(SDO) Self-Determination as Origination. The agent herself determines the
decision and action. The agent is not only the cause, but the source or origin of
her action.
In the first chapter I assumed that incompatibilism is true. That means, in particular,
that AP is incompatible with the truth of determinism, because AP requires a certain
kind of indeterminism; namely, indeterminism with respect to certain courses of
actions. If Sue A-ed after she considered two alternative courses of action, A-ing and
B-ing, then AP is satisfied only if it was not causally determined that Sue A-s—only if
there was an objective chance that Sue would B instead. (It must be undetermined
whether Sue A-s or B-s either at the time she makes the choice or at the time she
                                                 
79 Compare Fischer, 1994 and Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, who use Frankfurt-style examples in order to
show that guidance control is sufficient for moral responsibility. Guidance control is construed in terms
of causal mechanisms, and it is argued that having guidance control is compatible with causal
determinism. Given that, it is clear that such an account of moral responsibility is compatible with the
standard-causal approach.
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performs the action, or at both the time of choice and action—depending on whether
free will is associated with choice or action, or with both choice and action.)
So, AP requires that, with respect to past, present and future actions, for an agent
to perform an action with free will it must be the case, at the time of choice or action,
that more than one course of action is metaphysically open to the agent in the sense
explained. But having alternative possibilities in that sense is not sufficient for having
libertarian—that is, incompatibilist—free will. Further, it must be the case that the
agent has the power or ability to choose and perform any one of the open alternative
courses of action. The agent himself must have the power to determine which of the
open pathways will become actual. The agent, in other words, must have control over
which one of the alternative courses of action she performs. Let us call this kind of
control plural control, as it involves control over a set of more than one alternative
courses of action: control over which of the open alternatives will become actual.80
In the first chapter I pointed out that a indeterministic version of the standard-
causal model satisfies AP and that such a theory can account for self-determination
construed as non-deviant causation by one’s own reason-states. In this chapter I
showed that the standard-casual model can also account for a more refined notion of
self-determination as autonomy. However, I granted—to proponents of agent-
causation—that it fails to account for self-determination as origination and that it fails
to account for the associated kind of control, which is plural control. Let us now have
a closer look at this last claim.
Randolph Clarke says that the kind of control established by the indeterministic
standard-causal theory is ‘wholly negative: it is just a matter of the absence of any
determining cause of the action’.81 The standard-causal theory ‘fails to secure for the
agent the exercise of any further positive powers to causally influence which of the
alternative courses of events that are open will become actual.’82 One way of
explicating that is to use the model—or analogy—of forking paths. If we think of life
                                                 
80 It is common to associate free will with that kind of control. Compare, for instance, Kane who talks
about ‘plural voluntary control over a set of options’ as necessary for acting with free will (Kane, 1998,
especially pp. 109-111 and pp. 133-135). Fischer and Ravizza argue that free will requires a ‘dual
power’, which is ‘the power freely to do some act A, and the power to do something else instead’, and
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action (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 31). Clarke, 2003, says that libertarian free will requires a variety
of control ‘to causally influence which of the open alternatives will be made actual’ (p. 151). Compare,
further, Haji, 1998, chapter 1.
81 Clarke, 2003, p. 96.
82 Ibid., p. 133.
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or the way in which the world unfolds as a path, then there is only one path if
determinism is true. However, if indeterminism is true, the paths fork at certain
points, and if AP is satisfied, then some of those forking paths represent alternative
courses of action open to agents. In order to have free will, however, the paths must
not only be open to an agent—it must not only be a matter of chance or probability
which path becomes actual. In addition, the agent must have the to power to make one
path actual and to ‘close off’ the others.83 The indeterministic standard-causal theory
establishes only the first, but not the second part of that analogy; it establishes forking
paths, but not the required agential power to determine which of the paths will
become actual.
Clarke also says that the standard-causal model fails, because the kind of agential
control it provides does not go beyond the kind of control established by compatibilist
accounts of free will. Consider again Sue’s A-ing. On the standard-causal model,
Sue’s exercise of control consists in non-deviant causation by reason-states that are
directed towards A-ing. That kind of control is compatible with both determinism and
indeterminism. What the theory requires is non-deviant causation, not non-deviant
causal determination. To assume indeterminism does not undermine control, but it
does not add anything either. To grant that Sue might instead have B-ed for reasons
does not show that Sue had the power to determine whether she A-s or B-s, because
whether she A-s or B-s is a matter of chance or probability (which does not entail that
it is random or accidental).
Libertarians are convinced that free will requires not only the falsity of
determinism, but also a kind of control that goes beyond a kind of control that is
compatible with determinism. I agree that the standard-causal model cannot account
for plural control. The theory construes the exercise of agential control as constituted
by a causal process, which takes place between an action and a mental state that
rationalises, guides and causes that action. In cases in which the agent considered
more than one option, and decided to do one thing rather than another, we can say that
the agent formed an intention to pursue one action rather than any of the considered
alternatives. But that does not show that the agent had what libertarians mean by
                                                 
83 Compare Fischer, 1994, who refers to Borges’ story of ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ (p. 3).
Compare also Haji, 1998, who refers to Feinberg’s analogy of ‘life as a kind of maze of railroad tracks’
(p. 17).
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plural control. By forming that intention the agent settled on one course of action and
the content of the intention guides only the performance of that action.84 Something
similar holds for actions that issue from desires and beliefs. The desire to attain E and
the belief that one can attain E by A-ing can rationalise and guide only an A-ing.
Control as non-deviant causation by reason-states is always directed, so to speak,
towards one course of action, because reason-states can constitute control only with
respect to the course of action, which is rationalised by them.85
Plural Control and Self-Constitution
Robert Nozick and Robert Kane argued that a crucial element of acting with free will
is what I shall call the element of self-constitution.86 They think that libertarian free
will can be captured in standard-causal terms, because self-constitution can be
captured in standard-causal terms. I will first introduce the notion of self-constitution,
and then I will discuss Robert Kane’s theory.87 I will argue that it fails to account for
free will, because it fails to account for plural control.
Consider once more the agent S who faces the choice between A-ing and B-ing. S
considers the reasons RA for A-ing and reasons RB for B-ing. Assume that S decides to
A, and that this choice is caused and guided by RA. Assume further that RA does not
causally determine A-ing. Rather, RA renders A-ing probable, such that there is an
objective chance that S chooses to B instead.
Both Nozick and Kane think that acting with free will requires that the action is
causally undetermined in the way outlined. If S is to act with free will, the reasons, RA
and RB, must leave it open whether S A-s or B-s. However, both Nozick and Kane
think that the following must be added to a characterisation of the situation. If S
chooses to A, for instance, S chooses to A for the reasons and thereby S makes the
reasons in favour of A-ing prevail by acting on them. Further, making choices of that
kind has an effect on some of the agent’s psychological and dispositional properties.
                                                 
84 Compare Mele, 1992, who argues that to form an intention is to settle on one course of action.
85 That does not mean that an agent never exercises any control over whether to perform one course of
action rather than another. Assume that Sam forms the judgement that it would be better to A rather
than B before forming an intention to act, and that Sam is disposed to choose and act in accordance
with his better judgement. Accordingly, it is then probable that Sam will A rather than B, and there is a
sense in which Sam has control over whether to A  rather than B. But that kind of control is different
from having plural control over A-ing and B-ing.
86 Nozick, 1981, pp. 294-316 and, Kane, 1998, especially chapter 8.
87 I will restrict my critique to Kane’s position as it encompasses all the important aspect of Nozick’s
earlier proposal.
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Once the agent has chosen to do one course of action for one set of reasons, it will be
more likely, in similar future circumstances, that the agent chooses again to act for
those reasons. That is to say that the choice changes the agent’s disposition how to
evaluate the reasons and how to act accordingly. Further, the choice has the normative
implication that it commits the agent to acting for certain reasons in certain
circumstances. In that way choosing and acting with free will has a significant effect
on the agent’s future actions and on the agent herself, as it results in changes with
respect to the agent’s psychological constitution—that is why I shall call this feature
of acting with free will the aspect of self-constitution.
Self-constitution is, as far as I can see, perfectly compatible with the standard-
causal approach. The problem, though, is that it is difficult to see how it helps with
free will, because it is difficult to see how self-constitution is of any relevance to
plural control. Let us now have a closer look at Kane’s position.
Robert Kane has offered a very insightful, but also very complex account of free
will. I have to restrict my discussion to those elements of his account, which I deem
central and crucial. Probably the most important element is an account of a certain
kind of decisions, which Kane calls ‘self-forming willings’.88 These decisions bear all
the marks of self-constitution, as introduced above. Kane’s preferred example of a
self-forming willing is a moral choice by which the agent settles an inner conflict
between two courses of action: the agent thinks it is morally required to do one thing,
but is tempted to do something else instead. Being undecided, the agent must settle
the conflict by making a decision in favour of one of the two alternatives. Generally, a
decision is a self-forming willing only if it satisfies all of the following conditions.
(1) The alternative courses of action are genuinely open to the agent.
(2) The agent has reasons for all the alternative courses of action.
(3) No matter what the agent chooses to do, he acts and chooses for those reasons.
(4) The agent makes those reasons the ones she wants to act on—more than any
others—by choosing to act on them.89
Such choices are self-constitutive—or self-forming, as Kane says—because they
‘structure and reorganise the motivational structure’ of the agent in a particular way;
had the agent decided otherwise, the motivational structure would have been
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89 Compare ibid., p. 135.
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reorganised different correspondingly.90 The agent wants to do both courses of action
and both are reasonable in the light of her beliefs, desires and values. Because of that
the agent will identify herself with her choice and action, no matter what she chooses
to do. Further, the agent decides which action she prefers by making the decision,
because ‘what [agents] do by choosing is to make one set of reasons prevail over
others then and there as motivators of action’.91
The question we have to ask is whether the theory offers an account of control
that goes beyond causation and guidance by reason-states; in particular, we want to
know whether the theory can account for plural control in standard-causal terms.
Kane acknowledges that having free will requires that the agent has ‘plural voluntary
control’, as he calls it, and he thinks that his theory can account for it. So far,
however, we have not seen anything that show us how standard-causal processes can
constitute plural control.
Kane’s account of plural voluntary control requires that the agent performs the
action on purpose and for reasons, in a sense that encompasses the conditions (1) to
(4), and that the agent is not coerced, compelled, or controlled by other agents.92 But
all that does not add anything to a positive account of control. Further, all that is in
line with the account of free and autonomous agency that I have outlined at the
beginning of this section—an account that does not require plural control. Addressing
the sort of scepticism about plural control that I am advocating, Kane says that
[…] it does not follow that because you cannot guarantee which of a set of
outcomes occurs beforehand, you do not control which of them occurs, when it
occurs.93
Plural control, as Kane points out, has to be distinguished from ‘antecedent
determining control’. When an agent has antecedent determining control, the agent
can ‘guarantee or determine which of a set of outcomes is going to occur before it
occurs’.94 Plural voluntary control is not like that, since the agent determines the
outcome by and when—and not before—making the choice.
Two things must be noticed here. Firstly, that point is only negative. It tells us
only what plural control is not, and in what way it is different from another kind of
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91 Ibid., p. 135.
92 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
93 Ibid., p. 134.
94 Ibid., p. 144.
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control—namely, antecedent determining control. It does not tell us what plural
control is in positive terms, and it does not show how and why it can—or cannot—be
realised by standard-causal processes. Secondly, the point does not distinguish plural
control uniquely, because almost exactly the same point can be made with respect to
control as non-deviant causation by reason-states. Having that kind of control, the
agent does not guarantee or determine the outcome before performing the action,
because the agent exercises control by performing an action that is caused,
rationalised, guided by and responsive to mental attitudes—not before performing it.
Kane then says that having ‘plural voluntary control over a set of options implies
being able to bring about whichever one (of the options) you will, when you will to do
so’.95 Now, that is a positive claim. But it is merely conceptual; it characterises what
libertarians mean when they require plural control. It does not tell us anything about
why and how plural control can be understood in standard-causal terms—why and
how it can be realised or constituted by standard-causal processes.
Finally, let us return to the case in which the agent settles a moral conflict by
making a free choice. Kane uses that case in order to explain the proposed account of
plural voluntary control. Commenting on it, he says the following.
If [agents] fail [to do what they take to be morally required], it will be because
they did not allow their [moral] efforts to succeed. They chose instead to make
their self-interested or present-oriented inclinations prevail […].96
This passage is particularly telling. In the attempt to explain how plural control can be
constituted by an indeterministic standard-causal process, Kane says that the agent
allows one set of reasons to prevail. But clearly, this act of allowing—or not
allowing—certain motives to prevail is part of the very phenomenon that is in need of
explanation. Either that act of allowing a motive to prevail can itself be accounted for
in standard-causal terms, or we must assume that the agent performs it by exercising
an agent-causal—or otherwise irreducible—power. Otherwise, the act of allowing a
motive to prevail must not be mentioned in an account of plural control. Kane rejects
agent-causal together with all other non-reductive theories of agency97, and he does
not provide an account of the act of allowing a motive to prevail in standard-causal
                                                 
95 Ibid., p. 134.
96 Ibid., p. 133.
97 Compare ibid., p. 116.
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terms. Yet Kane cannot avoid alluding to such a notion in order to explain plural
voluntary control.
Kane’s conditions and remarks concerning plural control are helpful and
important. Kane rightly rejects the sceptics who expect plural control to be like
‘antecedent determining control’. But given that the offered standard-causal account
of control by reasons differs from antecedent determining control as well, that remark
is beside the point. What the sceptic should demand is not antecedent determining
control, but an account of plural control that is on a par with the offered standard-
causal account of control as causation and guidance by reason-states. In other words,
the sceptic should demand an account of how and why a standard-causal process can
constitute or realise plural control. Ultimately, Kane has failed to provide that.
Free Will: Why We Don’t Have it, and Why That Doesn’t
Matter
I will now argue that we do not have reason to believe that we have libertarian free
will. The argument consists of two main parts. The first part shows that there is no
theory of agency available that can account for free will. In the first chapter I showed
that non-reductive accounts cannot account for free will, and in this chapter I
completed my arguments for the claim that reductive standard-causal theories cannot
account for free will either. That completes, in connection with the rejection of
volitionism and pluralism, the first part.
In the second part I argue that not having free will is less drastic than libertarians
think it is, primarily for the following two reasons. Firstly, Frankfurt-style example
give us good reason to think that moral responsibility does not presuppose plural
control—hence, that it does not presuppose free will. Secondly, free will concerns an
agent’s ability to choose between alternative courses of action for reasons. We have
seen that the standard-causal theory can account for that ability insofar as it can
account for deliberative and autonomous acting for reasons. Further, I will argue that
it is not as obvious or straightforward to see what the additional value of having plural
control consists in as libertarians think it is. Before turning to the second part, though,
I shall say more on open or alternative possibilities.
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Alternative Possibilities
At the core of the condition of open and alternative possibilities (AP) is the following
proposition.
 (P) The agent could have done otherwise.
Some philosophers have argued that P admits of a conditional analysis, which is,
generally and roughly, of the following form.
(CP) The agent S  would have done otherwise, if S had wanted (decided,
intended, or willed) otherwise.
It is common to point out that the antecedent of CP must not mention other acts of the
agent, since that raises only the question whether the agent could have done otherwise
with respect to them. In particular, the conditional analysis must not refer to mental
acts such as the agent’s willing or making of decisions. Rather, to have at least initial
plausibility, the conditional analysis must refer to mental states or non-actional
mental events in the antecedent.98
Incompatibilists and libertarians reject that analysis. They insist on what is called
an unconditional or categorical interpretation of P. Firstly, even the version of CP that
refers only to mental events is subject to counterexamples. Consider Sam who A-ed
because of an irresistible desire to A. It is true that Sam would have done otherwise,
had he not had that desire—had he had different reason-states and events. But,
intuitively, it is false that Sam could have done otherwise in the circumstance—Sam
was not able to do otherwise in the circumstances.99 Secondly, the conditional
analysis, CP, misses the very point of what it is to have or act with free will.
Intuitively, to say that an agent acted with free will is to say that that very agent—the
same person with exactly the same psychological dispositions, thoughts, desires,
beliefs, intentions, and so on—could have done otherwise in exactly the same
circumstances at exactly the same time. By making the action counterfactually
dependent on the agent’s reason-states, the conditional analysis fails to capture the
nature of free will, which is highlighted by counterexamples of the kind just
presented.
                                                 
98 Compare, for instance, Davidson, 1980, essay 4. For discussion see, for instance, Berfosky, 2002, pp.
185-186 and Kane, 1998, pp. 57-59.
99 See Chisholm, 1964, and Berofsky, 2002, p. 186.
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Throughout I assumed that incompatibilism about free will is true, and I have just
presented two reasons in support of the claim that CP fails as an analysis of P. The
conditional analysis, CP, is usually deployed by compatibilists. But it is subject to
counterexamples and I agree with libertarians that it does not capture what acting with
free will consists in. However, compatibilism is not committed to CP. That is, the
falsity or inadequacy of CP does not entail that compatibilism, in general, is false or
inadequate—nor that incompatibilism is true. However, compatibilism in general
faces the so-called consequence argument for incompatibilism, which has received a
great deal of attention in the more recent literature on free will and which is generally
considered to be a very strong and convincing argument.100 The conclusion of that
argument says, in effect, that the ability to do otherwise is not compatible with
determinism. Compatibilists, of course, can avoid engaging with that argument by
denying that free will is the ability to do otherwise. In response to that I think it is
credible to insist, on intuitive grounds, that free will is the ability to do
otherwise—and that acting with free will requires that the agent could have done
otherwise. I shall therefore continue to assume that free will is libertarian—that is,
incompatibilist—free will.
Where does this leave us with the assessment of the standard-causal theory? To
begin with, note that the categorical reading of P admits itself of two interpretations.
On a weak construal, P requires only a metaphysically open future in the sense that it
is not causally determined which of the open alternatives the agent is going to pursue.
On a strong construal, however, P means that the agent was able to do otherwise in
the sense that, firstly, the agent had metaphysically open alternatives, and secondly,
that the agent had the power to perform either one of the open alternatives—in other
words, that the agent had plural control over the alternatives.101
                                                 
100 The most prominent and most detailed formulation can be found in van Inwagen, 1983, who states
the argument informally as follows: ‘If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the
laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born;
and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things
(including our present acts) are not up to us’ (p. 16).
101 Note that this distinction is helpful, but it is not of real importance. The strong construal merely
incorporates the insight that, if an agent is able to do otherwise, objective alternatives have to be
supplemented with plural control—dual power, plural voluntary control, self-determination as
origination, or whatever label one prefers. The weak construal, on the other hand, highlights that we
can distinguish between having open alternatives and having control over them. To distinguish
between the strong and the weak version is therefore, first and foremost, a matter of exposition.
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We saw that the standard-causal theory is compatible with the weak construal of
the categorical version of P, since it does not require that the causal connections
between reason-states and actions are deterministic. That is interesting insofar as it
shows that the fact that an action is causally undetermined is compatible with the fact
that agent exercises control in performing it; it makes clear, in other words, that the
fact that an event is undetermined does not entail that it is random or that it is under
no one’s control. But the fact that the weak construal of P is compatible with the
standard-causal approach is uninteresting insofar as the weak construal is only
necessary, but not sufficient for free will. More interesting—and more
controversial— is the strong construal, which incorporates the requirement of plural
control. I argued that the standard-causal theory cannot account for plural control.
Given all that, we can conclude that the standard-causal is compatible with both CP
—the conditional analysis of P—and with the weak construal of the categorical
interpretation of P. In that sense, it is true that some agents could have done otherwise
with respect to some actions, if the standard-causal theory is true. However, the
standard-causal theory is incompatible with the strong construal of the categorical
reading. In that sense, it is false that some agents could have done otherwise with
respect to some of their actions; that is, in that sense, no agent could ever have done
otherwise, if the standard-causal theory is true.
Not Having Free Will
Let me now explain why that result is less drastic as it seems to be—or why it is less
drastic than libertarians think. In a first step, let us recall what is not entailed by the
assumption that the standard-causal model is correct. Assuming that the standard-
causal theory is true, it does not follow that agents do not exercise control over their
behaviour. The theory accounts for control as non-deviant causation by—guidance by
and responsiveness to—reason-states. Secondly, it does not follow that human agents
are not morally responsible for their actions—or that we are not justified in holding
others morally responsible for some of their actions and consequences thereof.
Frankfurt’s counterfactual intervener example strongly suggests that having plural
control and libertarian free will is not necessary for being responsible. Thirdly, it does
not follow that we cannot distinguish between free and unfree actions. As explained
above, the standard-causal approach has resources to distinguish between, and
account for, important features of human agency, including rational, deliberative, free
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and autonomous agency. Hence, it does not follow that agents cannot govern
themselves—that they are not capable of self-determination.102
Finally, the standard-causal model is compatible with at least the following two
interpretations of P (the claim that, with respect to a certain action, the agent could
have done otherwise). Firstly, if a probabilistic version of the theory is true, then it is
possible that some agents could have done otherwise in the sense that there was an
objective chance that they acted otherwise. Secondly, P requires that agents could
have done otherwise. The reason for this focus on the past may be that free will has
often been treated as a necessary condition for moral responsibility—and usually we
hold people morally responsible for their past actions or consequences thereof. But P
could easily be reformulated as to apply to past, present, and future actions. What is
crucial, according to the categorical reading, is that the circumstances—including the
agent’s thoughts, dispositions and character traits—are being held constant. The
categorical reading focuses on the agent in the same circumstances at a particular
point in time. The conditional version considers counterfactual scenarios that are
similar to the actual situation; in particular, scenarios in which the some of the agent’s
reason-states are different. There is, however, a rather different interpretation of what
our ability to do otherwise consists in, which compares the actions of the same agent
in similar circumstances at different times. Frequently, when people say that they can
do—or are able to do—otherwise, they mean that they will do otherwise in case they
find themselves in similar circumstances in the future. By that we mean often that we
are able to do better in the future, because we have learned the lessons from our past
experiences. The ability to learn from our past actions and their consequences is no
doubt essential to human agency, moral responsibility and personhood. Clearly, this
ability for self-improvement does not presuppose plural control. It is entirely
unproblematic, and it is certainly compatible with the standard-causal approach.
                                                 
102 Prima facie, there are two ways in which the standard-causal theory can account for self-
determination without presupposing plural control. Firstly, self-determination can be identified with the
kind of free and autonomous agency that has been outlined above (pp. 196). Alternatively, self-
determination can be construed being governed by one’s own reasons: I govern myself insofar as my
actions are guided by my desires, beliefs and intentions. That approach requires an account of the
involved notion of ownership in standard-causal terms, which is likely to be tantamount to the
suggested account of autonomous agency. (Just consider that an agent’s reason-states might be defined
as being her own if and only if, firstly, the agent can identify herself with them or with being motivated
by them, and secondly, the agent has acquired them in a normal way—in a way that does not involve
deception, brainwashing, coercion etc.)
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Given that, we can conclude that the standard-causal model does not entail that agents
could not have done otherwise in every sense—or under any interpretation.103
The Purported Value of Free Will
That completes the first step of my case for the claim that not having free will is not
as drastic as one might think. In a second step I will now argue that our intuitions
concerning the value of free will and plural control are less compelling and less
straightforward than libertarians claim they are.
Consider the following example.104 An agent, Alice, faces a choice between two
courses of action; between telling the truth or a lie concerning a particular matter. If
Alice is able to act with free will, then she is able to tell the truth and she is able to tell
a lie, in the sense that she has plural control over the two alternatives. If Alice has free
will, then there is a possible world in which Alice tells the truth and a world in which
she tells a lie, and those two worlds are identical or alike in all relevant respects up to
the point at which Alice decides what to do.
That seems to be a straightforward and unproblematic case of an agent’s acting
with free will. Libertarians, though, face difficult questions. The first question is when
or at what point in the process, which leads to the action, does Alice exercise free
will? Approaching an answer to that question, we have to distinguish between two
cases.
Firstly, let us assume that Alice is going through a proper deliberative process.
Alice weighs the reasons for and against the alternatives, she forms a judgement and
an intention on the basis of that evaluation, and she performs an action on the basis of
the judgement and in accordance with the intention. Further, we assume that Alice
exercises free will in doing so. That means that Alice is at some point in that process
able to go either way; at some point in that deliberative process the path, which lies
ahead of Alice, forks. The three most plausible candidates for that point are the
formation of the judgement, the formation of the intention and the performance of the
action. Libertarians agree that the act of free will is either the act of making a decision
                                                 
103 There is, of course, one further interpretation of ‘could have done otherwise’ that is compatible with
the standard-causal model, which construes the ability in question as a general ability of the agent. An
agent, for instance, could have lifted that stone, which weighs 20 kilograms, in the sense that the agent
is, generally, able to lift a stone that weighs 20 kilograms (as opposed, say, to not being able to lift a
stone that weighs 200 kilograms).
104 I borrow the example from van Inwagen, 2000.
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(that is, the act of forming an intention) or the performance of the action. Assuming
that Alice’s choice is rational, we can assume that the decision is based on the
judgement, and that the action is in accordance with the decision.
The problem, of course, is that we have to hold constant the judgement if we
want to identify the act of free will with the decision, and we have to hold constant
the decision, if we want to identify it with the action. Suppose that in the actual world
Alice judges that it is better to the tell truth. She then decides—forms the
intention—to tell the truth, and, subsequently, she tells the truth. In the alternative
scenario, Alice either decides to tell a lie, even though she judged it is better not to, or
she tells a lie, even though she decided not to. In that case, deciding against her
judgement or acting against her decision would count as an exercise of libertarian free
will. But to anyone who is not concerned with the question of whether or not Alice
exercises free will, Alice’s action will seem to be a clear instance of weak-willed and
irrational behaviour. Weak-willed agents act intentionally against their better
judgement or decision, and they do so freely in the sense that their actions are not
compelled or forced.
Alice’s free choice, it emerges, has lots in common with a weak-willed and
irrational choice. In fact, apart from the purported fact that Alice exercises plural
control, her choice is indistinguishable form weak-willed and irrational choices. But
choices of the latter kind are certainly not the result of the exercise of a particularly
refined and valuable form of agency. Arguably, they are not the result of the exercise
of a capacity at all; rather, they are the result of a failure to exercise one’s ability for
rational agency properly.
However, libertarians can object that the first interpretation of Alice’s choice
does not provide a correct reconstruction of acting with free will. That brings us to the
second interpretation, which is in line with Nozick’s and Kane’s account of free will.
According to Nozick and Kane, the agent, whenever she acts with free will, makes
one set of reasons prevail by deciding to act on them. On that interpretation, Alice is
going through a deliberative process, which differs from the one described. Alice is
undecided. She fails to recognise a set of reasons that outweighs the opposing
reasons. That is why she must settle the practical problem by deciding which set of
reasons to act on. Does that mean that Alice does not form a judgement at all? Either
we say that her judgement is identical with the act of choice by which she decides to
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act for one set of reasons, or we say that she does not form a judgement at all. The
former option, it seems to me, is not very plausible. Arguably, the kind of judgement
in question must compare the alternative courses of action; it is a judgement
concerning which course of action is best, or better than the available alternatives.
Further, judgements of that kind must be based on reasons in the sense that the
formation the judgment is based on the agent’s recognition that she has most reason to
pursue one course of action—or good reason to pursue one course of action rather
than another. Given that, it would be wrong to say that Alice forms a
judgement—failing to recognise that there is reason to pursue one course of action
rather than the other, she cannot form a judgement. Both the decision to tell the truth
and the decision to tell a lie would be based on reasons, but neither decision would be
based on a judgement. On that second interpretation, it seems clear when or at what
point Alice acts with free will; namely, when she makes the decision to act on one set
of reasons. Identifying the act of free will with a decision of that kind, libertarians can
avoid the objection that acting with free will may in some cases be irrational or
virtually indistinguishable from weak-willed action. For on that interpretation, actions
will typically be in accordance with decisions, and decisions will typically be based
on reasons.
Given that interpretation, what does the value of free will consist in? A
libertarian might say the following. Alice has reason to tell the truth, and she has
reason to tell a lie. She does not think that she has better reasons for either course of
action. She cannot judge what is better, and she must, therefore, settle the issue by
making a choice. The standard-causal theory can account for choices of that kind. But
it cannot account for Alice’s having plural control over the alternatives. Human
agents, however, can be the true sources, origins or authors of their actions, and they
are the true sources, origins or authors of their actions only if they have plural
control—only if they have libertarian free will. And only as the true sources, origins
or authors of their actions, human agents can make a real difference. Of course, that is
a redescription rather than an explanation of the value of free will. But one should not
expect an explanation of the value of free will, since having free will is intrinsically
valuable. Such redescriptions help us to understand why having free will is
intrinsically valuable, but they do not explain its value by referring to an external
good—by telling us what free will is good for.
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I acknowledge the point that having free will may be intrinsically valuable, and I
think that the presented considerations concerning authorship and difference-making
have some plausibility and force on intuitive grounds. But I do not think that they are
conclusive or compelling, for the following three reasons.
Firstly, no theory of agency, I argued, can account for plural control. The
reductive standard-causal model can account for agential control in terms of non-
deviant causation by reason-states. We can see or understand why that is an account
of control. But neither the reductive standard-causal nor non-reductive models can
account for plural control. It remains unexplained how plural control works. Given
that, it is impossible to assess the force of the mentioned libertarian intuitions. Given
that there is no account of plural control, it remains unclear what the value of having
plural control actually consists in.
Secondly, in the first chapter we saw that it is true, in some sense, that according
to the standard-causal theory the agent is not the origin or source of her actions. The
agent is not the origin or source, in the sense that the causal processes that lead to the
agent’s actions do not originate within the agent. In that purely metaphysical or
extensional sense, the agent is not the origin or source of her actions. But from that it
does not follow that the agent is not in control, or that the agent is not governing
herself, or that the agent is not the author of her actions. Nor does it follow that the
agent does not make a real difference. To the contrary, given all the arguments and
considerations of the previous sections and chapters, it would not only be misguided
but false to say that, according to the standard-causal model, an agent—in our case,
Alice—does not govern herself and does not make a real difference.105
The third and final point is the following. Libertarians hold that no matter
whether Alice tells the truth or a lie, her action will be rational—done for
reasons—and, in that sense, it will not be random. The standard-causal theory can
accommodate both claims—and it can account for both claims. But there is no reason
to think that choices of the kind in question are particularly valuable. For in a
particular and narrow sense, Alice’s choice is random, after all. Alice has reasons for
both courses of action, but she does not have reason to choose one rather than the
                                                 
105 Libertarians may grant that agents make a difference, on the standard-causal account, but deny that
they make a real difference. However, I fail to see how one could argue for that claim (without
begging the question).
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other. In order settle the practical question what to do, she has to settle on one course
of action rather than the other one for no reason. In that sense, Alice is merely
picking one course of action. In the supermarket, for instance, one has to pick that
yoghurt, or whatever it is, rather than another one, because one does not have any
reason to choose that one rather than another one. There is nothing mysterious about
that—but the ability to pick is also nothing special or particularly valuable.
Libertarians may object that Alice’s choice is like picking only in some
respects—and only on an abstract level. The important difference is that Alice’s
choice is self-constitutive, whereas cases of mere picking are not. That is, whether she
tells the truth or not in the present situation will have an influence on choices in
similar future situations—by reorganising her motivational structure, as Kane thinks.
Given what I said in the section on self-constitution, however, it is clear that this
response is beside the point. Firstly, the standard-causal model is compatible with the
notion of self-constitution. And secondly, self-constitution does not help with
libertarian free will, because it does not establish the required account of plural
control. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that Alice’s choice is self-constitutive
and that it is, in that sense, different from mere picking. Further, let us say that it is
valuable to have the ability to make self-constitutive choices. Given all that, nothing
follows with respect to the value of having free will, because having free will is
distinct from having the ability to make self-constitutive choices. The former requires
plural control, whereas the latter does not—and the ability to make self-constitutive
choices, as I argued, does not amount to or constitute having plural control.
That shows, I think, that our intuitions concerning the value of free will are not
conclusive. It is not clear what the value of having plural control is, since we do not
know, exactly, how plural control works. That, of course, concerns only the intrinsic
value of free will. Apart from that, free will is often regarded as very important and
valuable insofar as it grounds moral responsibility. But, as already mentioned, I think
that Frankfurt-style examples show that plural control—and hence libertarian free
will—is not necessary for moral responsibility.106
                                                 
106 Compare p. 197, note 78.
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Conclusion
The different abilities that are characteristic of human agency can be arranged in a
hierarchy with the most fundamental and basic ability at the bottom, and with more
and more sophisticated abilities on top of that. Free will—the ability to do
otherwise—could be allocated in that hierarchy in two ways. It is common to regard
free will as the highest and most distinct aspect of human agency. On that view, free
will would be at the very top of the hierarchy. It would presuppose rational,
deliberate, free and autonomous action, but none of these abilities would presuppose
free will. On an alternative view, free will is a presupposition of all distinctively
human actions. On that view, even acting for reasons presupposes free will, because
one acts for reasons only if one chooses with free will to act in the light of reasons.107
However, I have argued that a comprehensive account of human agency can be
given without free will in either of those two roles—without free will as the highest
and most distinct ability and without free will as a presupposition of all human
agency. I have argued that we can give an account of all significant abilities and
aspects of human agency without presupposing plural control, and I showed that our
intuitions concerning the value and importance of free will are far less straightforward
than libertarians think. Bringing all the relevant claims together, I can now state my
case against free will. The following argument is not supposed to show that free will
is impossible, nor that it is impossible that we have free will, nor that free will does
not exist. Rather, it is an argument for the proposition that we do not have reason to
believe in our having free will. It goes as follows. (Recall, once more, that free will is
libertarian free will, as I assume that incompatibilism is true.)
In connection with issues concerning reason-explanations of actions and their
relation to causal explanations of bodily movements, I argued in the second and third
chapter that the standard-causal theory provides the best available account of human
agency. Further, I showed that the standard-causal theory does not and cannot account
for free will, because it cannot account for plural control.
(1) The best theory of human agency cannot account for our having free will.
The standard-causal approach is a reductive approach. In the first chapter I showed
that non-reductive alternatives—in particular, agent-causal theories—cannot account
                                                 
107 Compare Searle, 2001.
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for free will either. Further, I rejected volitionism and pluralism in the first and the
second chapter, respectively. Given that those four positions exhaust the options,
proposition (1) can be strengthened as follows.
(2) There is no account of our having free will available.
In a fairly recent article, Peter van Inwagen reaches a similar conclusion.108 For van
Inwagen, however, ‘free will undeniably exists’—by which he means, I suppose, that
it is undeniable that we have free will. According to van Inwagen, free will is,
therefore, ‘a mystery’: we have free will and there is a ‘strong and unanswered prima
facie case for its impossibility’.109
Given (2), we are faced with the following disjunction: either we believe in a
mystery or we abandon the belief that we have free will. Obviously, I do not think that
free will undeniably exists. One would have good reason to believe in free will,
despite its mysteriousness, if one thinks that it is necessary for moral responsibility.
We saw, though, that there is good reason to abandon that assumption.
(3) There is good reason to believe that free will is not necessary for moral
responsibility.
Many philosophers think having free will is intrinsically valuable. Against that I
argued in this section that our intuitions with respect to the intrinsic value of free will
are not conclusive, since acting with free will can be virtually indistinguishable from
weak-willed action or mere picking. Others think that it is just obvious that we have
free will. They reject the proposition that we need reason to believe in our having free
will. It is true that the majority of philosophers writing on free will do not question its
existence—or our having it. That is partly because most philosophers deal with the
question whether free will is compatible with the thesis of causal determinism—they
are concerned with its compatibility, rather than its existence. But that does not mean
that the existence of—or our having of—free will is uncontroversial, or that it cannot
be questioned. To me, and to many others, it is not just obvious that we have free
will.110
                                                 
108 Van Inwagen, 2000.
109 Ibid., p. 2.
110 Note that compatibilists about free will are with me, rather than the libertarian on that matter.
Compatibilists claim that we do have free will and that it is compatible with determinism. But the
employed conception of free will differs from the libertarian conception, which I have used throughout,
in significant respects. Most notably, on the compatibilist conception it is not necessary for an agent to
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(4) Our intuitions with respect to the existence and value of free will are
inconclusive.
I argued that the standard-causal theory can account for all abilities that are
characteristic for human agency, except free will. Further, there is reason to endorse
the standard-causal theory, as I showed that it is the best theory available.
 (5) The standard-causal theory can account for all aspects of human agency
except free will.
 (6) There is reason to endorse the standard-causal account of human agency.
If one questioned that we are capable of rational, deliberative, free or autonomous
agency, we could, in response, refer to the standard-causal model. That model
accounts for all those capacities, and it shows how it is possible that we are both part
of the natural order and capable of all the kinds of agency in question. That is, the
standard-causal model gives us reason to believe that we are capable of rational,
deliberative, free or autonomous agency. Given my arguments, though, it does not
give us any reason to believe that we have free will. That completes my case against
free will. Taken together, the six claims show that we do not have good—compelling,
strong or sufficient—reason to believe in our having the mysterious ability called free
will. I shall close with some remarks concerning the overall dialectic.
Firstly, the case against free will concerns the libertarian and incompatibilist
conception of free will, according to which having free will presupposes having plural
control. I argued against the conditional analysis of alternative possibilities and I
referred to the consequence argument against compatibilism, which shows that the
ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. As I understand it, free will
is the ability to do otherwise. Compatibilist theories that deny that we have free will
in that sense deny, in effect, that we have free will. Those theories may well provide
interesting and viable account of related kinds of agency, such as deliberate and
autonomous agency, but we should not say that they account for our having free will.
Secondly, the defended standard-causal model of agency is compatible with both
causal determinism and causal indeterminism. It construes agential control in terms of
non-deviant causation by reason-states and, in contrast to some compatibilist theories
of free will, it does not require that those causal processes are deterministic. From
                                                                                                                                            
have plural control in order to have free will. Compare, for instance, Dennett, 1984 and Frankfurt,
1971, reprinted in Frankfurt, 1988, as essay 2.
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that, though, that it does not follow that deliberative, free and autonomous agency is
compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. One may argue, for instance,
that free and autonomous agency requires undetermined events at some stage in the
causal processes that result in free and autonomous actions.
A final remark concerns the revision of common sense intuitions. Whether or not
a theory of human agency is plausible depends to a large extend on whether it
reflects—or is in accordance with—our intuitions concerning agency. The proposed
view is in line with most of our intuitions. Nevertheless, opponents may insist that it
is implausible, since it fails to capture one very important and central intuition;
namely, the intuition that we have free will. However, even if there was
overwhelming intuitive agreement that we have libertarian free will, it would only be
a majority view. Further, it must be granted that theories can be revisionary. Even if a
philosophical theory of human agency must be largely supported by our intuitions,
one should not require or expect that it is line with all intuitions. The mere fact that a
theory is in conflict with some common sense intuitions should not render it
implausible. Rather, one must ask further questions such as how many intuitions are
violated by a given theory (in comparison to the number of intuitions that support it)?
How central or important are those intuitions? I argued that libertarian free will is not
indispensable, because it is not necessary for moral responsibility and because our
intuitions concerning its existence and value are inconclusive. The proposed position
certainly is revisionary for those who think it is undeniable that we have libertarian
free will. But that alone does not provide sufficient reason to discard it.111
                                                 
111 To be sure, my conclusion and that final remark concern the use of the term ‘free will’ in
philosophy and the considered intuitions of philosophers; in particular, my conclusion and that final
remark concern a notion of free will according to which having free will presupposes having plural
control.
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Conclusion
I defended and argued for the reductive standard-causal model of agency. In the first
chapter, I rejected the non-reductive approach and volitionism. I introduced pluralism,
and I showed that apparent alternatives, such as emergentism and a Kantian
psychology, fall under the introduced positions. In the second chapter, I turned to
causalism about reason-explanations. I considered different interpretations of the
claim that reasons cause and causally explain actions, and I rejected alternative non-
causal theories of reason-explanation. Non-causalism, firstly, fails to account for the
metaphysical aspect of acting for reasons, and secondly, it is committed to pluralism.
I argued that the pluralistic stance is unsatisfactory, because it does not recognise the
fact that the relationship between reasons for actions and the causes of bodily
movements is in need of explanation. In the third chapter, I argued that causalism can
account for that relationship—which is to say that it can solve what I called the
coincidence problem. I showed, further, that a solution to that problem neither
requires the assumption that mental types are identical with non-mental types, nor that
psychology is reducible. I defended this non-reductive position against the causal
exclusion argument. In the fourth chapter, I presented a response to the challenge of
disappearing agency by providing an account of agential control, construed as non-
deviant causation by reason-states. Further, I argued that acting for reasons neither
requires deliberation nor that the agent actively treats some consideration as a reason.
In the last section of that last chapter, we saw that the standard-causal model cannot
account for libertarian free will, and I argued that we do not have reason to believe in
our having free will, under the assumption that incompatibilism is true.
This thesis does not claim to defend an original position in the theory of action.
The standard-causal theory is the mainstream position in the analytical philosophy of
action and mind. I explained in the introduction why it is, nevertheless, in need of
defence. The main contribution of this thesis is that it provides an overall or global
argument for the standard-causal approach, and that it responds to global rather than
local challenges. The rival agent-causal theory is usually rejected because of problems
with the presupposed notion of substance-causation. I assumed the possibility of
causation by substances, and I argued that the agent-causal view fails as a theory of
agency, as it fails to account for agential control. I showed, further, that this argument
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applies to the non-reductive approach in general. The second and the third chapter
present my global argument for the standard-causal approach, and in the third chapter
I suggest a novel solution to the coincidence problem. In the final chapter, I argued
that the challenge of disappearing agency is merely a challenge, not a philosophical
problem. Further, I argued that there is no related metaphysical problem of accounting
for the agent’s role in ‘full-blown’ agency or ‘action par excellence’. In my response
to the challenge of disappearing agency, I suggested a straightforward solution to the
problem of deviant causal chains, which has been overlooked by most philosophers
who have attempted to solve this troublesome problem. And in the last chapter, I
proposed a non-standard stance with respect to the problem of free will. I assumed
that free will, construed as the ability to do otherwise, is incompatible with the thesis
of causal determinism. I argued that having libertarian free will presupposes plural
control, and I showed that neither the reductive nor the non-reductive model can
account for that kind of control. Further, I assumed that being morally responsible
does not presuppose acting with libertarian free will, and I argued that our intuitions
concerning the value of free will are inconclusive. On the basis of that, I concluded
that we do not have reason to believe in our having libertarian free will.
What is distinctive about that approach to the problem of free will is that it shifts
the focus from the question of whether having free will is compatible with
determinism to the question of whether there is reason to believe that we have plural
control and the question of what the value of libertarian free will consists in. The
motive behind that shift is, firstly, that there is reason to endorse the standard-causal
model, and secondly, that this model is compatible with both causal determinism and
indeterminism.
The promoted position on free will does not fall under any of the traditional
views, such as compatibilism or hard determinism, and I am not aware of any other
established name for it either. But that, of course, is not to say that it is entirely
original, as it shares some important assumptions and claims with the position known
as semi-compatibilism.1 The defended position, however, does not fall under semi-
compatibilism. One important difference is that my position is not committed to the
                                                 
1 Compare Fischer, 1994, and Fischer and Ravizza, 1998: ‘moral responsibility is compatible with
causal determinism, even if causal determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise’ (Fischer
and Ravizza, p. 53).
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claim that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. Rather, it is
committed to the related but different claim that moral responsibility does not
presuppose plural control—and that it does, therefore, not presuppose libertarian free
will. Further, semi-compatibilism concerns first and foremost moral responsibility.
Concerning free will it says merely that incompatibilism might well be true; it neither
claims that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, nor does it assert or
deny that we have free will.
Finally, I shall highlight some of the background assumptions and some remaining
issues and problems. I assumed that there are substances—things and beings that
persist through change and that possess causal powers—and properties. I assumed
that some properties are causally relevant, and I remained neutral on the question of
whether events are particulars or instantiations of properties. In the last chapter, I
assumed that the ability to do otherwise is incompatible with causal determinism and
that Frankfurt-style examples show that moral responsibility does not require plural
control.
In the first and second chapter, I motivated but did not fully justify the
assumption that actions are events. In the second and third chapter, I responded to
different challenges to the claim that reason-states cause and causally explain actions.
I presented different ways in which the causal explanatory force of reason-
explanations can be construed—by appeal to counterfactuals, intentional ceteris
paribus laws or underlying mechanisms—, but I did not develop and defend any
position in particular.
The third chapter contributes to a defence of non-reductive physicalism, but is by
no means a full defence. The proposed solution to the coincidence problem has been
presented in rather abstract and broad terms. A full defence would require a more
detailed exposition of the proposed strategy. Concerning the causal exclusion
argument, I tried to deflate the charge that the proposed position does not show how
mental states and event can be causally efficacious independently of and in addition
to physical states and events, and I responded to the objection that it establishes
merely the causal explanatory relevance of the mental, but not its causal efficacy. It is
more than likely, though, that my responses will not convince all opponents.
However, I think I did enough in order to show, firstly, that the causal exclusion
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argument is not as straightforward and not as pervasive as many think, and secondly,
that non-reductive physicalism is a plausible and viable position.
Further, a full account of the standard-causal model of agency would need to say
more on the relationship between acting for reasons and acting for good or normative
reasons. I suggested using the term ‘acting for reasons’ in a minimal sense that does
not presuppose acting for good reasons, deliberation, means-end reasoning, nor that
the agent actively treats something as a reason. It is important to note that on my view
the usage of the term ‘acting for reasons’ is terminological. It is a plausible use, but I
do not claim that it is based on the correct analysis of the terms—on my view there is
no single one correct analysis, as I think that the term is ambiguous. A fully
developed theory, though, would need to specify more in detail what acting for good
reasons and an agent’s treating something as a reason consists in, and how those
features relate to acting for reasons in the minimal sense.
Finally, there are some open questions concerning the normativity of rational
action and the issue of rule-following. In the fourth chapter, I explained how the
standard-causal theory can accommodate the intuition that a reason for action is a
rational cause of action. Reason-states do not merely cause and rationalise action, but
they cause them in virtue of rationalising them, because an action that is caused by a
reason-state in the right—that is, non-deviant—way is a response to the content of a
mental state that rationalises the action’s performance. One may object, though, that
rational action must be construed in normative rather than causal terms, because an
agent who acts rationally does not simply manifest a psychological regularity. Rather,
an agent who acts rationally follows a rule—a norm or standard of rationality. It is not
clear to me whether such considerations constitute an objection or a problem. But
even if that worry is misguided, it would be interesting to see why. A full defence of
the standard-causal theory might therefore include a response to the just outlined
point concerning rule-following.
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